

Chapter 3

Culture, Rights, and Women

Students who entered my classes on the Middle East and North Africa often presumed that the women of the region were oppressed because they did not appear to enjoy the freedoms that women in Europe and the United States have come to take as normal. The assumption seemed to be that there was a single Arab-Muslim culture that produced this oppression, despite the fact that not all societies in the region are either predominantly Arab or predominantly Muslim and without any evidence that most women in the region feel the oppression that is said to afflict them. Spectacular instances of injustice, such as the enslavement of Yazidi women by ISIS in Iraq, or the mass kidnaping by Boko Haram in Nigeria, or the case of Malala Yousafzai in Pakistan, may have affected the popular perception that Islam sanctions the oppression of women. The Saudi move in 2018 to let women drive cars drew attention to a particular Arab vision of relations between the sexes that further reinforced the cultural stereotype, even though it presaged further change.

The problem is that the notion of a uniform set of oppressive cultural constraints does little to help explain the enormous variation in rules and lifestyles to be found within the Middle East and North Africa. If one judges the condition of women by their ability to hold citizenship, access to public office, success in working outside the home, rights to property and inheritance, position in family law, presence at all levels of education, and attitudes toward the equality of the sexes, the variation from one state to another and the variation by class and geographic location within a single country is enormous. The starting point for looking at the condition of women in the region is variety, not uniformity, and broad generalizations about culture provide little help in explaining that variety. Anthropologist Lila Abu Lughod, in *Do Muslim Women Need Saving*, says she is writing against the concept of culture, because generalizations about what women want or need—the “rights” that

they supposedly should enjoy—fail to speak to the perceptions and lives of individual women making their way through unique economic, social, and political circumstances. She is skeptical about the “rights culture” that characterizes much external intervention in the region as well as concepts of Arab culture said to determine behavior.¹

To be sure, the societies of this region remain patriarchal, but they are scarcely unusual in this respect. Islam was born into a Mediterranean world dominated by two patriarchal empires, the Roman and the Sassanian. Islam’s principal interpreters over the centuries, the body of scholars known as *ulama*, have been overwhelmingly male, but patriarchy is scarcely limited to the so-called Muslim world, and anthropologist Deniz Kandiyoti reminds us that not all patriarchies are the same. The “patriarchal bargain” differs from place to place and from one time period to another.² Where women have negotiated greater equality in the public forum, they may have done so on condition that the division of responsibility in the family remains unchanged. The “bargain” in Tunisia is quite different than it is in Saudi Arabia, where in 2021 the balance appears to be changing rapidly; the label “Arab” applies to both countries but does not help to explain the sharp differences in the condition of women between those two countries, much less the contrasts among lifestyles within each society.

Apparent Uniformity, Actual Diversity

The prevalence of Islam among most countries of the region creates an impression of uniformity, even if that uniformity melts away under closer inspection. Although most Muslim countries invoke Islamic precepts in regulating the role of women in the home and society, they differ in the ways they apply those precepts. Rules said to be straight out of the legal tradition of Sharia are scarcely uniform. Only Saudi Arabia among Muslim countries, which claims the Sharia as its constitution, permits the tradition of judge-made law to prevail in some domains. That is, the

state has not sought to generate a legal code inspired by the Sharia. Rather, it permits its ulama, all male, to continue a tradition of interpretation deeply embedded in one of the traditional schools of law, the Hanbali, and influenced by the work of a scholar-preacher of the eighteenth century, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Contemporary scholars working in that tradition articulate the moral and ethical rules of the kingdom—except for those domains in which the monarchy has stepped in with “regulations.” The kingdom has decided that the state should “regulate” the matter of women driving automobiles, as it has chosen to regulate (with the consent of the ulama) domains such as the oil industry, the airlines, the highways of the country, and television. The rulers of the Saud dynasty are, of course, male. The historian of Saudi Arabia, Madawi al-Rasheed, calls the country “a most masculine State.”³

In other Muslim countries, governments have chosen to ignore the Sharia or to write some of what are taken to be its precepts into modern law codes. When shortly after independence in 1956 Tunisia adopted a Personal Status Code (PSC) guaranteeing citizenship and equal treatment in most matters to women, only provisions about inheritance showed deep influence of Sharia principles. In contrast and at nearly the same time, Morocco adopted a code governing family law called the Moudawana that echoed what was then the prevailing interpretation of the Sharia by ulama trained in the Maliki school of jurisprudence. Once codified, such an interpretation becomes difficult to modify, unlike the process by which highly trained legal scholars defined and redefined over the centuries the precepts they extracted from the Quran and the Sunna of the Prophet. Codification brings the Sharia process to a halt, satisfying reformers in the short run but slowing future changes, because the legal code comes to be regarded as absolute religious truth rather than the work of a human legislators acting at a particular moment in time to draw upon a complicated, nuanced, and dynamic legal tradition.⁴

How does one account for the sharp divergence in codification between two Maghribian countries affected by French colonial domination? Mounira Charrad has argued that the key difference was the residual importance of tribalism to the monarchy in Morocco, whereas such blood relationships, tightly tied to patriarchy, had less significance in Tunisia. The nationalist movement headed by Habib Bourguiba, who became the country's first president and promulgated the PSC in 1957, found its base in the urbanized, coastal areas. The Moroccan monarchy depended heavily in the early years of independence on support in the rural areas where tribal loyalties remained strong.⁵ Morocco modified its Moudawana in several important ways in 2004, and Tunisia has updated its PSC even more recently.

Law codes constitute one determinant of the place and role of women in a given society. Fatima Z. Rahman attempted to assess the impact of such codes by rating some 51 Muslim-majority countries on how much their law codes reflected Sharia principles on divorce and child custody. She rated a country from one to three on each of those two issues, "one" indicating no correspondence with Sharia and "three" representing distinct influence of Sharia. She found a significant degree of negative correlation between Sharia influence and the proportion of women in higher education, the proportion of women to men serving in parliament, and the share of non-agricultural labor represented by women. She rated fourteen of the countries "3," with strong influence of Sharia, and twelve countries as "1" with no discernible influence on these two issues.⁶ That leaves 25 countries in the intermediate "2" category---somewhat affected by notions of Sharia. Variation, not uniformity, is the rule.

In the name of secularizing politics, some states have authorized religious courts to retain control over domains such as marriage and divorce. Egypt and Israel fall into that category. "Neither Israel nor Egypt has a civil family code that is uniform and applicable to all citizens irrespective of

communal affiliation. In other words, the only law in the field of personal status that these governments recognize is religious law.”⁷ One notable effect is that secular Jews who do not wish to be married in traditional, religious fashion, cannot be married in Israel. While governments may seek in this way to avoid codifying religious law, claiming separation of religion and politics, they thereby put issues of family law under the tutelage of male religious authorities, who embrace orthodoxy and reinforce patriarchy.

Law codes that affect the status of women may or may not affect patriarchy at the level of the family. Fifty years ago the late Fatima Mernissi, the Moroccan sociologist, argued that change was undermining patriarchy in Morocco. She observed that educational opportunities and economic circumstances were drawing women out of the home and into the workplace. Job opportunities were pulling people into the cities and breaking up family structures in the process. The nuclear family was coming to be the norm, and male prerogatives were diminishing. She portrayed ideological pleas for a return to the old order in the name of Islamic authenticity as unlikely to prevail against the forces of modernization. The adoption of a new family code in Morocco in 2004 constitutes partial confirmation of her forecast that changes at the level of the family would prove influential despite the resistance of religious ideology.⁸

The most striking element of social change affecting women across the region is access to education. The rise in female literacy has been sharpest in countries such as Saudi Arabia, where it was most lacking. In many countries the inclusion of girls in primary education is virtually total, and at the secondary and higher levels the rate of female participation approaches and even surpasses that of males. Women outnumber men in higher educational institutions in a number of countries including Saudi Arabia and Iran, but that is not the case everywhere in the region. In Tunisia, women constitute 40 per cent of those enrolled in higher education, as compared with 12 per cent in

Morocco, for example. Women make up 42% of the teaching staff at Tunisian universities but only 17% in Morocco.⁹ While there has been uniform emphasis on educating females across the region, the impact remains remarkably variable.

Increased access to education everywhere in the region has not produced a uniform pattern of female participation in the economy, society, or politics. Fewer women work outside the home in the Middle East and North Africa than in other regions of the world. The World Bank put the percentage of women 15 or older in the labor force at 17% in 1990 and 21% in 2017. That compares with 28% in South Asia, 52% in Latin America and the Caribbean, 50% in Europe, and 63% in sub-Saharan Africa.¹⁰ But within the MENA itself there is considerable variation, especially between high- and low-income states. Among states without significant oil rents, Turkey leads the way (32%) followed by Morocco and Tunisia among the Arabs. Yemen and Syria, troubled by civil war, bring up the rear at 6 and 12% respectively, but even Jordan and Algeria, enjoying stability, only reach 14 and 15%.¹¹

Michael L. Ross has attempted to explain the region's divergence from international norms as a function of oil rather than Islam. He has argued that economies dominated by oil discouraged the sort of industry in which women regularly find employment.¹² In a more recent study, Ann Price finds that national income is the most important explanation of attitudes conducive to the employment of women. She used a question posed in the World Values Survey---“When jobs are scarce, men should have more rights to a job than women”---as her indicator of such attitudes. “Overall economic development (as represented by GDP) is the most important economic factor in explaining attitudes toward women’s right to employment. Individuals residing in wealthier nations are more likely to support women’s right to employment than individuals in less developed nations.”¹³ Her analysis discounts oil rents as an explanatory factor but acknowledges that variables

besides income, such as personal religiosity, female enrollment in higher education, and representation of women in Parliament all help explain Middle East exceptionalism in female employment and account for some of the variation within the region. Price writes: “I find that when it comes to attitudes toward women’s work in the Middle East, it is not Islam or oil that is the barrier, but a combination of factors converging in the region that discourages more gender-equitable ideology on women’s right to employment.”¹⁴

Several states in the region have taken measures to combat state-level patriarchy by using quotas to assure representation of women in their parliaments. In Algeria, for example, 30% of legislators are now female. Similarly, quota systems have boosted female participation in the legislatures of Jordan, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia. Tunisia may be the most significant in this respect, because, ever since the Arab Spring and the overthrow there of President Ben Ali, assemblies—first the Constituent Assembly, now the Parliament—have exercised significant authority. In Jordan and Morocco, the legislatures have had significant influence but remain distinctly subordinate to the ruling monarchs. Lindsay J. Benstead argues that quotas help counter patriarchal tendencies embedded in local cultures, where men are accustomed to work only with other men, and women do not have confidence in other women.¹⁵ Women constitute roughly a fourth of the members of the Israeli Knesset, where there are no quotas. The legislatures of Turkey and Lebanon, the two other republics where parliaments have been prominent if not dominant in politics, include only 14% and 3% women respectively.¹⁶ The Kuwaiti Parliament, which has been acquiring more power in a political system where women make up half of all public employees, included four women among its 50 elected and 15 appointed members after the 2009 election but the number dwindled to two in 2013 and one in the 2016 election.¹⁷

Explaining Diversity

Cultural generalizations about Islam and Arabism fail to provide much help in accounting for the experience of women in the nation-states of the Middle East and North Africa. One obvious reason is that the region is not entirely Muslim or entirely Arab. But a second and more important reason is that national policies about women's place in society differ not just between Arab and non-Arab states or between Muslim-majority states and the Jewish state of Israel. They also differ significantly from one Muslim state to another, and from one Arab state to another. Four variables can help to explain some of this variation: 1) the timing and nature of state formation; 2) form of government and prevailing ideology; 3) strength of the Islamist movement; and 4) the degree of security or insecurity a state has provided.

State formation would take account of how a country acceded to modern statehood. Modern Turkey emerged from the Ottoman Empire at a moment and in a fashion that makes it unique in the region. At a time when the British were denying Egypt genuine independence and when the French and British were ruling Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Palestine as mandates of the League of Nations, the Turks sought to distance themselves from their Ottoman past and embrace what they perceived as European modernity, which meant a radical revision of women's role in society. About the same time (the 1920s) a coup in Iran brought to power a new dynasty deeply influenced by Turkish actions and dedicated to cultural reform. Both these states defied cultural norms to advance women's rights in a fashion that would be inconceivable in any Muslim state today. In fact, those policies may have helped provoke backlash: the Iranian revolution of 1979 and the strength of the Islamist movement in contemporary Turkey since the 1970s.

One would expect the condition of women in the three North African states that emerged from French colonialism after World War II to be similar. Yet that is not the case, partly because France did not treat Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia in similar fashion. While Algerian women arose

to participate in eight years of war against France, victory led to the formation of a nationalist government highly ambivalent about all things European and dedicated instead to a reassertion of Arab and Islamic authenticity. Next door in Morocco, the French turned King Mohammed V into a nationalist hero, who returned from French-imposed exile to head a newly independent state. He saw his most loyal support in traditionalist, rural, tribal areas and adopted a family policy anchored in such values. To the east in Tunisia, in contrast, a newly independent elite sent a weak monarch packing, established a progressive republic, and adopted a family code that remains exemplary in the Arab and Muslim world. The differing versions of French colonial rule in these cases help account for the governments that took control after independence and the family policies those governments pursued.

The distinction between monarchies and republics also contributes to an understanding of policies toward women. On the one hand, monarchies emerge and survive as patrimonial enterprises dependent on bloodlines for claims to power. A royal family, patriarchal in structure, rules over subjects, not citizens. Not surprisingly, then, the country with the most conservative policies toward women, Saudi Arabia, is a monarchy tightly dominated by such a family with the support of ulama devoted to a puritanical understanding of Islam. On the other hand, republics normally defend the equality of all citizens. Among republics established in the MENA, Turkey, Israel, and Lebanon have led the way toward women's rights. The Baathist regimes in Syria and Iraq together with Nasir's Egypt all championed such rights as well, but the authoritarianism of those regimes undercut their ostensible commitments to the promotion of women.

Islamist movements have affected almost every country in the region but not in the same way or to the same degree. Iran stands alone. Without any significant Islamist movement dedicated to the revival of old cultural norms, it gave birth to a revolution that turned out to be Islamist in

orientation. Its policies toward women reflect that revolution as well as a reaction to the forced policies of modernization undertaken by the previous regime. While Egypt has avoided Islamist revolution, its policies toward women have been deeply influenced by the oldest Islamist movement in the Arab world, the Muslim Brotherhood. The influence of Islamists across the region has both advanced the cause of female literacy and political participation and insisted upon respect for traditional family responsibilities. Nowhere is the result more confusing and startling than in Turkey, where an Islamist government took power in 2002 and eventually liberated women to wear the headscarf in public. The reinforcement of religious parties in Israel has produced a somewhat similar pattern of ambivalence, politicizing women and restricting their activity at one and the same time.¹⁸

All three of the above variables—state formation, type of government, strength of Islamist movements—probably pale in importance compared with state insecurity to explain the current condition of women in the area. The period of sanctions on Iraq in the 1990s followed by invasion in 2003 produced a situation in which all Iraqis suffered, women as much or more than men. To evaluate the position of women in terms of legal rights, access to education, employment opportunities, or political representation is not possible in places where political order has broken down as in Yemen, Syria, and Libya since 2011, Lebanon between 1975 and 1990 or Algeria during the 1990s. Young men end up doing most of the dying in struggle, but women end up bearing much of the responsibility of trying to protect and feed families under conditions of scarcity and insecurity. Such violence often weakens patriarchy in the short run, but history shows that patriarchy often reasserts itself once crisis ends.

State Formation: Iran and Turkey

Shortly after the revolution of 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran imposed a dress code on women that required them to cover their heads and dress modestly in public. At about that same

moment, the Turkish Republic was forbidding women to cover their heads in universities and other public places including the Parliament. The policies of these two states toward women appeared contradictory. To be sure geography, language, and sectarianism separated these countries then and now, but a time differential of 50 years in the formation of these republics may be the most powerful explanation of difference. What is true of both states is that they have regarded women as symbols of national identity.

In its final century, the Ottoman Empire sought to borrow European ideas, money, technology, and fashion in an effort to resist imperialism through defensive “modernization.” While modernizing reformers aimed primarily to guarantee equality to all citizens (and hence to minorities that were either non-Muslim or non-Turkish), they also hoped to satisfy external powers and enhance the unity of the empire. The infatuation with European power and customs affected the position of women.

A group who called themselves Young Ottomans advanced the cause of women as equal subjects even as they objected to what they regarded as the bureaucratic tyranny of the reformers. The Young Ottomans aimed not so much to “liberate” women as to save the empire, which was also the objective of the bureaucracy they despised. After 1876, Sultan Abdülhamid II ended the reign of the bureaucracy, championed a constitution, and then promptly subverted it.¹⁹ He invoked a claim to be not just sultan but caliph, the ruler of Muslims worldwide at a time when the empire remained multicultural but had lost many some of its non-Muslim subjects. The reassertion of Islamic identity ran counter to the emphasis of the reform movement (Tanzimat) on asserting the equality of all citizens, men and women.

The new Turkey that emerged after the defeat of the empire in World War I and after the subsequent war of independence against Greece began by defining itself as unambiguously opposed

to all that the empire represented and favorable to “civilization” as defined by Europe. Under the direction of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the new republic embraced a clash of civilizations between East and West in which everything linked to the Ottomans, including language and religion, would be renounced as “traditionalist” and retrograde, and everything European would be applauded. The regime advanced women as a symbol of the transformation.

The Kemalist politicization of women’s rights in a highly patriarchal context still steeped in Sunni orthodoxy from the Ottoman era was not without theoretical difficulties. For one thing, Mustafa Kemal did not hesitate to invoke Islam in rallying nationalist forces against the Greeks, who were the only Europeans to resist the Turks in their rejection of the Treaty of Sèvres. Moreover, once established in power, the Kemalists vaunted both Turkish particularism and the universalism of the European Enlightenment. They were attempting to establish an identity distinct from the Ottomans and from Islam, and in doing so they hailed the women of Anatolia as unspoiled representatives of Turkish culture. But these were not the women of European dress and refinement that Mustafa Kemal promoted in the rarified elite atmosphere of Istanbul and the new capital, Ankara.

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk began with personal convictions about the need to advance the cause of women but proceeded cautiously out of respect for strong conservative representation in the first Grand National Assembly.²⁰ It was only after the new Turkey had abolished the sultanate and the caliphate, breaking with the institutions and the Islamic foundation of the Ottoman Empire, that he procured adoption of a civil code according women greater access to divorce, equality in inheritance, equal access to education, and other important rights. The Grand National Assembly adopted the Swiss Civil Code with only a few changes to reflect local culture. Sharia courts were abolished. The Kemalists argued that the legal needs of a modern state anywhere in the world were

the same.

There was further delay in giving women the right to vote. By 1930 the Republican Peoples Party had achieved dominance of the assembly and the country. Complaints that Turkey was turning into a dictatorship like those of contemporary Italy and Germany may have encouraged Atatürk to advance female suffrage, first at the municipal level in 1931 and then at the national level in 1934—a moment when much of Europe did not yet permit women to vote. He may have thought this action demonstrated a commitment to democracy.

What is clear is that this package of reforms reflected the will of a regime dedicated to an ideology of modernization. It did not reflect the demands of women's organizations or the will of Turkish men and women.²¹ In fact, the regime banned feminist associations, religious organizations, and all other segments of civil society that might challenge the state. For the Kemalists, rendering women equal to men was not the objective, nor was it the objective of the Swiss Civil Code. Rather, the appearance and behavior of women became a critical measure of civilizational change promoted and dominated by men. "I think that appraisals of the Kemalist reforms concerning women miss the point that such reforms were not designed to change sexual roles but rather had a pragmatic political aim," writes Binnaz Toprak.²² The aim was polishing the modernizing identity of the Turkish Republic. Only in the 1950s, with the onset of multipartism, did women begin to acquire political influence, and only in the year 2000 did the Swiss Code finally get rewritten. By then the international context had shifted in response to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Turkish desire to enter the European Union, the fall of the Soviet Union, and the advent of Islamist movements in Turkey and elsewhere.

The Kemalist program in Turkey produced significant change in many domains. "Of all the Moslem countries, Turkey has so far produced the highest number of educated women on all

levels,” a Turkish scholar wrote in 1981.²³ She acknowledges the impact of urbanization, industrialization, and migration on the role of women in the country, but a recent analysis of attitudes suggests that gender relations have not been thoroughly transformed. Mehmet Gurses writes: “Despite significant progress introducing democratic reforms, building institutions to channel demands from below, and preventing the rise of armed Islamist groups, the Turkish model has failed to socially transform the society and close the gender gap.”²⁴ The gap between urban and rural areas remains significant and helps explain the increasing appeal of Islamist parties. In the three most heavily populated provinces of Western Turkey, 40% of the wage-earning population was female by 1970, but in eastern Anatolia the percentage was 4%.²⁵ It would be interesting to know the extent to which that discrepancy still exists.

The circumstances giving rise to the Islamic Republic of Iran offer stark contrast with those marking the birth of the Turkish republic. The revolution of 1979 ended a monarchy much criticized for its obsession—“Westoxication” was the term invented by a dissident intellectual, Al-e Ahmad—with bringing Iran to the level of Western civilization.²⁶ As in Kemalist Turkey, everything European represented the good in Pahlavi Iran (1925-1979), which took the protagonists of religion to be an anachronistic nuisance that could be ignored, repressed, or exiled. That judgment proved to be mistaken. Rallied by the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, a portion of the clerical class managed to get control of demonstrations against the shah and replace his regime with a new one. Identification with the secular West became a political liability.

The new republic faced a dilemma somewhat similar to that of the Turks. Both regimes evoked a clash of civilizations but put themselves on opposite sides. Both needed to accommodate universalistic values represented by mass support of the revolution and a resulting expectation of public participation in politics. Turkey complied immediately in form and later in substance. In Iran,

the constitution drafted by the new leadership and approved by referendum contained a profound contradiction between the rule of a religious leader endowed with knowledge of Islamic law and the authority of officials elected by universal suffrage. Religious judges took over the court system to administer European-style law codes injected with provisions deemed consistent with the Sharia. The new regime revived and enlivened a legislature that had been perfunctory under the shah and took command of a modern bureaucracy and economy, all the while proclaiming Islam as the guiding principle of legislation and policy. The constitution accorded authority over the military, the police, and the judiciary to a supreme leader chosen for life.

Women found themselves caught between being symbols of a change in cultural identity—demonstrated by headscarves donned voluntarily in demonstrations against the Shah—and being citizens of the republic with rights to vote and to hold office, as provided by the new constitution.²⁷ The new regime imposed a dress code and sought to restore elements of the Sharia system, making women the visual symbol of a reinvigorated Islamic civilization. A patriarchal authoritarianism comparable to that once exercised by the Kemalists sought to traditionalize Iranian women, but the Iranian regime went further than the Kemalists in its reliance on a morals police to enforce the new norms of behavior.

Both these countries sought to use the law to transform cultural practices at the national level, and in both cases there were significant gaps between legal theory and reality. The Kemalist reforms affected major cities such as Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir much more than they did the Anatolian countryside. The new rules required registration of marriages and divorces, but some provinces, such as Van in the far eastern reaches, reported very few of either in the first decades of the republic. That fact suggests non-compliance with the new rules. The regime's encouragement of Western fashion including the substitution of broad-brimmed hats for men rather than the fez and

the abandonment of the veil for women did not much affect style outside the cities. In Iran the cities are the place where the rules have been most significantly challenged, largely by young women flaunting tight coats, heavy makeup and hair escaping from brightly-colored scarves and young people portraying their defiance of Islamic-inspired moral codes as political activism on behalf of liberty.²⁸ As Afsaneh Najmabadi has observed: “To have a room of her own, the Iranian woman is now faced with subverting God and State.”²⁹

In some areas of Iran, the trend has been in the other direction. In one rural area, where women used to work in the fields but are now processing pistachio nuts indoors, fashion has become more conservative. “The light floral cotton veil which used to be worn loosely by the village women does not seem to provide sufficient protection any longer. Today the floral *chador* (veil) is held tightly even inside the village, while for going into town the black (urban) *chador* has become the preferred garment.”³⁰ The division of labor between men and women has changed in the village as a result of a shift from growing foodstuffs to the production of pistachios. That has altered gender relationships, as has the Islamist ideology of the regime.

The changes in family law enacted by the regime have had a less profound effect in Iran than one might imagine. Much of the law developed under the previous regime remains in place, and the codes are available for study by any enterprising soul. More women have university education than ever before; many participate in study groups and associations that address women’s rights.³¹ While divorce has once again become a prerogative limited to men, women in fact have perfected strategies for enticing men into divorce or deterring them from it and for achieving guardianship arrangements less prejudicial than the law prescribes. One key is the dowry, which is promised but not paid to women at the moment of marriage. It is usually so large that a husband who wants divorce cannot come up with it all at once. If the woman wants divorce, she can often “buy” her way out of the

marriage by giving up some or all of the dowry she had been promised but never touched. Women are also well aware of the grounds on which they can demand annulment.³² Ziba Mir-Hosseini writes: “Iranian women still enjoy a higher degree of legal and social support than other Muslim women when it comes to negotiating the terms of their marital life. . . I shall argue that the material status of women in law is not as dismal as it has been portrayed.”³³

Both Turkey and Iran emerged from revolutions. Revolutions generate ideologies and extremism. Both countries have made women central political symbols of the societies they are seeking to achieve. The Kemalist revolution targeted the imperial past of the Ottomans, which they blamed for retarding modernity, while sixty years later the Iranians targeted the sort of European-style modernization that the Kemalists wanted and the Pahlavi shahs had cultivated. The origins of these two states help explain the radicalism of their policies toward women as well as the rather more modest outcomes: the Kemalists did not manage to suppress traditionalist attitudes, and the Iranians, despite enormous efforts, have not managed to coerce full compliance with the dress code or halt the mobilization of Iranian women. They have not managed to stamp out youth sex, drugs, liquor, or the private parties that continue to flourish in a regime that is sometimes repressive, sometimes tacitly complicit and/or sometimes responsive to the social problems generated by these and other “sins.”³⁴ In both Turkey and Iran, economic and social realities have trumped ideologies grounded in cultural identities.

State Formation: Algeria and Tunisia

The conditions of state formation, helpful for accounting for developments in Turkey and Iran, also illuminate the divergence in policies toward women in two North African states, Algeria and Tunisia, both subjected to French colonialism and both therefore exposed to the European understanding of gender relations. Within months of independence Tunisia adopted a Personal

Statute Code (CSP) that remains exemplary in the Arab world. Forty years after Mustafa Kemal's reforms, President Bourguiba elaborated a similar case for equality of the sexes as vital to the modernization and civilization of the country. The European woman represented a model to be emulated, whereas Algeria next door, after an eight-year war for independence, tried to distance itself from France and Europe in terms of language, religion, and culture. It adopted a code of family law marked by fidelity to traditional practices, many of them attributed to the Sharia.

Independent Tunisia inherited an administrative structure from the French protectorate established in 1882 that, in turn, owed something to the semi-autonomous Tunisian entity, which was nominally subject to the Ottoman Empire. The beylical regime in Tunisia before 1882 had initiated administrative reforms to strengthen state institutions and diminish the power of tribal loyalties. As elsewhere in the region, reform failed to head off foreign takeover but it gave the French much to work with.³⁵ The institutional legacy made it possible for Habib Bourguiba, himself a product of modern secondary education and French law school, to effect change in the status of women as soon as independence was achieved in 1956.

Bourguiba and his modernizing team forced the Bey of Tunis to promulgate the Personal Statute Code (PSC) even before the country had adopted a republican constitution. He could do so because his party depended very little on the conservative, traditional, tribal forces supporting his rival, Ben Youssef, who was defeated and forced to flee the country in January, 1956. Even ulama of the Zaytuna mosque-university in Tunis dared not oppose Bourguiba and the adoption of the new personal status code, though several members of the High Islamic Tribunal did retire or resign. The reform reinforced national legal uniformity in matters affecting the family and thus further weakened allegiances along blood lines.

The PSC affected just about every aspect of family law in Tunisia. "The code dropped the

vision of the family as an extended kinship group built on strong ties crisscrossing a community of male relatives. It replaced it with the vision of conjugal unit in which ties between spouses and between parents and children occupy a prominent place...The code abolished polygamy, eliminated the husband's right to repudiate his wife, allowed women to file for divorce, and increased women's custody rights."³⁶ Its principal weakness was the right to inherit property, where men continued to enjoy an advantage.

Bourguiba's motives may have been political—he hoped women might be supportive of his Neo-Destour Party—but like Mustafa Kemal he also believed that a modern society requires the legal emancipation of women. He said in a speech in 1965: “I had been conscious for more than 35 years of the need to free women from obscurantism and to make them a vital part of the nation; in my mind it was a question of creating the conditions not only for their happiness and enjoyment but also the possibility of their becoming a factor in evolution and progress.”³⁷ Women were symbols of the new Tunisia. Proponents insisted that the code included a revised, updated version of Islamic principles. Ahmed Mestiri, minister of justice in Bourguiba's government, said that it differed from the reforms of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, which were distinctly of secular origins. Mona Charrad writes: “The CPS (CSP) can be interpreted either way, as an Islamic body of legislation inspired by secular norms, or a secular body of legislation inspired by Islam.”³⁸ The Tunisian action resembled that of Turkey by its commitment to female emancipation as a necessary component of modern society.

Algeria achieved independence from France under quite different circumstances than did Tunisia. The French had given up their protectorates in Morocco and Tunisia in 1955 and 1956 to focus on defeating revolution in Algeria, where roughly a tenth of the population held French citizenship. Bourguiba accepted autonomy as a step toward genuine independence, despite the

counsel of many of his supporters, thus avoiding further French hostility and achieving his goal without significant violence. In Algeria independence came after eight years of war and bitter negotiations.

Moreover, French efforts to negate tribalism and other local loyalties actually served to reinforce them. Tribal solidarities permitted resistance to the French occupation in the nineteenth century. Much larger than Tunisia, Algeria includes more diversity of language and religious practice, and the revolutionary fight against France between 1954 and 1962 drew upon particularistic, regional loyalties. While the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) amassed an army on the frontiers, the most effective fighting against French forces occurred in the mountains, where loyalties to tribe and saint cultures remained especially important. The combatants, village men with important support from their women-folk, were not part of an urban middle class that supported Bourguiba's ascent in Tunisia. Algeria emerged from the fight determined to reassert its distinctiveness from French culture.

The first independent Algerian government headed by Ahmed Ben Bella faced enormous problems, partly a product of the massive departure of nearly all French citizens (nearly one million), and partly a product of sharp divisions within the forces of revolution. Principal among them was the split between the army of the exterior and the guerrillas of the interior, but there were also sharp ideological differences within the FLN. Women had played important roles in the revolution, but a revision of family law was not at the top of the revolutionary agenda. Instead, the regime sought to bring the country together with an appeal to the Arab-Islamic heritage. That meant promoting the study of modern standard Arabic and a version of Islam purified of colonial influence and superstition.³⁹

A traditionalizing movement, the Association of Reformist Ulama, had gained support in

Algeria in the 1930s. While revisionist in the sense of criticizing mainstream Islam for its dependence on the French, it essentially promoted a revitalization of the religious identity and represented traditionalist views on the role of women in the family and in the public sphere. While supportive of the revolution, the movement was not influential within the FLN during the long struggle. Having escaped the taint of French influence by standing against the official religious establishment in the colonial period, however, it became a force in the post-revolutionary period. The regime's commitment to teaching modern standard Arabic, a language defined by its close relationship to Quranic scripture, coincided with its desire to assert cultural authenticity and the agenda of the reform movement within Islam.

The other major factor that distinguished the Algerian case from that of Tunisia was the weakness of the new Algerian regime. Ahmed Ben Bella lasted only three years as president before being ousted in a coup d'état by Colonel Houari Boumediene, who had commanded the army of the exterior and been instrumental in supporting Ben Bella. Soon Boumediene suppressed another coup led by a fighter from the interior. The FLN lacked the organizational foundation and mass participation that characterized the Neo-Destour party in Tunisia. It could not overcome the ideological and geographical divisions that split the country and immobilized government. It empowered a military elite that has dominated the country ever since.

It seems unlikely that the Algerian government could have mustered broad support for any single version of family law, much less one as liberal as that in Tunisia. In fact, it took twenty years for Algeria to enact a law similar to the one adopted immediately after independence in Morocco. When the law was first proposed in 1981, some Algerian women organized and managed to delay enactment. Then as the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) became an ever more important political force, President Chadli Benjedid pushed adoption of a traditionalizing, Islamizing law that secularist

women were resisting.

Thus the revolutionary origins of Turkey, Iran, and Algeria, all took women as symbols of their renovated societies but shaped their roles in distinctive if not contradictory ways. On the one hand, the regimes in Turkey and Iran sought to transform gender relations by virtue of legislation, undercutting traditionalist Sharia models in the one case and reinforcing Sharia influence in the other. On the other hand, the anti-French, anti-imperialist, military regime that came to dominate the new order in Algeria rejected the modernizing, Westernizing impulses of neighboring Tunisia, which had also achieved its independence from France. Women were to be testaments to authenticity. All four of these states are Muslim-majority republics, and as republics they committed themselves to equality of all citizens, male and female, as did other republics such as Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. All remained patriarchal at the political level, and mostly at the family level as well, but such generalities obscure sharp differences in the conflicts over family and gender issues.

Monarchies vs Republics

Republics start from an assumption of equality among citizens, even though many have been slow to accord women citizenship and the right to vote. Monarchies start from an assumption about radical inequality between the ruling dynasty and its subjects. Blood distinguishes the rulers from the ruled, sets the nobility above commoners, and translates into tribal affiliation. Monarchies such as those in Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Jordan have all depended for support on an alliance of families embedded in tribes, each of which sees itself as descended from a common ancestor. Traditional interpretations of the Sharia reflect and support the patrilineal structure of extended family relations typical of such cultures. While patriarchy marks the past and present of every country in the region, the monarchs of the region, all males, depend upon and reinforce patriarchy as a vital source of their contemporary legitimacy.

It should not be surprising for that reason that Morocco delayed fifty years in modernizing family law. Soon after independence from France, Morocco adopted a family code that closely followed traditional Sharia-based practices authorized by the Malekite school of legal interpretation, which prevails in North Africa. Even though the Moroccan monarch Mohamed V did not lead the independence movement, the French authorities sent him into exile after he declared support for liberation. When he returned, he enjoyed a prestige and power that the nationalists could not deny, and that power derived in large measure from the rural, tribal areas of the country, where blood ties and patrilineal family structures were the rule, as Mona Charrad has observed.⁴⁰

The Moroccan dynasty traces its roots to the sixteenth century and claims descent from the Prophet. Unlike its neighbors to the east, Algeria and Tunisia, Morocco escaped Ottoman rule, which amounted to semi-autonomous rule by Turkish speaking dynasties that lacked both local roots and full support from Istanbul. The French eliminated the Ottoman ruler (dey) of Algiers after the invasion of 1830, and the Tunisians dispensed with a dynast of Turkish origin (bey) two years after independence. In contrast, the Moroccan monarchy survived a French protectorate that lasted 50 years—1904 to 1955—and managed to outmaneuver nationalist parties and ward off attempted coups in the early years of independence. After the death of Muhammad V in 1959, his son Hasan II ruled the country for nearly forty years with an iron will and a bit of luck, or divine grace (baraka), that saved him from military overthrow. As “Commander of the Faithful,” a title first invoked by the third caliph ‘Umar (634-644), he enjoyed religious respect as well as control of the military and the modern bureaucracy.

It is not only the monarchy’s dependence on the traditional values of rural Morocco that explains the long delay in reforming family law in Morocco. The slow pace of economic growth, for lack of any resources comparable to those oil- and gas-producing Algeria next door, may also have

moderated the pressures for change. The pace of change in the rural areas of Morocco was among the slowest in the Middle East and North Africa. In 2013, Doris Gray wrote:

Visiting rural regions resembles traveling back in time. Life is slow and in some of the larger rural areas of Morocco, high in the Atlas mountains and along the Sahara desert, residents are dressed mostly in traditional Moroccan attire. There is an absence of paved roads and running water, electricity is sparse, and subsistence farming remains the main activity.⁴¹

Gray estimated that roughly 40% of the Moroccan population lived in areas that might fit that description. Next to Yemen, Morocco remained the least urbanized of the MENA states.

When change to family law arrived in Morocco, it came not as unilateral action by the leadership, as in Turkey and Tunisia, but as the product of feminist pressure balanced by Islamist resistance. When Mohammed VI assumed the throne in 2000, demands for changes in family law surfaced almost immediately. Sharp debate and conflict ensued, and in 2004 the king approved a new version of the Moudawana, which he claimed to be a reflection of religious law rather than a refutation of it. It went far to make women equal in rights and permitted Morocco to lift the reservations it attached to the signing of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) many years before. The new rules turned marriage into a voluntary contractual obligation for men and women, contingent on both being 18 years old. Without abolishing polygamy altogether, the new Moudawana imposed restrictions.

The changes did not entirely satisfy either secular feminists or Islamist women, some of whom nonetheless identified themselves as feminist. For Islamists the codification of Sharia represents state intervention to define family law, while secularists worry that the standard remains reflective of a certain Islam rather than universal human rights. Kristina Benson writes:

Moroccan feminists are increasingly working within the framework of Islamic feminism, some out of pragmatism and some out of enthusiasm for their faith. The fact that feminists resort to Islamic rhetoric to argue for their rights could lead to the conclusion that Islam (as it is locally understood and practiced) is responsible for denying them their rights. As demonstrated, it is a combination of a highly patriarchal kinship structure, strong resistance to Western cultural hegemony, the collective memory of colonization, and political appropriation of religious discourse that has acted in concert to define women's citizenship rights.⁴²

While the new law broke with the 1958 version in many respects, it did not resolve issues of inequality linked to interpretations of the Sharia, such as inheritance, divorce, and testimony; enforcement depends on the actions of the Islamic court system.⁴³ One analyst notes that it mostly pertains to wives, not women in general, and does not refer to "gender equality." It remains patriarchal because of its "oblique designation of the husband as head of the family."⁴⁴ Insofar as the gender relationships are changing in Morocco, education and the media may have had as much or more impact than the revision of the Moudawana.⁴⁵

The monarchy in Saudi Arabia delayed even longer than Morocco in moving toward greater legal equality for men and women. Here is a country still governed by the sons of its modern founder, Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud, whose progeny occupy many of the principal offices of the kingdom. Blood ties are essential links to power in the society, where family law remains the province of a patriarchal hierarchy of religious scholars, descendants and followers of an eighteenth century reformer, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. The Saud family has cultivated an image of the ideal Muslim woman as the submissive, loyal, maternal symbol of piety that marks the exceptionalism of the regime. Eleanor A. Doumato writes:

The official version of the ideal woman tends to elevate the public separation of women from men as the hallmark of Islamic society. It defines the particular Muslim society of Saudi Arabia as something distinct from and morally superior to the West, as well as being superior to other Muslim countries where women are less rigidly separated. The ideal woman, therefore, stands among other symbols which define a national identity that is uniquely Saudi Arabian.⁴⁶

To protect that symbol the Saud family has imposed a set of rules and restrictions unparalleled in other Muslim countries.

Madawi al-Rasheed, like Doumato, argues that monarchy is not a sufficient explanation.⁴⁷ All monarchies depend on the sort of extended family relationships which Sharia takes as given, relationships that assign a woman duties she must perform for her husband's relatives. However, monarchies in Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and even Jordan and Morocco, have responded differently than Saudi Arabia.⁴⁸ The direct colonial domination that provoked change and also spurred resistance to Westernization in Morocco was missing in the peninsula. The idea of schooling for girls arrived only in the 1960s. By one estimate, 15% of Saudi men and 2% of Saudi women were literate in 1970, even though Saudi Arabia had been a state for some 40 years.⁴⁹ The enormous resources made available by the discovery of oil enabled the regime to put the youth in school. Oil created jobs mainly for men, not women. The oil economy enabled a new middle class to hire domestic servants to liberate women from housework without furnishing employment for them outside the home. The Saudi resources coupled with political will did produce a boom in literacy within two generations. By 2013, literacy among females more than 15 years old had reached 91%.⁵⁰

Rasheed argues that neither monarchy nor oil constitutes a satisfactory explanation of Saudi

exceptionalism. Rather, it was the monarchy's decision to seize upon a radical, puritanical version of Islam and politicize it as a national ideology, which she terms religious nationalism, that best accounts for Saudi resistance to reform.⁵¹ The doctrines of Wahhabi ulama differ only slightly from those propounded by radical Islamists elsewhere. What is unusual is that the state has chosen to enforce them. Already in the 1920s the dynasty rounded up Bedouins, settled them in camps, and exposed them to the Wahhabi preachers. Then those Bedouins, known as the Ikhwan, became soldiers in the fight to carry state ideology to the rest of Arabia. They helped the Saud family gain control much of the peninsula. So great was their aggressiveness and ferocity that they threatened British interests in nearby Iraq and Jordan against the will of the monarch, who could not afford to offend the British. Abd al-Aziz had to confront the Ikhwan militarily.

The constitution of Saudi Arabia is the Sharia. The only law in the kingdom is that administered by the ulama, but their domain has become more and more restricted as the state has proceeded to adopt "regulations" affecting the modern economy and polity. What remains under ulama control is family law, and the ulama have made it their focus. Rules concerning women as symbols of authenticity have been their obsession.

One traumatic event, the seizure in 1979 of the great mosque in Mecca by a man named Juhayman, who criticized the kingdom for its loss of fidelity to Islam, ignited a firestorm of conservatism in Saudi Arabia. The revolution in Iran at about that same time may have contributed as well to a pietistic revival in Saudi Arabia. Ulama issued some 30,000 religious opinions (fatwas) in a decade. The king reinvigorated the morals police and toughened the rules and dress codes they were hired to enforce. Where men and women had mixed more freely before 1979 there was now segregation. The arrival of American forces in Saudi Arabia to help liberate Kuwait in 1990 further fanned the flames of conservative resistance to foreign influence and change.⁵²

Only after the attacks of September 11, 2001, did the forces of reform begin to reassert themselves. Embarrassed by the participation of Saudi subjects in the attacks on the United States, the Saudi regime began to modify its image of the ideal woman in a more cosmopolitan direction. King Abdullah and his successor King Salman have started to build facilities where mixing is accepted, to encourage women into a wider range of professions, to appear with women in public, and, most recently, to decide that women could drive automobiles in the kingdom. For Rasheed, the monarchy will prevail over the ulama in altering the position of women in the kingdom, as it has with respect to television, regulation of the oil industry, defensive alliance with the United States, and many other matters.

If Rasheed is right about the centrality of the ideal woman to religious nationalism in Saudi Arabia, then normalizing the position of women might jeopardize the legitimacy of the regime. Would religious nationalism become secular nationalism? While the Quran emphasizes the equality of all believers and does not authorize a priesthood, religious nationalism as propounded by the dynasty and the Wahhabi ulama reinforces hierarchy and patriarchy. The king is the protector of the two holy cities. The ulama maintain a monopoly on the interpretation of the law, opposing codification and denouncing the Shiism of the Eastern province as heresy. A shift toward secular nationalism would perhaps jeopardize all these hierarchies by advancing a notion of citizenship and participation in politics. The regime seems to have moved in this direction by scheduling municipal elections and promising women the right to vote and hold office. Will women of Saudi Arabia eventually come to see themselves as citizens rather than subjects? Currently they are included as dependents on the citizenship cards of fathers or husbands.⁵³

Although monarchies have sometimes been slow to reform family law, republics have not necessarily responded as quickly as Tunisia. Algeria is one example. Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Libya—all of

which experienced colonialism and, in three cases, overthrew monarchies—undertook to implement elements of socialist theory and focused on reducing inequalities of class more than those based on gender. All advanced female education and opened the way for greater female participation in the workplace. All hypothesized the equality of all citizens but remained highly authoritarian, patriarchal societies. Not coincidentally, all provoked the growth of strong Islamist movements that challenged secularizing agendas and demanded justice rather than equality.

Islamist Movements in the Republics

Egypt led the way in the MENA with its efforts at defensive modernization in the nineteenth century. Muhammad Ali and his successors, who ruled Egypt from 1805 until the British occupation in 1881, revamped the Egyptian military, commercialized agriculture, began a policy of industrial development, centralized power at the expense of religious elites, and borrowed vast sums from Europe to build infrastructure. The British occupied the country to head off revolution and assure payment of debts, but the modernizing spirit carried into the twentieth century. Already in the 1920s, elite Egyptian women took off their veils and campaigned for schools and rights. The overthrow of the monarchy and establishment of a republic in 1952 constituted another strike against patriarchy. Women acquired the right to vote and hold office in 1956 under the rule of Gamal Abd al-Nasir and the Free Officers. The Nasir regime encouraged women toward the applied sciences including medicine.⁵⁴ By the 1960s women were entering the labor force in larger numbers, literacy was on the rise, and it was rare to see urban women with covered heads.

In the Nasirist period (1952–1970), the cultural attitudes often identified with Arab society continued to lose traction in a secularizing context, even if the regime’s dedication to female equality may have been half-hearted. The neo-patriarchal regime promoted women’s education and employment for reasons probably linked to developmental perspectives. It avoided religious

resistance by completing a government takeover of religious institutions begun two centuries earlier under Muhammad Ali. Consistent with its repression of the Communist Party, the Muslim Brotherhood, and any other group likely to challenge its authority, the government forbade the formation of autonomous women's associations.⁵⁵

Out of sight, out of mind. The Brotherhood was scarcely new (founded in 1928) but its impact seemed marginal after an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate President Nasir in 1954 led the regime to ban the organization and imprison its leadership. The founder, Hasan al-Banna, was dead; the leading ideologue, Sayyid Qutb, liberated from prison after ten years, published a book entitled *Milestones* that earned him re-arrest, trial and execution. He proclaimed the need for revolution in Egypt and in all other Muslim-majority countries against what he termed the *jabiliyya*, the modern age of ignorance and immorality. Initiated in the West, the *jabiliyya* had come to encompass even Muslim-majority states such as Egypt, according to Qutb. Only a genuinely Islamic state could liberate Muslims from their own animal propensities and enable them to achieve spiritual redemption, he said. Saving women from the sort of sexual exploitation he linked with the West was an essential part of the message, which seemed extreme, anachronistic, and wildly unrealistic in Egypt in 1966.⁵⁶

Then came the Israeli defeat of three Arab states in six days of June, 1967. Many scholars have observed that the defeat triggered the growth of Islamist movements everywhere in the Arab world. Islamists argued that neglect of religion helped explain the disaster and that only spiritual revival would enable Muslims to resist Israel and the West. Even though banned in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood had already spread its message to other states, often via teachers as in Algeria and Saudi Arabia. After President Nasir's death in 1970, Anwar al-Sadat, a collaborator in the coup of 1952, took the presidency and set the country on a path toward liberalization. He freed thousands

of political prisoners including high officials of the Brotherhood on condition that they not make war against the state. He sought their support against the partisans of Nasir, who were still powerful inside and outside government. Many Nasirists were socialists who opposed Sadat's liberalization of the economy---although Nasir himself had moved in that direction after 1967---and the new president's decision to break with the Soviet Union and establish an alliance with the United States. As a self-styled "believer president," Sadat cultivated support of the newly liberated Brotherhood leadership to escape the shadow and influence of his predecessor.

In the subsequent fifty years Egypt has seemingly become more religious, reversing a trend toward secularization that began in the nineteenth century. One indicator would be a series of constitutions that have made Islam "a source of legislation" and then "the principal source of legislation."⁵⁷ Another indicator would be the maintenance under religious jurisdiction of laws governing the family. A third would be transformation of female dress in the streets of Cairo. Bourgeois women came to frequent posh shopping centers in fashionable Islamic dress. Covered heads became the norm rather than the exception, and with the change in practice came a change in the meaning of the hijab. For some it became a symbol of renewed piety; for others an introduction of new fashion, a tool of defense in crowded buses, or a symbol of solidarity with other women. The change owed its inspiration to the longstanding tradition of veiling but represented a modern set of elaborations on that theme that occasioned new practices and new fashions.

Islamist activity and pressure together with government response account for the apparent increase in Egyptian religiosity. Faced with a few terrorist incidents in the 1970s, and then the assassination of President Sadat in 1981, the Egyptian government found itself in a delicate situation. It needed to inoculate Egyptians against radical Islamist appeals, and to do so it found the Brotherhood and its services both dangerous and helpful. In books, pamphlets, newspapers and

television outlets, the Brotherhood sought to make the society more pious. It promoted clinics, burial societies, and schools, often nudging the official ulama anchored in the Al-Azhar system to take a firmer line with the Presidency on matters pertaining to religion. President Mubarek cultivated the Shaykh al-Azhar and the Coptic Pope to demonstrate his commitment to religious principles, even as he sought to curb radicalism. Cairo's reputation as a playground for rich Saudis seeking escape from the puritanism of their country began to change; bars closed or went underground and entertainments came under closer scrutiny.

The 1990s constituted a difficult decade in both Egypt and Algeria. Both countries succeeded in defeating radical Islam, but the cost in Algeria far exceeded that in Egypt, where leaders of the Islamic Group, which had attacked police and tourists to undermine the government's economic and political stability, ended up in prison. Never legal and always suspected of secret support for the radical attacks, the Brotherhood incurred sanctions and cautions but managed to survive and even prosper. It ran "independent" candidates for Parliament and managed to elect a significant number, albeit to a Parliament that played only a supporting role to that of the Presidency. Awab observes that the Brotherhood won respect from the religious establishment, which enabled it to "provide many of the so-called traditionalists, as well as the general public of Muslims, with a frame of reference for the Islamic order."⁵⁸

The government's persistent need to accommodate Islamism and combat radicalism partly explains its policies on the rights of women, but pressures from the United Nations, human rights organizations, the United States and Europe—all vital to Egyptian political, economic, and military ambitions—also conditioned government attitudes, which became increasingly ambivalent after Nasir's death in 1970. The constitution of 1956 promised equality to all citizens: "All Egyptians are equal under the law in public rights and duties, without discrimination due to sex, origin, language,

religion, or belief.” But the constitution also introduced a concept that foreshadowed ambivalence: “The State facilitates for women the agreement (*al-tamfiq*) between her work in society and her duties to the family” (Article 19). The 1971 constitution added a phrase: “...considering her equal status with man in the fields of political, social, cultural, and economic life, without contravening the laws of Islamic shari‘a” (Article 11).⁵⁹ The emphasis on public equality did not alter the existence of a private realm, that of the family, regulated by religious authorities rather than the state.

In 1979 Jihan Sadat, wife of the president, championed revision of the personal status code in Egypt. A presidential decree, never ratified in Parliament, regulated polygamy, divorce, and guardianship of children. Islamists opposed the revisions to the law, which dated from 1929, as contrary to Islam. Those revisions lasted only until 1985, when a court pronounced them unconstitutional for lacking parliamentary approval. Replacement legislation provided only some of the benefits of “Jihan’s law.” After 2000, Suzanne Mubarak, wife of the president, championed some further revisions including no-fault divorce, if women gave up all financial claims against their husbands.⁶⁰ These issues remained the province of civil family courts applying Coptic Christian or Muslim religious law. There were no women judges in these courts and few women on the bench in Egyptian courts more generally.⁶¹

Meanwhile, Islamists advanced education for women. They called upon women as employees and volunteers in their various social and commercial enterprises, some aimed at women. Moreover, they used women in political activities. Women contacted women voters and served as poll watchers in Egypt to ward off government-sponsored thugs.⁶² At the same time, the Islamist message there and elsewhere was that women needed to stay home, tend the family, and raise children. Islamists cultivated agency in women even as they reinforced misogynistic doctrines and patrimonial leadership patterns. A study of youth attitudes in Egypt and Saudi Arabia found that

religiosity correlated positively with belief in gender equality among women in Egypt but negatively among men. Kucinskias writes about Egypt: “. . . My results suggest young women are drawing from Islamic identity in empowering ways.”⁶³

This conclusion applies to Islamist movements elsewhere. A study of women in the Lebanese Islamist organization, Hizbullah, found that women supported the militia but also provided social services and hosted television shows for the organization’s station. “A woman is the face of Hizbullah’s international English language program,” notes Baylouny.⁶⁴ The Islamist regime in Iran discovered near the end of its first decade that it needed women in public places and public roles. Moghissi writes: “The remarkable visibility of Iranian women in various kinds of artistic and professional activities since the late 1980s, perhaps more than any other country in the Middle East, must be seen in this light.”⁶⁵ Nilüfer Göle acknowledges that the Islamist movement has opened new horizons for women in Turkey: “An elite cadre of Islamic women is thus emerging from within Islamism.”⁶⁶ Saba Mahmood has argued that women choosing to join and promote Islamist organizations demonstrate the sort of agency one can identify with feminism.⁶⁷

Survey research suggests that the support for gender equality varies across the Arab world, from relatively lower in Yemen to higher in Lebanon. And in the seven Arab countries included in the first wave of the Arab Barometer women were more supportive of gender equality than men. Among the men, older generations tended to be more supportive than younger cohorts. Males who were 25 to 35 in 2007, when the survey was conducted, proved to be the most patriarchal. Women were about equally supportive of gender equality in every age cohort.⁶⁸

In Egypt, feminist organizations committed to universalistic principles of gender equality have not been able to free themselves from the taint of Western influence. A group formed in 2005 called Women for Democracy failed “to translate transnational gendered principles into cultural

repertoires related to the daily lives and histories of groups” within Egypt. The organization hypothesized a uniform feeling of “oppression” among women ignoring significant differences of experience even within their own group.⁶⁹ The organization quickly disappeared, making it apparent that successful feminism must take account of Islam if it is to garner broad support.⁷⁰ Some women may feel oppressed. Lila Abu Lughod reports asking a woman she came to know well as part of her study of a village in southern Egypt if she felt oppressed. The woman answered “yes”—but she blamed the government, not men.⁷¹

While secular feminism cannot ignore the claims of Islamists, Islamist women cannot avoid the modernization paradigm. Naje Al-Ali writes about Egypt: “For the majority, even those who are extremely critical of ‘westernization,’ the process of modernization is accepted as the implicit background for promoting women’s equality.”⁷² Amy Young Evrard makes a similar point about Morocco. Secular and Islamist groups are all products of modernization projects and global processes. Both have connections to the outside world.⁷³ Margot Badran sums up the situation in Egypt:

Islam, in modern Egypt, has been controlled by the state. The Islamic establishment has had to negotiate with and accommodate to the secular state. The last bastion of official Islam has been the regulation of family life. This is precisely the area where the state has allowed patriarchal control over women a free hand and where gender relations have been most unequal.⁷⁴

Islamist pressure strengthens the position of the religious establishment as a pillar of the regime and thereby reduces the state’s freedom to act on issues such as gender equality.

The question of female circumcision, also called female genital mutilation (FGM), illustrates the relationships between the state, al-Azhar, and the Brotherhood. Under international feminist

pressure, President Mubarek initiated a campaign against the practice, which is widespread among both Muslims and Christians. He failed, however, to muster support for his initiative from the religious establishment, which may have been influenced by the opposition of the Muslim Brothers. The highest official of the establishment, the Shaykh al-Azhar, “almost sanctified [female circumcision] as an Islamic custom, the interference with which is considered unacceptable from a cultural and religious point of view.”⁷⁵ The president’s initiative won the support of the Grand Mufti, head of a government office (the Dar al-Ifta) that issues religious advice on all sorts of issues. The Grand Mufti denounced the practice as contrary to Islam, but the state nonetheless abandoned its campaign.

Most Muslim-majority countries have felt the influence of Islamist organizations. Egypt is only one place where the effects of Islamist pressures have been striking. Before 1967 the balance of power appeared to lie with the secular state in Turkey, Iran, and elsewhere. Then the balance shifted toward Islamists, who rose to power in Turkey, Egypt, Iran, Tunisia, and Morocco. Yet all of these regimes continued to promote education for girls and women, and all have encouraged the participation of women in politics. Islamists have taken advantage of quota systems to elect female members of parliament in Morocco, Jordan, and Tunisia. Islamists nonetheless are reluctant to embrace the concept of equal roles within the family for men and women even when they may embrace equal citizenship.

Conflict and Strife

No account of diversity in the condition of women in the MENA would be complete without noting that a breakdown of law and order affects women in ways more dramatic than the factors considered thus far: state formation, form of government, and strength of Islamist movements. After the defeat of Iraq’s ambitions in Kuwait, Iraq underwent more than a decade of

sanctions before it incurred foreign invasion and occupation. Nadjé al-Ali has been eloquent in pointing out the suffering incurred in Iraq over recent decades as a result of deprivation, sectarianism, abuse by occupying military, terrorism, and disease.⁷⁶ Under the Baathist regime in Iraq, women had achieved significant gains in education, health, and employment but, like men, endured cruel, arbitrary, one-party rule. Even the gains vanished in a period marked first by a war against Iran that lasted eight years—the regime urged women to return home and produce more children—and then sanctions and invasion. The emergence of ISIS in northern and western Iraq led to further atrocities, some of them directed at women. An eventual history of this period will doubtless chronicle a decline in the well-being of all Iraqi citizens.

As Hobbes observed, where there is no civil society, life is brutish and short—for women and men alike. Authoritarian regimes see themselves as the alternatives to such disorder, the guarantors of civilized life even as they oppose political liberties that would undermine their control. It is quite plausible that political parties in a democratic setting would seek to augment their bases of support by empowering women through education, employment, and political participation. Such an instinct may have driven Mustafa Kemal in Turkey and Habib Bourguiba in Tunisia; these rulers intended to found popularly based regimes, even if they subsequently governed in a manner quite at odds with democratic principles. Even authoritarian rulers, such as the Sabah family in Kuwait, may favor the empowerment of women in hopes of solidifying their own rule.⁷⁷ Do monarchs such as those in Morocco, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia see the education of women and the guarantee of political rights as helpful to the prolongation of those dynasties? Does the potential economic contribution of women employed outside the home constitute sufficient motive for authoritarian regimes to push forward with female education? Do foreign NGOs help or hinder the process? In few of these countries have feminist organizations been effective in pushing reform. Change has

generally come from the top down as it did in Morocco.

* * *

The idea that there is a unique, uniform patriarchal culture oppressing women of the Middle East and North Africa does not hold up. If there is such a culture, it is changing in ways that are not unique to the area. The spread of economic well-being in the region, though very unevenly distributed, is a primary reason. The rapid increase in primary school enrollments almost everywhere and the resulting decrease in female illiteracy is another. In some countries females outnumber males in school at the level of higher education and have come to staff governmental bureaucracies as they do in the rest of the world. Medical conditions have improved almost everywhere, reducing deaths in childbirth and effectively reducing birthrates. Several countries have established quotas for women in legislative bodies. Islamist movements across the region have brought women into study groups, and from those activities have emerged women preachers to carry a message that urges women to take charge of their lives without neglecting their duties to the household and family.

Table 1 Explaining Variation in the Condition of Women in Selected Countries

	Turkey	Iran	Algeria	Tunisia	Morocco	Saudi Arabia	Egypt	Iraq
Formation	War of Independence 1923	Revolution of 1979	War of Independence 1979	Negotiated Independence 1956	Negotiated Independence 1955	Conquest of Saud Family 1920s	Coup d'etat of 1952	American Invasion of 2003
Type of regime	Republic	Republic	Republic	Republic	Monarchy	Monarchy	Republic	Republic
Islamist Movements	Strong since 1990s	Strong since Revolution	Strong from the 1980s; war in 1990s	Repression until Arab Spring of 2011	Some influence, participation	Repression in 1990s	Muslim Brotherhood Repressed	Islamism stronger since invasion
Security/ Insecurity	Mostly Stable	Mostly stable, secure	Insecurity in the 1990s	Mostly stable, secure	Mostly stable, secure	Mostly stable, secure	Mostly stable, secure	General insecurity since 1990
Legal position of women	Strong, no Sharia	Codified some Sharia	Codified, some Sharia	Codified, no Sharia	Codified, some Sharia	Uncodified, only Sharia	Codified, secular	Codified, secular
Employment Of women % of labor force	33.5%	16.5%	14.9%	24.1%	21.4%	23.4%	22.8%	12.4%
Women in legislative body (2017)	14.6%	5.9%	21.3% (quota)	31.3% (quota)	18.4%	19.9% (See note)	14.2	25.3
Women/Men with some Secondary Education	44.9/66.0%	65.8/70.9%	37.5/37.9%	41.2/52.7	28.0/34.8	67.8/75.5%	58.2/70.7%	38.7/56.7
Human Inequality Index	.317	.461	.442	.298	.482	.234	.449	.506

Source for employment data: International Labour Organization, ILOSTAT, ILO modelled estimates, <https://ilostat.ilo.org>, for July 2018.

Source for other statistics: UNDP, Human Development Reports, Gender Inequality Index, accessed July 23, 2019.

These trends transcend national boundaries but nonetheless vary in their impact from one state to another and from one class or region to another within individual countries. Fariba Solati, an economist at St. Thomas University, Canada, has argued that patriarchy is receding in the MENA and around the world but that the MENA remains the most patriarchal region of the world. That fact, she says, explains why fewer women of the MENA work outside the home in places where they are counted as part of the labor force. To explain that phenomenon, she uses statistical means to construct a model of patriarchy with three principal components: the first depends upon indices of education and demography; the second uses the survival rate of children, boys vs. girls; the third depends upon two measures of women's presence in the public sphere.⁷⁸ One of those measures is the female presence in the labor force, which is the variable she is seeking to explain; the other is female representation in a legislative body. It is only on this third component that she finds a significance difference between the MENA and other developing regions in her study, those for which statistics are available.⁷⁹ She controls for income levels and acknowledges that rising income appears to have a major impact on patriarchy as she attempts to measure it.⁸⁰

Solati herself offers a compelling, complementary explanation for the low rates of female participation in the workforce in this region. In a chapter entitled "Invisible Work of the Invisible Half: Women and 'Work' in the Middle East and North Africa," she gives reasons why statistical data often under estimates what women do. It is not just housework and childcare that is left out. Often rural women work in the fields and do not get credit for contributing to marketable output. Or they work in the "informal" economy, always under reported in national statistics. Or they perform work at home out of sight rather than in a factory or public setting; the household gets the credit in the name of the husband or brother or other relative. Solati lists scores of other reasons why women's work may be underestimated in statistics; her examples are from Turkey and Iran but

the scenarios would seem to apply in differential measure to all countries in the region.⁸¹

Solati's admirable explanation for the inability of economists to adequately value female participation in the labor force further erodes the idea that there is a single patriarchal culture oppressing women in the Middle East and North Africa. First, Solati provides no evidence that women feel oppressed by virtue of their invisibility in the workforce. Second, the variation in economic circumstances, from city to village, from farm to factory, from school to bureaucracy, makes it difficult to generalize about the treatment of women at even the national level much less that of the region or the Arab world or the Muslim world. National policies, themselves reflective of colonial experience and post-colonial circumstances, fashioned in governments of different sorts and affected by Islamist movements of various intensity, do help account for the degree to which men and women are treated equally. Policies may not be enforced or enforceable in some or all parts of the country.

Social and economic forces may well lie beyond the control of any Islamist government. This is the very core of Fatima Mernissi's argument against Islamism, but it could be used against rights organizations, too: changes usually branded as "modern" continue to sweep the region in ways that frustrate ideologues and policy makers, who are usually eager to make local culture conform to their goals.⁸² In the eyes of rights organizations, cultural rules are changing too slowly; in the eyes of Islamists, practices are changing too rapidly; it would be difficult to find elites in the region who would claim that cultural traditions alone deprive them of choice. Whether Islamists or secularists, women see themselves as choosers and hence a part of the modernization paradigm.

Table 1 sums up the argument that the treatment of women varies by nation state and offers some statistical evidence to suggest that national policies make a difference. One surprise is the relatively low indicator of gender inequality, and the relatively high percentage of females in the

workforce, in Saudi Arabia. According to UNDP data, the percentages of both men and women over 25 with some exposure to secondary education are the highest in the selected countries included in the table, and percentage of women with such exposure approaches that of men. The fact that non-citizens constitute roughly half the population of the country may explain these numbers. The UNDP report that women constitute 20% of the country's parliament is highly misleading, because the Saudis do not have an official assembly worthy of that name. The statistics on Iran are striking for the percentage of men and women who report having some schooling. It is not surprising, given its history, that the statistics for Turkey show a higher proportion of women in the workforce than elsewhere in the region. It is, however, somewhat surprising that there remains a gap between the percentages of men and women who have experienced some secondary education in Turkey. For Morocco, those percentages remain shockingly low: 28% for women and 35% for men. Notice that Iraq has the highest index of gender inequality, which is surely a product of the insecurity that has befallen the country since 1990. What the table cannot show is how greatly the treatment of women differs from one social class to another, from one geographic region to another, or from one ethnic or religious group to another within each country.

The table does not reflect, either, the impact of international organizations and NGOs. The notion of universal human rights has affected the perspectives of those involved in local battles over family law and female participation in politics. Response has varied from wholesale endorsement of the UDHR and embrace of the CEDAW principles to outright rejection of such notions as products of Western cultural norms. In most countries the response has fallen somewhere in between, accepting certain principles and expressing reservations about others, all the while asserting the need for "authenticity" of response. Almost everywhere the idea of "rights" has entered the discussion of legal codes and constitutions, language imported long ago from, or imposed by, the West. Women

may choose to formulate demands in terms of rights accorded to them in legal documents, national or international. They may also choose to invoke the Quran to support their arguments and claims. One option does not foreclose the other. Islamists may invoke “rights” and secularists may seek to bolster claims with religious reasoning. Neither the rights culture nor religious culture determines outcomes, but together they condition the ongoing dialogue. Human beings craft the outcomes in families, villages, cities, regions, and the national states of the region. Those outcomes are not necessarily uniform, consistent, or durable. That is why broad generalizations about rights and culture do not provide an accurate picture of the condition of women in the Middle East and North Africa.

External pressures to promote universal rights for women, or to combat cultural practices such as FGM may be counter-productive when inattentive to concrete, detailed analysis of local conditions and local discourse on these issues. Sarah Bush studied the impact of American NGO pressures on Jordan to increase the representation of women in its parliament. She concludes: “At least in the case of gender quotas in Jordan, . . . the results suggest that foreign endorsements of political reforms will not necessarily delegitimize the cause, even when delivered by American groups that publics might generally distrust.” That is not a sterling recommendation for external intervention.⁸³

#

NOTES

-
1. Lila Abu Lughod, *Do Muslim Women Need Saving?* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 2013), Introduction.
 2. Deniz Kandiyoti, “Bargaining with Patriarchy,” *Gender and Society* 2:3 (1988), 274-290.
 3. Madawi al-Rasheed, *A Most Masculine State: Gender, Politics, and Religion in Saudi Arabia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
 4. Kristina Benson, “The Moroccan Personal Status Law and the Invention of Identity,” *UCLA Journal of Islamic and Near Eastern Law*, 2013, 3.
 5. Mounira Charrad, *States and Women's Rights: The Making of Postcolonial Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).
 6. Fatima Z. Rahman, “Gender Equality in Muslim-Majority States and Shari'a Family Law: Is There a Link?” *Australian Journal of Political Science* (47:3) September 2012, pp. 347-362.
 7. Yksel Sezgin, “Triangulating Reform in Family Law: The State, Religion, and Women’s Rights in Comparative Perspective,” in Chitra Raghavan and James P. Levine, *Self-Determination and Women's Rights in Muslim Societies* (Waltham, MA: Brandeis University Press, 2012), 244.
 8. Fatima Mernissi, *Beyond the Veil: Male-female Dynamics in Modern Muslim Society* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987).
 9. Valentine M. Moghadam, “Women’s Rights and Democratization in Morocco and Tunisia” in Jocelyne Cesari and José Casanova, eds., *Islam, Gender and Democracy in Comparative Perspective* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 237-265.
 10. ILO Estimates, November 2017.
 11. OECD (2017), “Women's Participation in the Labour Market and Entrepreneurship in Selected MENA Countries,” in *Women's Economic Empowerment in Selected MENA Countries: The Impact of Legal*

Frameworks in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia, (OECD Publishing, Paris), Chapter 1, 28.

12. Michael L. Ross, "Oil, Islam, and Women," *American Political Science Review* (102:1), February 2008, 107-123.

13. Ann Price, "How National Structures Shape Attitudes Toward Women's Right to Employment in the Middle East," *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*. (56:6), 2015, 425.

14. Price, 424.

15. Lindsay J. Benstead, "Why Quotas are Needed to Achieve Gender Equality," in *Women and Gender in Middle East Politics*, POMEPS Studies #19 (May 10, 2016).

16. OECD (2019), Women in politics (indicator). doi: 10.1787/edc3ff4f-en. (Accessed on 18 January 2019).

17. Scott Wiener, "Rethinking Patriarchy and Gender in the Gulf States," in *Women and Gender*, 14.

18. See Lihi Ben Shitrit, *Righteous Transgressions: Women's Activism on the Israeli and Palestinian Religious Right* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015.)

19. Deniz Kandiyoti, "End of Empire, Islam, Nationalism and Women in Turkey," in Kandiyoti, ed., *Women, Islam and the State* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991.)

20. Nermin Abadan-Unat, "Social Change and Turkish Women," in Abadan-Unat, ed., *Women in Turkish Society* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1981), 11.

21. Nilüfer Göle, *The Forbidden Modern: Civilization and Veiling* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 59.

22. Binnaz (Sayari) Toprak, "Religion and Turkish Women," in Abadan-Unat, 289.

23. Abadan-Unat, 26.

24. Mehmet Gurses, "Islamists and Women's Rights: Lessons from Turkey," *Journal of the Middle East*

and Africa 6 (2015), 44.

25. Abadan-Unat, 24.

26. Jalal Al-i Ahmad, *Occidentosis: A Plague from the West*, trans. by R. Campbell, ed. Hamid Algar, (Berkeley, CA: Mizan Press, 1984).

27. Ziba Mir-Hosseini, "Gender and Democracy in Iran," in Jocelyne Cesari and José Casanova, eds., *Islam, Gender and Democracy in Comparative Perspective* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 19.

28. Pardis Mahdavi, *Passionate Uprisings: Iran's Sexual Revolution* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2009).

29. Afsaneh Najmabadi, "Hazards of Modernity and Morality: Women, State and Ideology in Contemporary Iran," in Deniz Kandiyoti, ed., *Women, Islam and the State* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991), 70.

30. Shahrashoub Razavi, "Women, Work and Power in the Rafsanjan Basin of Iran," in *Women in the Middle East: Perceptions, Realities and Struggles for Liberation*, Haleh Afshar, ed. (Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 1993).

31. Haideh Moghissi, "Islamic Cultural Nationalism and Gender Politics in Iran," *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 29, No. 3, 2008, 546.

32. Ziba Mir-Hosseini, "Women, Marriage and the Law in Post-Revolutionary Iran," in Haleh Afshar, ed., *Women in the Middle East: Perceptions, Realities, and Struggles for Liberation* (Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 1993), 68ff.

33. Mir-Hosseini, 59.

34. See Mahdavi for at least anecdotal confirmation.

35. Lisa Anderson, *The State and Social Transformation in Tunisia and Libya, 1830-1980* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986.)

-
36. Charrad, 219.
37. Lilia Labidi, "Discours féministe et fait islamiste en Tunisie," *Confluences Méditerranée* 59:4 (2006), 141.
38. Charrad, 222.
39. Mohamed Benrabah, "Language and Politics in Algeria," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 10 (2004).
40. Charrad, 168.
41. Doris H. Gray, *Beyond Feminism and Islamism: Gender and Equality in North Africa* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2013), 147.
42. Kristina Benson, "The Moroccan Personal Status Law and the Invention of Identity," *UCLA Journal of Islamic and Near Eastern Law*, 2013, 10.
43. A. Booley, "The Rights and Freedoms of Moroccan Women: Has the 2004 Reform Benefited Moroccan Women?" *Potchefstroom Elec. L.J.* 1, 23 (2016), 18.
44. Katia Zvan Elliott, "The Moudawana and Rural Marital Relationships," in Raghavan and Levine, 148.
45. Elliott, 168.
46. Eleanor A. Doumato, "Gender, Monarchy, and National Identity in Saudi Arabia," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 19:1 (1992), 33.
47. al-Rasheed, *A Most Masculine State*.
48. On Kuwait, see Mary Ann Tétreault, "A State of Two Minds: State Cultures, Women, and Politics in Kuwait," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 33:2 (2001), 203-220.
49. Al-Rasheed, 100.
50. World Bank Indicators.
51. Al-Rasheed, 16.

-
52. Doumato, 42.
53. Doumato, 41.
54. Margot Badran, "Competing Agenda: Feminists, Islam and the State in 19th- and 20th-Century Egypt," in Deniz Kandiyoti, ed., *Women, Islam and the State* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991), 218.
55. Nadjé al-Ali, *Secularism, Gender and the State in the Middle East: The Egyptian Women's Movement* (Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. ???.
56. Sayyid Qutb, *Milestones* (New Delhi: Islamic Book Service, 2015).
57. Egyptian constitutions of 1971 and 1981.
58. Hoda Ragheb Awab, "The legal status of women in Egypt: Reform and social inertia," in Fatima Sadiqi and Moha Ennaji, eds., *Women in the Middle East and North Africa: Agents of Change*, (Abington, UK: Routledge, 2011), 131.
59. Ellen McLarney, "Women's Equality: Constitutions and Revolutions in Egypt," in *Women and Gender in Middle East Politics*, POMEPS Studies #19, May 10, 2016.
60. Mervat F. Hatem, "First Ladies and the (Re) Definition of the Authoritarian State in Egypt" in *Women and Gender in Middle East Politics*, POMEPS Studies #19, May 10, 2016.
61. *Women's Economic Empowerment in Selected Mena Countries* (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2017, Chapter 2, 61.
62. Lisa Blaydes and Safionaz El Tarouty, "Women's Electoral Participation in Egypt: The Implications of Gender for Voter Recruitment and Mobilization," *The Middle East Journal* 63:3 (2009), 364-380.
63. Jaime Kucinkas, "A Research Note on Islam and Gender Egalitarianism: An Examination of Egyptian and Saudi Arabian Youth Attitudes," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* (2010) 49(4), 68.

-
64. Anne Marie Baylouny, "Hizbullah's Women: Internal Transformation in a Social Movement and Militia." in Joel Beinin and Frédéric Vairel, *Social Movements, Mobilization, and Contestation in the Middle East and North Africa* (Stanford: Stanford University Press: 2011), 173.
65. Haideh Moghissi, "Islamic Cultural Nationalism and Gender Politics in Iran," *Third World Quarterly*, 29:3 (2008), 546.
66. Göle, 22.
67. Saba Mahmood, *Politics of piety: The Islamic revival and the feminist subject* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005).
68. Veronica V. Kostenko, Pavel A. Kuzmichev and Eduard D. Ponarin, "Attitudes towards gender equality and perception of democracy in the Arab world," *Democratization*, (23:5), 2016, 862-891.
69. Rabab al-Mahdi, "Does Political Islam Impede Gender-Based Mobilization? The Case of Egypt," *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, 11:3-4, (2010), 390.
70. Azza M. Karam, *Women, Islamisms and the State: Contemporary Feminisms in Egypt* (London: MacMillan Press, 1998), 15.
71. Lila Abu Lughod, *Do Muslim Women Need Saving* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 2013),???. Is it Khadija? Might be in chapter 5.
72. Al-Ali, 227.
73. Evrard, 262.
74. Badran, 228.
75. Karam, 173-174.
76. Nadjé Al-Ali, "Iraqi women: from dictatorship to the 'New Iraq,'" lecture, Colorado College, October 19, 2011 (video recording). Nadjé al-Ali and Nicola Pratt, *What Kind of Liberation? Women and the Occupation of Iraq* (Berkeley: University of California press, 2009).

77. Tetrault.

78. Fariba Solati, *Women, Work, and Patriarchy in the Middle East and North Africa* (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2017), 94ff.

79. Solati, 88.

80. Solati, 90.

81. Solati, Chapter 3.

82. Mernissi, *Beyond the Veil*.

83. Sarah Bush, "Does Western pressure for gender equality help?," in POMEPS, 59.