

Chapter 5

Political Culture: Cause or Effect

Political culture is the residue of history as it is imprinted on the minds or demonstrated in the actions of subjects and citizens at the level of nation-state or region. While it is the context for decision making of individuals, groups and governments, it is also an ongoing product of contemporary decisions. When governments ban religious organizations and declare that the Turkish language will be written in the Roman alphabet, as the Turkish government did in the 1920s, they modify the context in which future politics will be conducted. When President Bourguiba of Tunisia promulgates a civil code empowering women in 1958, he transforms the political culture of his country. When Israel proclaims itself a Jewish state, it alters the framework within which politics are conducted in that country. When states politicize elements of culture, they effectively modify the setting in which future decisions will be taken. Previous chapters have described actions that move political entities from one configuration of political culture toward another. These chapters have sought to explain how and why political actors in the MENA have sought to dominate and change the political culture of countries and the region as a whole. They have treated political culture as result rather than cause. This chapter will examine the utility of that concept as cause rather than effect.

Political culture is a convenient concept widely used in journalistic as well as academic writing to indicate the particularism of politics in a given region, state, or enterprise. It is convenient and compelling though it is impressionistic and suggestive, best understood, perhaps, through poetry and novels, individual testimony and narrative, biography of leaders, and travel accounts. Since World War II, “political culture” has replaced an older idea of “national character,” which attributed certain traits---aggressiveness, reverence for authority, orderliness---to a whole people, such as the

Germans as an explanation for their willingness to wage war. Like national character, political culture still emphasized attitudes, values, and psychological predispositions, but it promised new, more scientific methodologies and did not presume uniformity in a population. Could it be used to explain why some nations with low standards of living suddenly moved toward economic growth and social development? Could political culture be invoked reliably as an independent variable to explain political behavior? How might it be made saved from the charge that it was just an explanation for what could not be otherwise explained in more concrete terms? How could it be made scientific?

As political scientists labored to answer such questions in the 1950s and 1960s, they were pursuing a line of thinking with long, deep roots. Invoking cultural characteristics as an explanation of economic, social, and political development stems from Ibn Khaldun via Tocqueville and Max Weber. Ibn Khaldun, born in what has become the modern nation of Tunisia, argued in the fourteenth century that Bedouin culture produced strong, courageous, combative, and puritanical tribes capable of seizing political power and holding it, until entry into urban living deprived them of all ferocity and made them vulnerable to a subsequent Bedouin invasion. His model seemed to account for much of the political turbulence in the North Africa he knew. From his perspective, culture shaped societies and human beings in the short run, but underlying human nature ultimately prevailed over culture. Once Bedouins took control of the towns and settled into the comfort of city life, they lost their ferocity, their ability to defend themselves together with the work ethic and virtues that had initially brought them success.¹ The human desire for material comfort ultimately negated the advantages Bedouin culture had offered. The decline of Bedouin ferocity exposed one tribe to the assault of another not yet softened by urban living.

Tocqueville invoked the instinctively egalitarian culture he found in the United States as an

explanation for the emerging democracy he encountered. Touring this country in the Jacksonian era, he became alarmed at the power of American egalitarianism, which he feared would undercut the good things of life he associated with nobility and elites: literature, music, philosophy, and even effective government. He thought the constraints of culture would fetter intellectual and political development, undermining liberty even as it enhanced participatory democracy. His insights have inspired modern efforts to investigate the relationship, if any, between values and attitudes, such as egalitarianism, and liberal democratic institutions.² A book called *The Civic Culture*, the first cross-national study based on survey research, published in 1963, evoked Toqueville in the early pages.³

Writing a half century later than Tocqueville, the German sociologist Max Weber tied culture to the progress of economy and society in modern Europe. His *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* suggested that the Calvinist branch of Protestantism, which held that human beings are pre-determined from birth for salvation or damnation, produced a counter-intuitive result: men and women dedicated themselves to worldly achievement as measured by the pursuit of wealth and acclaim.⁴ Northern, Protestant Europe soared far ahead of the Mediterranean south in industrial development, a fact still noticeable in the twentieth century, although Catholic countries have now narrowed the gap. Weber saw religion as a primary force in shaping attitudes toward wealth, even though he and others also came to argue that industrialization had inaugurated a set of changes in society that might be termed secularization. If culture shaped economics, economics was also remaking culture. Separating the independent from the dependent variable was not easy.

Refining the Concept

Political scientists of the 1950s sought to give political culture more rigorous, scientific treatment. Comparison was one tool. Survey research powered by digital computing was another. The idea was to ask people questions about political objects and actions in ways that permitted

statistical analysis of their answers at the national level. Responses would be indicators of values and attitudes that could be compared across national, continental, or cultural borders. The hope was to establish reasons why some societies supported liberal, democratic political systems while others did not. Establishing cause was the objective.

In *The Civic Culture*, Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba included five states, two of them primary models of liberal democracy (the United States and the United Kingdom), two of them European states attempting to join the liberal democratic club, after experiences with Nazism and fascism (Germany and Italy), and one, Mexico, a less developed country. The authors started from the assumption that these countries could be placed on a scale of political development that ran from authoritarianism to democracy. The question posed was whether there are a set of attitudes that underpin successful democracies—that is, whether successful democracies reflect or perhaps generate a set of cultural characteristics that set them apart. Conducted at a moment when Europe was coming back to its feet after the devastation of WWII, the surveys demonstrated high levels of citizen competence, high levels of interpersonal trust, and high levels of confidence in governmental decision making in Britain and the United States. With relatively minor differences between the two countries, there emerged a set of values and attitudes that the authors termed “the civic culture.” The surveys in Italy and Germany turned up major deficiencies: skepticism about democracy and authoritarian tendencies of the sort rarely identified in the U. K. and the U. S. They called Mexico an aspiring democracy, because the surveys turned up high commitment to democracy in a country where competitive elections were not yet a reality.

This study gave the notion of political culture new stature. To be sure, other academics had been working on this concept as an alternative to “national character.” Lucien Pye and others engaged in trying to explain why democratic political development caught on in some countries or

some groups more quickly than others rejected the idea that there could ever be identified a single “national character” that would account for a country’s politics. They began to talk instead about political culture as the psychological dimension of politics and to ask how historical memory, child-raising, popular literature, sports, family interactions, atmosphere in the workplace, knowledge of political activities, and willingness to participate in politics might influence outcomes. Might these cultural characteristics, measured at the individual level, affect the speed with which countries advanced along the continuum of development hypothesized by modernization theory?⁵

The *Civic Culture* took these questions and reworked them in the form of a questionnaire administered in four different languages in five countries. Made possible by the advent of digital computing, this study sought to take political culture from the realm of impression and speculation and put it in the domain of science. It sought to treat culture in comparative fashion, overcoming the difficulties in translating concepts into different languages, constructing reliable samples, and processing data in an era when punch cards and batch processing were still the norm. Statistical software packages were still in development. Differences in national political cultures came then to be measured in proportions of the population agreeing with propositions such as, “in general one can trust other people” or “one can expect equal treatment in a government office.” The study suggested that a certain combination of attitudes reflected in the surveys constituted the “civic culture” necessary for sustaining democracy. The study matched the variation in attitudes with the variation in political histories of these countries.

Such a snapshot taken at a single moment in time could not, of course, indicate whether histories determined attitudes or attitudes determined histories. When the studies were repeated three decades later, German attitudes, in particular, showed remarkable change.⁶ With a thriving economy and twenty-five years of experience in a newly inaugurated democratic system, West

German respondents manifested much more faith in fellow citizens and trust in their government than they had in the initial survey. The new study emphasized the degree to which political institutions can modify the political culture in which they function. It was the period when surveys in the United States turned up declining faith in government in the wake of the Vietnam war and the Watergate scandal.

The interest in political culture as an independent variable affecting economic, social, and political development appeared to decline in the 1970s, even though the modernization model in which it is embedded continued to inspire leadership in the Middle East and North Africa. In fact, the liberal, democratic version of modernization theory gained momentum in the 1980s and 1990s, as the Ronald Reagan presidency dedicated itself to reasserting liberal economic principles around the globe. The end of the Cold War and the dismemberment of the Soviet Union in 1989 caused Francis Fukuyama to proclaim the “end of history” and assert the victory of the liberal democratic conception of progress.⁷ History seemed to be moving in the direction identified by the modernization paradigm, and, as one might expect, the idea that political culture might have a role in accelerating or slowing that process re-emerged as well. In an article that appeared in 1988, Ronald Inglehart proclaimed the “renaissance of political culture.”⁸

Several other publications confirmed the revival, notable among them *Culture Matters: Essays in Honor of Aaron Wildavsky*, a volume edited by Richard J. Ellis and Michael Thompson (1997); *Culture's Consequences* by Geert Hofstede, first published in 1980 and reprinted in 2001, and Lawrence E. Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington, eds., *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress*.⁹ These studies differed in the points of departure. In the introduction to the essays in honor of Wildavsky, the authors wrote: “As long as culture is defined solely in terms of national, religious, ethnic, social or corporate distinctions, common measures are impossible and culture must remain a fancy name

for what we do not understand. . .”¹⁰ The authors of *Culture Matters* looked to anthropological theory and particularly the work of Mary Douglas to divide populations anywhere and everywhere into four cultural categories with varying political proclivities and instincts. Hofstede worked from survey data collected at IBM subsidiaries in 50 countries and sought to identify national differences. Ronald Inglehart launched Eurobarometer and then went on to establish the World Values Survey. Together with a set of co-authors, Inglehart articulated a version of modernization theory to account for the data collected and a concept of political culture to go with the theory.¹¹ All these studies started from the precepts of modernization theory.

In his earliest work on European data, Inglehart detected a shift in values across Europe toward what he interpreted as “post-bourgeois” or “post-materialist” orientations. The surveys conducted in every country of the European Community (later the European Union) asked respondents which of four things caused them the most concern: rising prices, freedom of expression, rates of crime, or protection of the environment. Those who chose rising prices and crime fell into a camp he called materialist; post-materialists were those who made the other choices. Categorising people by their choices, Inglehart constructed a materialist/post-materialist index that became the foundation of much of his work. Lacking serial interviews with the same set of respondents, he relied upon the analysis of age cohorts to argue that European values were shifting in the direction of post-materialism. Young cohorts registered higher on his index. He attributed the rise of “green” parties in several European countries and the adaptation of older parties to these concerns as possible consequences of this underlying shift in values. He observed, of course, that this shift was occurring at different rates in different countries. The more prosperous the economy, the more rapid the shift. He embraced Maslow’s hierarchy of needs to explain these changes as result of a universal human logic.¹²

Inglehart claimed to rediscover the importance of political culture in explaining national differences all the while asserting the universality of developmental processes. He argued that no set of control variables could fully account for national differences in overall life satisfaction in Europe. In an article published in 1988 he wrote: “I argue that different societies are marked to very different degrees by a specific syndrome of political attitudes; that these differences are enduring, but not immutable; and that they have major political consequences, being closely linked to the viability of democratic institutions.”¹³ With that statement he reaffirmed the conclusions of the original *Civic Culture* study. Even with the controls for income and social class, the French and Italians remained much less happy with their lives and more pessimistic about their political systems than other Europeans, according to the Inglehart data. The Danes ranked at the top of the chart for life satisfaction, for example. After a period in which he said rational choice models attracted the most attention in political science, Inglehart announced the “renaissance” of political culture.

Having helped construct and interpret the Eurobarometer surveys, which were the basis of his findings, Inglehart turned his attention to a broader sweep of countries. The World Values Survey included ten countries in the first wave (1981–1984) and reached nearly 100 countries by the sixth wave of interviewing, 2010–2014. By the second and third waves several countries in the Middle East and North Africa had been included. Inglehart and collaborators followed with books analyzing data and identifying sets of questions that appeared to tap a common set of values. They identified two major scales, one tending to rank respondents from traditional to modern—the terms common to the modernization paradigm—which, in the main, meant putting people on a scale from highly conservative/religious to highly secular. The second major scale evolved from “materialist/post-materialist” to “self-expression” and on to “emancipative values” in the latest iteration by Christian Welzel. Using national mean responses on those two scales, the investigators

created a map of the world in two dimensions. The most secular societies with a high attachment to emancipative values appear in the upper right quadrant of the map. Societies with low scores on both scales appear in the bottom left quadrant. States where Muslims are a majority such as Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, Iran, Iraq, Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Turkey tended to cluster at the bottom left; the Scandinavian countries appeared in the upper right corner. Welzel called it the “New Cultural Map of the World.”¹⁴ (See Figure 1.) [Figure 1 about here.]

Welzel argued that “culture zones” accounted for between a fourth and a third of the “total variation in secular and emancipative values” averaged by age cohort to suggest the evolution of values over time. By mapping cohorts he suggests movement of all 95 societies included thus far in World Values Surveys as moving in a similar direction; the wind is blowing from southwest to north east, from the lower left to the upper right corners. In earlier iterations, that wind seemed to be economic development; in the latest iteration by Welzel, it is a fundamental human desire for emancipation. This assertion squares with the fundamental assumptions of modernization theory. History is moving in a clear, identifiable direction in which the West is leading the way.

Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart had previously authored a volume, *Sacred and Secular*, that focused on the issue of secularization. They concluded that the religious revival that has marked much of the world, and most especially the Middle East and North Africa, should not be understood as a reversal of long-term trends toward secularism. They found respondents in countries of the MENA remarkably supportive of democratic norms, even though they lived in non-democratic societies. Norris and Inglehart found sharp differences in attitudes between East and West only on questions about the role of women in society and about homosexuality. According to the investigators, the “wind” continued to blow steadily toward greater secularism, despite cultural resistance.¹⁵ In short, the cultural variations that Inglehart and colleagues claimed to have detected

would not prove to be of significance in the long run. The “renaissance of political culture” Inglehart claimed to have discovered in the 1990s did not in the end lend much support to the concept as an independent variable shaping political behavior.

Applying the Concept: Tunisia

An analysis of one case, that of Tunisia, helps to illustrate to 1) the plausibility of this approach to explaining democratic development; 2) the promise, strength, and serious limitations of this approach to political culture, and 3) a possible amendment of the concept that might make it more useful. Tunisia is particularly interesting for its leadership in challenging authoritarianism in the Arab Spring of 2011, for its relatively smooth transition to a new constitution, and for its success in making that transition with a minimum of violence. While Tunisia is distinctive in a number of ways---small, with a relatively homogenous population, geographic isolation from the Middle East, prosperous but not oil-rich in economy, friendly in its relationship with former colonial power, parsimonious in spending on the military---all of which might constitute a part of the explanation for success, but none of those distinctive characteristics links directly with the outcome of the Arab Spring.. Could political culture, itself a product of these forces, provide an overall explanation for its movement toward liberal democracy?

In what follows I will argue that the answer is “no.” First, the challenge is to explain why Tunisia, a Muslim country and therefore a part of what Welzel calls the “Islamic East,” has distinguished itself from other countries in the area. Culture conceived at the level of zones does not help with that question. One would have to find evidence of sharp differences between Tunisian responses and those of other countries within the culture zone, but comparison, I will argue, does not turn up such differences. Tunisians appear about as religious as other Arab Muslims, as committed to democratic norms, similar in their degree of willingness to trust other people, and

similar in their commitment to emancipative values. The results of the sixth and seventh waves of the World Values Survey, which included Tunisia for the first time, demonstrate the difficulties in identifying unique public attitudes and values that explain the Tunisian case.

[Figures 2 to 5 about here.]

For example, because secularism has been a vital element in the modernization paradigm, one might reasonably expect that Tunisia's progress reflects a less religious, more secular population. Several items in the World Values Surveys seek to tap religiosity. One such question is "Do you consider yourself a religious person?" More than 70% of respondents in 11 of 15 countries from the MENA in the sixth and seventh waves of the survey classified themselves as religious persons. In Tunisia the proportion was 63%, roughly the same as the percentage in Kuwait and Lebanon. Egypt topped the charts at 97% (See Figure 2). By another measure of religiosity, the frequency of prayer, Tunisia ranked second, tied with Algeria, in the percentage of people saying they prayed "never or practically never" (13%), well behind Yemen (38%) among ten MENA countries. Nonetheless, more than 80% of Tunisians reported praying at least several times a week, joining six other states in that category among the ten where the question was posed (See Figure 3.) Tunisians looked slightly different from fellow Arabs in responding to a question about the importance of God in their lives: about 72% rated God as "very important," 10 on a scale of 1 to 10, which was below average for the countries where the question was posed. At the lower end of the scale were Bahrain, Turkey, and Lebanon. (See Figure 4.) In these two waves, the World Values Survey combined a set of questions to assess the overall presence of secular values in a society. On that scale none of the 14 MENA countries for which the index could be calculated rated as highly secular. Those with the highest proportion of respondents reporting moderately secular values were Lebanon, Algeria, Palestine, Iraq, Palestine, and Tunisia. (See Figure 5).

These inconsistent and even contradictory results indicate why it would be difficult to argue that religiosity or secularism necessarily accounts for the political outcome in Tunisia. Tunisia is a country whose first president, Habib Bourguiba, acted in ways broadly interpreted as secular but might be better understood as representing a reformist notion of Islam. He encouraged an Islamist movement among students in the 1970s as a means of combating what he regarded as a more threatening movement from the socialist left. Eventually the Islamist movement under the leadership of Rachid al-Ghannouchi acquired such broad support that the government declared it illegal. The ban lasted more than 30 years. In short, Tunisia has participated in the Islamic revival movement that has affected every Muslim country but has done so without abandoning a secularizing tradition that began under Bourguiba. Its history is unique, but the survey results do not set it apart from its neighbors on the spectrum of religiosity and secularism.

[Figures 6 and 7 about here.]

Tunisia does not stand apart, either, with respect to several values and attitudes thought important to the establishment and maintenance of liberal democracy. On the importance of democracy, Tunisia ranks right at the average (66%) of respondents choosing to give democracy a rating of at least eight on a scale of ten in 14 MENA countries. Egyptians led the field with almost 90% of respondents giving democracy high importance in each of two surveys conducted after the Arab Spring of 2011. (See Figure 6). In Tunisia the per cent of respondents giving democracy high importance dropped from 77 in 2013, only two years after the revolution, to 64 in 2019. Among these 14 countries only Turkey and Lebanon might be said to have serious experience with democracy but the appreciation of democracy deteriorated in both those countries, too, from the 6th to the 7th wave of interviewing.

As others have observed, verbal praise of democracy does not necessarily coincide with

democratic practice. Asked to evaluate the degree of democracy practiced by their own governments,—“How democratically is this country being governed today?”—41% of respondents in Tunisia chose ratings below four on a scale of ten in 2013, and that number did drop in 2019 but still constituted almost a third of those who responded, a result perhaps not surprising in a country emerging from dictatorship. The countries where respondents were most inclined to say their countries were governed in substantially democratic ways (above 4 on a 10 point scale) were Iran, Algeria, Turkey, and Jordan.[Figure 8 about here.]

Mapping Political Attitudes

One could suppose that the relatively homogeneity of Tunisian society would contribute to a sense of community solidarity that might be detectable by survey methods. In fact, there is a bit of evidence for that. Interviewers asked respondents how they think of themselves by offering three options: member of local community, citizen of the world, and part of the nation. Respondents could agree strongly, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly with each of the three options. Tunisians were among those most likely to “strongly agree” with that they felt “part of the nation.” Only Qataris (92%), Libyans (77%), and Egyptians (70%) topped Tunisia (68%) in this regard among the 14 MENA nations where this question was asked in the sixth wave. Of course, Qatar’s population and geography are both minuscule by comparison even with Tunisia; and Libya, small in population but immense in territory, had almost disappeared as a political entity when the survey was conducted in 2013. Multiple militias controlled segments of the territory after the fall of President Qadhdhafi. The long history of Egypt makes a high level of national identification quite plausible. Algeria (64%) and Yemen (62%) were not far behind Tunisia’s 68%. Perhaps the Arab Spring, which affected Libya, Egypt, Yemen, and even Algeria more than some other countries contributed to this strong support for the nation. The places where many respondents chose to “disagree” or “strongly

disagree” about identification with the nation were Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon, and Turkey. Sharp ethnic and/or religious division marks each of those countries (See Figure 8).

Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel have argued that “emancipative values” are the most reliable indicators of the shift toward liberal democratic values, even more reliable than the degree to which countries undergo secularization. In *Freedom Rising*, Christian Welzel constructs indexes for both these concepts, each of them built on the use of answers to 12 survey questions in four subgroups. He labels the subgroups of questions designed to measure secularization as defiance, agnosticism, relativism, and skepticism. The index requires reversal of responses to most of the twelve questions, asking about things such as national pride, whether one identifies as a religious person, whether one trusts the police, etc. The subgroups of questions to test emancipative values focus on choice, equality, voice, and autonomy. Those questions touch toleration, women’s equality, freedom of speech, and independence as a desired quality, among other things. Welzel shows that these sets of questions tap into two different scales of values. People who respond positively to one of the questions on a single scale tend to be positive on the others, and vice versa.

Welzel standardizes the responses to all the questions on range of 0 to 1. Thus, on a question that permits survey participants to respond “strongly agree, agree, disagree, and strongly disagree,” the responses would be coded 1.0, .67, .33, and 0. Such standardization permits averaging responses even when a response is missing or a question is not asked in a particular survey. From there it is possible to produce national averages (means) on each of these two scales. Welzel’s scatter plot of some 95 countries updates the map Inglehart produced in 1997, which tended to group countries by cultural region.¹⁶ The “Islamic East” appears in the southwest corner of Welzel’s map, and northern Europe in the northeast. Welzel offers some evidence that all countries are moving in a direction of southwest to northeast. He thinks technology is a significant factor in that change.

[Figure 9 about here.]

On a map of just the MENA countries included in the Sixth Wave of the World Values Survey, Tunisia figures in the middle on both scales (See Figure 9). On the emancipative values scale it ranks higher than the monarchies, and even a bit higher than Turkey, although Turkey looks more secular in values. The position of Lebanon surely reflects the multi-denominational, multiethnic makeup of that country and its long experience with consensus-oriented democracy.¹⁷ Once again, the position of Tunisia on these two scales does not explain why it has been more successful than other countries in making a fresh start after the Arab Spring. The map does tend to suggest that the culture of the monarchies included in this wave of surveys—Jordan, Morocco, and Qatar—are more conservative. The monarchies promote stability, continuity, religious tradition, patriarchy, family, deference, and nobility. In short, they systematically discourage secularism and emancipative values.

The comparisons derived from the World Values Survey may help an attentive reader to make some significant distinctions among countries within what Welzel calls a “culture zone.” That does not necessarily mean that culture has constrained these countries. Welzel thinks the fate of cultural areas itself depends on technology and on access to what he calls “cool water.” The “cool water hypothesis” explains why Europe leaped ahead and stayed ahead in the medieval period. Its access to rain water for agriculture and bodies of water for internal transportation constituted an enormous advantage. That natural advantage spurred technological advances that have differentially penetrated culture zones. He claims that 62% of the variation in secular values and 72% of the variation of emancipative values among nation-states can be explained by the mean performance of their culture zones. But, according to Welzel, the reasons for the existence of cultural zones may not be cultural! Within a single culture zone, which is the Middle East and North Africa in this case, culture defined in this way explains nothing. As one authority observed, “The closer one comes to

understanding when, where, and why culture matters, the more it appears that culture is only a mask for the forces that really matter.”¹⁸

Cause and Effect

The data show that values and attitudes vary by country, but discovering patterns in the variations to account for different political trajectories is not easy. That is the first reason why the concept of political culture defined as values and attitudes measured by survey research does not explain Tunisia’s success. There is a second reason. The assumption of those looking at the impact of culture is that culture affects values, values affect attitudes, and people act in accord with their values and attitudes. Mark Tessler of the University of Michigan has worked hard at evaluating that assumption in the context of the Middle East and North Africa. In particular, he has sought to understand why it is that Muslims in the MENA differ rather sharply in their opinions about the role of religion in politics. Some think the leadership should be religious and policies should reflect religious principles. Some do not. In a study initially published in 2008, Amaney Jamal and Tessler worked with Arab Barometer data from Morocco, Algeria, Palestine, Jordan, and Kuwait. They reported that 56% of respondents said they thought religious leaders should influence political decisions, while 44% disagreed with that idea.

One might imagine that those who are most devout would be most inclined to favor a strong role for religion in politics. One might also imagine, in the light of the secularization hypothesis, that the most religious respondents would be least likely to favor democracy. What Jamal and Tessler discovered was that more than 90% of respondents in these countries favored democratic arrangements, and only some of these respondents expressed a preference for an Islamic version of democracy.

The regression analysis shows that personal religiosity is not significantly related to

political-system preference in any of the five countries in which Arab Barometer surveys were conducted. This is consistent with earlier findings; not only does religiosity not lead men and women to be less supportive of democracy, it does not lead them to be more supportive of a political system that incorporates an Islamic dimension.¹⁹

They concluded that the best explanation of a respondent's preference for a political system influenced by Islam lay with that person's judgment about his or her own political system. The explanation, derived from questions about trust in government, citizens' ability to influence policy, and democracy's capacity to maintain order, took a somewhat different form in each country.

These differences invite inquiry into the ways that particular national circumstances determine how political judgments shape citizens' attitudes about the desired connection between democracy and Islam. Even in the absence of such inquiry, however, findings from the Arab Barometer make clear that explanatory power is to be found in political judgments rather than religious orientations.²⁰

If religion is important in defining a political culture but high levels of religious commitment do not translate into predictable political attitudes much less actions designed to impede progress toward democracy, the utility of the concept itself comes into question.

A few years later, working with forty-four data sets from fifteen different countries, Tessler advanced a slightly modified argument.²¹ From ten questions asked in various surveys, he constructed an index for the way respondents envisioned a desirable relationship between religion and politics, from utter separation to thorough entanglement. To account for variations in the attitude measured by the index, he drew upon four sorts of independent variables: educational level achieved by respondents, attitudes toward gender equality, political judgments about the regime, and

economic circumstances measured by the respondent's satisfaction with life. He controlled for personal religiosity, sex, and age of respondents. He also divided the countries between those where political systems had or have a strong connection to religion and those where the connection is less explicit. Among regimes with a strong religious connection, positive regime evaluation emerged as a significant contributor to support for political Islam, while economic condition and satisfaction of the respondent were less significant in these states than in the more secular states. Personal religiosity, introduced as a control variable, emerged as a significant factor in both sets of states. It appeared to propel respondents in the direction of political Islam, while higher support for gender equality turned them in the opposite direction.²² This finding softens the earlier Tessler argument about a lack of correlation between religiosity and Islamist tendencies.

The problem of distinguishing cause and effect is endemic to this sort of analysis. Because a survey gathers multiple responses at a single moment in time, it is difficult to satisfy David Hume's cardinal rules for an empirical proof of a causal relationship: cause should precede effect.²³ Within the realm of survey research, the solution would be serial interviews with a single set of respondents, something that is virtually impossible even at the level of a single nation. The next best approach is repetition of surveys utilizing many of the same questions. Such data is now available over a period of decades for the United States and Europe. Within the Middle East and North Africa, time series data are available for only a few countries, such as Turkey and Egypt. Where no serial data is available, analysts often look at age cohorts, as Inglehart did in his first article about post-bourgeois values in Europe.²⁴ The assumption is that the attitudes of older cohorts may reflect their experience in growing up. If younger cohorts are more inclined to embrace emancipative values, one could predict a broader incidence of such values in the future. If, as Tessler showed, it is older men who are more inclined to reject equality of the genders, that might suggest future change.

Because answers to a single questionnaire come from the mind of a single respondent, it is difficult to satisfy another of Hume's requirements: cause must be separate from effect. Can one suppose that a respondent's report of religious feelings is fully separable from the same respondent's political inclinations? A respondent might or might not see them that way, and if they are simply two aspects of a single set of values, it makes no sense to speak of cause and effect. Even if it is possible to demonstrate separation, another of Hume's conditions threatens empirical verification of cause and effect: cause must force an effect into existence. Tessler talks about trying to develop "causal stories" that enjoy reasonable plausibility. For example, he reasons that a person with deep misgivings about treating women equally in terms of rights and opportunities may feel impelled to prefer an Islamic form of government that he or she thinks would push back against egalitarianism between the sexes. Another example cited by Tessler: "It is perhaps not surprising that regime evaluation has the greatest impact on the views of older men, who are probably more politically mature than other population categories and more likely to have a sense of Islam's place in the country's and region's political history."²⁵ That is, negative evaluation of a relatively secular regime could lead older men to favor political Islam; in a regime "connected to religion," the mechanism might function in the opposite direction. Tessler cautions: "Deriving coherent causal stories from findings like these is a challenge that can be met to only a limited degree without additional research."²⁶ It would be difficult to argue that a person who is skeptical about equal rights for women must necessarily favor a government oriented to Islam, or that older men who dislike the secular state are obliged to favor Islamic politics. Human beings remain autonomous agents.

Inglehart and Welzel, together and individually, have done their best to show empirically that there is a single trajectory of human development that emerged first in Europe and is now extending itself to the whole globe. They have some serial data at their disposal, but Welzel goes beyond

empiricism to assert that there is a fundamental human impulse to be free, independent, and unconstrained by circumstances. “Humans are programmed to ascend rather than descend the utility ladder of freedoms; they stop their ascension as long as necessary to continue it as soon as possible.”²⁷ The forcing element is thus to be found in human nature, coupled with resources (such as the cool-water condition), emancipative values and certain civic guarantees. The result is human empowerment. And where is culture in this logic? It is nowhere to be found in the causal models Welzel proposes.²⁸ Welzel’s explanation goes well beyond empirical analysis; it is a declaration of *a priori* conviction.

The notion of political culture starts from a presumption about the particularity of a region or a nation-state that makes it more or less likely to adopt and maintain a liberal democratic political system. Are there are cultural attributes that can be said to have put Tunisia on its course, which at this writing appears quite different from the paths of Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Yemen? It turns out to be difficult to isolate such attributes and even harder to show empirically that those attributes affect political outcomes. But the very questions posed by the effort to describe political culture, such as whether and how it can contribute to democratic development, may presuppose a universalistic pattern of human development that denies the significance of cultural diversity! The presupposition gives meaning and purpose to the empirical findings but undermines their importance.

Redefining Political Culture

Steven Welch offers a promising approach to the problem of linking attitudes with actions and therefore accounting for the evolution of political cultures. He suggests that political culture comports two dimensions, attitudes of the general public, and political discourse, which usually involves primarily political elites, journalists, and academics. Surveys capture attitudes at a certain moment in time and do not provide direct linkages to action, while discourse is dynamic and may

help rigidify attitudes and attitudes or promote change.

My suggestion. . . is then that discourse influences behaviour not directly, in the form of the determination of behaviour by consciously held attitudes, underlying (but still expressible) values, or internalized rules, but indirectly, in a two-stage process. . .

First, discourse constructs or constitutes new things in the world. Secondly, individuals must adapt to these, that is, learn how to ‘go on’ in relation to them.²⁹

Discourse does not, of course, necessarily confine itself to national boundaries, and this fact contributes to its dynamism. Ideas such as Arabism and Islamism affect discourse in every country of the MENA, but there are also unique aspects of political discourse in every country. Moreover, discourse is cumulative. The discussion of the American Founders at the moment of independence and constitution-making remains relevant to contemporary America, as do the thoughts and writings of prominent Americans ever since. Contemporary discourse evokes memory and history; it does not necessarily emphasize emancipative values or endorse the modernization paradigm, a fact that may help explain why the path of “progress” identified by Welzel has not been one of consistent ascent.

Adding a discursive element to the concept of political culture makes it more useful in accounting for national development in the Middle East and North Africa. The attitudes measured by survey research may look quite similar from country to country, but those attitudes need to be considered in the light of a discourse that, though it may be shared, is distinctive in each country. Every government seeks to shape public perceptions and attitudes via policies, propaganda, and education. Intellectuals support, criticize, and oppose, where there is sufficient liberty to do so. It makes sense to envision political culture as a constantly evolving interaction of the inertial, constraining forces of habit and attitude with the discursive strains seeking always to sustain, amend,

or even transform mass response. Such a conception helps account for the fact that “culture moves³⁰” but that it usually moves more slowly than policies and even institutions. Values and attitudes of the general public become a factor that discourse can scarcely ignore, and those values and attitudes must necessarily be seen as result of and response to discourse rather than merely a cause of it.

Lisa Wedeen’s study of Syria under the Assads implements something approaching this idea of political culture.³¹ She looked carefully at a preposterous discourse developed in Syria to support President Hafiz al-Asad as a person of miraculous abilities, son of a mother likened to the Madonna, the man said to be “every Syrian” and a god as well. Of course, many Syrians did not believe all of this, but they behaved as if they did, all the while enjoying cartoons and plays that provided large hints of disbelief. But, Wedeen argued, the cultivation of this fantasy discourse nurtured compliance with a highly authoritarian regime. And compliance kept Hafiz al-Asad in power for thirty years. Wedeen has argued that culture understood as practices that acquire meaning, such as the cultivation and maintenance of the cult she describes, can be treated as a causal variable.

Attitudes toward Arabism and Islam may appear rather similar from country to country, but the discourses reflected in those attitudes may be very different. Political discourse in Tunisia, for example, differs significantly from the discourse in Algeria, Morocco, or Egypt, not to mention Saudi Arabia. Arabism and Islam figure in the discourse of all these countries, just as those ideas color public responses. Language theoretically unites these countries, but in fact discourse differs in important ways because of the varying importance of local dialects and the place of French in Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco. Focus on discourse helps one understand how and why Berberism has arisen as an issue in Algeria and Morocco, even though surveys fail to turn up startling differences between those who speak a dialect of Arabic at home and those who speak Berber.

Similarly, the presence of a sizable Coptic Christian minority in Egypt affects discourse there, even if Copts and Muslims respond very similarly to most survey questions.

An examination of discourse in Tunisia may shed more light on Tunisian distinctiveness and success than analysis of survey research. Just looking at the work of two key figures and a set of intellectuals can give some idea of why this country is quite different from others. The figures are Habib Bourguiba, leader of the independence movement and the first president of independent Tunisia, and Rachid Ghannouchi, an organizer of the Islamist movement in Turkey and an Islamist thinker. The intellectuals are a group of secular academics who have sought to rethink the political role of Islam in a place deeply influenced first by Bourguiba and then by Ghannouchi. A quick sketch of these contributions may help account for the political culture in which a leader was overthrown, an interim government established, a constitution approved, and a new political system inaugurated without large-scale violence.

Like many great leaders, Bourguiba managed to reconcile what seemed to be irreconcilable. He engineered independence from France without jeopardizing French cooperation and even goodwill. He campaigned for independence, often resorting to colloquial Arabic and invoking Islam, but then established a secular state and enacted a *Code du Statut Personnel* (CSP) that ignored religious law to establish rights for all citizens, male and female. Seeing himself as endowed with religious responsibility, he told Tunisians they were exempt from the need to fast during Ramadan because they were engaged in a jihad against poverty and underdevelopment. He founded and developed a political party that spread its tentacles to every part of the country and generated political participation—in a political party (the name changed over time; initially it was the Neo-Destour) that drew international praise and study of its effectiveness—even as he used that mechanism to solidify a progressively more authoritarian regime.³² He experimented with socialism but then abandoned it,

only to embrace Islamism and then regret that decision. He governed the country for thirty years, encouraging, cajoling, criticizing and otherwise shaping the mentalities of his co-citizens. The rhetoric was that of a tutelary democracy even after he engineered his election as president for life.

Ghannouchi responded to Bourguiba's secularism as well as to his authoritarianism, developing a formidable organization, the *Mouvement de Tendance Islamique* (MTI), to challenge the regime and then, after Ben Ali pushed aside Bourguiba and appeared to open the political system, turning the movement into a political party called al-Nahda. Faced with possible defeat, the new regime backed away from liberalization, banning the Nahda party and sending Ghannouchi into exile. There he continued to develop his conception of how and why Islam required democracy. He kept the discourse alive while many of his followers languished in Ben Ali's prisons. Liberated in the Arab Spring of 2011, he returned to Tunisia to lead the Nahda toward a share in an interim government and a dominant position in the constituent assembly. Then, when the assembly seemed to be at a standstill, when a Nahda-led government found itself under heavy criticism, and when the elected Islamist president of Egypt, Muhammad Morsi, lost his office in a military coup, Ghannouchi pulled the Nahda from power and spoke for compromise on the constitution. He accepted a constitution without mention of the Sharia and decided not to champion a candidate for the presidency. While this account may exaggerate Ghannouchi's dominance of the Islamist movement in Tunisia, it does not overplay his impact on political discourse in that country.

A group of Tunisian intellectuals responded to Ghannouchi with speech and writing that echoed Bourguiba's secular instincts and his verbal commitment to liberal democracy but also took account of the Muslim revival and the influence of Ghannouchi in particular. Yadh Ben Achour, Mohammed Talbi, Hamadi Redissi, Hmida Enneifer, Abdelmajid Charfi, Mohamed Charfi, and Sana Ben Achour, all of them academics, spoke and wrote around the turn of the millennium in a vein

that might be termed post-Islamic. They confronted Islamic history as a means of understanding what that history might mean for modern politics. They tended to reject the radical version of secularism developed in France and applied by Mustafa Kemal in Turkey at the same time that they rejected the idea that medieval legal codes should be applied in a modern society. They argued for flexibility in Islamic interpretation and rejection of the rigidity of Wahhabi and other radical conceptions, albeit with various nuances and approaches. By embracing liberal democratic principles, they implicitly rejected the authoritarianism of the Ben Ali regime and fostered wariness about the Islamism of Ghannouchi, whom they feared as he waited in the wings.³³

Those three streams of thought have dominated political discourse in Tunisia and helped create a unique political culture. Tunisia defines itself as Arab but the Arabic language does not have the same meaning in Tunisia as next door in Algeria, where the teaching of modern standard Arabic has been linked to the spread of state-sponsored Islam, a combination seen as threatening in Berber-speaking areas. Tunisia is a three-language country: the local dialect of Arabic which everyone knows; French, which almost everyone knows to some degree and some use extensively, and modern standard Arabic, which is taught in schools and used in certain disciplines at the university level. Many members of the elite can function in all three languages.

Tunisia defines itself as a Muslim state, but the constitution does not mention the Sharia. There is controversy and conversation about the role of publicly supported mosques. Under Ben Ali the mosques were locked between prayer cycles to prevent their use as political gathering places for Islamists. Now there seems to be agreement about preserving “neutrality” in the mosques. What that means is not yet clear, but it seems to distinguish Tunisia from Saudi Arabia and even Egypt, Turkey, Iran, and just about every other Arab Muslim country. While Tunisia feels the impact of sermons broadcast from the Gulf region, and French-language programming from Europe, it has

managed to create a pluralistic mainstream that may be capable of repulsing the attacks of radicals, impatient with the pace of economic and social development.

* * *

A dualistic conception of political culture conceived as the interplay of political discourse and orientations of the general public compromises comparability between nation-states. Comparability is a key attribute of what has been called the psychological approach to political culture, based on survey research ever since publication of the *The Civic Culture* and continued to this day with the The World Values Survey and the Arab Barometer. The advent of survey research, long blocked by the hostility of governments, enabled comparison at the national level by identifying political culture with percentages of responses to survey questions and more efficiently, in the case of the “mapping” of the World Values Survey, to a country’s position on two scales: secularism and emancipative values. Focusing on the written and oral discourse of elites suggests a partial return to an anthropological conception of culture, dependent on interpretation of utterances and publications but not presumptive of consensus, coherence, or persistence.³⁴

The weaknesses of survey research are several. One assumption is that mass attitudes affect elites in the policy making process who then influence outcomes. As Coppedge observes, there is much evidence to show that influence may flow in the other direction, from elites to masses.³⁵ It may be that elites shape political culture rather than being constrained by it. Moreover, while surveys may tap the attitudes of respondents, it is not certain that attitudes reflect deeply held values, which remain invisible, or that attitudes necessarily shape behavior. “Much of cultural theory is still suggesting that ‘culture matters,’ but it has not been able to replace this vague message with more specific causal models, confirmed by empirical tests.”³⁶ The approach reflects a strong faith in a paradigm of modernization that links economic progress with shifts toward secularism and self-

expression that subsequently underpins democratization. It is implicitly deterministic. Lawson writes: “To summarize, the perspectives of the political culture school, although not necessarily deterministic in their assumptions, have nonetheless been marshalled in the construction of political theories of causal determinism.”³⁷

Revising that approach by identifying political culture with both discourse and public attitudes does not necessarily contradict the underlying thesis of the modernization paradigm. Political discourse may focus on democratic development and push a culture in the predicted direction, but this approach also can help explain why the Islamic revival movement has since 1967 defied the secularization hypothesis of the paradigm. Almost everywhere in the Muslim world, Tunisia included, political discourse turns on religious issues more significantly than it did fifty years ago. In *Sacred and Secular*, Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart argue that this revival of religion will be temporary.³⁸ They also suggest that persistent religiosity in the United States makes it an outlier among highly developed nations.³⁹ Including discourse as an element of political culture, as both contributor and respondent to public attitudes, is to render political culture a positive, causal role in political outcomes.

The dualistic approach avoids the deterministic tendencies of the modernization paradigm and offers a possible linkage between attitudes and behavior. It owes something to an anthropological model, because it depends upon interpretation of discourse by human observers within or outside a country. While methodologies such as computerized content analysis might be helpful, thick description of the kind Lisa Wedeen has attempted in Syria and Yemen would also be appropriate and effective.⁴⁰ Such a dualistic approach imparts embraces a concept of political culture as a work in progress, something that is continuously generated and revised. It thus addresses some of the problems inherent in the universalistic, psychological approach.


Looking at verbal interchange in a country does not require speculation on its future course but opens the way toward using public opinion research to assess the impact of such discourse. How do Tunisians see Bourguiba and his ideas today? And those of Ghannouchi? How much has the intellectual discourse about Islam penetrated a broader public? What makes Tunisia unique? The World Values Survey supports comparison as a primary goal, and with that aim Inglehart, Welzel and associates have found commonalities across cultures. Yet the purpose of political culture as a concept has always been the illumination of politics in a single state and explication of patterns that defy comparison. To be sure, the surveys designed to facilitate comparison contribute to the understanding of a country such as Tunisia, but these surveys do not treat political culture as an explanatory factor in national politics. Adding discourse to the definition permits an exploration of national particularism and retains the possibility of comparison, though likely not primarily in quantitative fashion.

Even adding the idea that discourse helps explain the evolution of political culture does suffice to account for the enormous changes in political culture described in earlier chapters of this study. European imperialism sought to destroy existing versions of political culture in the region and in favor of science, rationalism, secularism, and liberalism. They also introduced conceptions of nationalism that led to the politicization of cultural particularisms that brought profound changes to the region. While the initial assault on the political cultures of the MENA came from Europe, it was independent governments of the region who pursued changes that help explain why women enjoy widely varying rights and opportunities across the region. Islamist movements politicized religion in ways that altered discourse, attitudes, and values across the region. Governments responded to those movements with both accommodation and repression, further changing political cultures. What is more, most national governments in the region have sought to control all political discourse

through manipulation of media and arresting political opposition. While discourse at the national and international level about matters such as human rights and political freedom have indubitably had some effect, most countries in this region have not accorded substantial freedom of expression. They have manipulated political culture to prevent effective individual participation in politics and to thwart any discourse that would move political culture toward the values and attitudes seen as supportive of democratic practice. Israel is a partial exception to that observation, but only partial because it has not managed to bring Palestinian Arabs into its political system.

The actions of governments inside and outside the region show that culture matters to them. Europe and the United States seek from the outside to promote human rights and reinforce liberal, democratic values. Inside the region, governments appeal to culture as they try to strengthen national identity and solidify their holds on power. Opposition forces politicize Islam to attack those in power as too much driven by Western models even as they seek to promote a version of modernity heavily influenced by those models. No two countries in the region have followed exactly the same pattern. The determinism that lurks in the political culture literature, or is explicit in what Christian Welzel has written, is not manifest. Nothing can, of course, disprove the predictions of modernization theory. For now, though, human beings at the helm of political organizations large and small appear to guarantee the significance of culture, and with that significance come consequences quite the opposite of the liberal democratic societies promised by the political culture literature.

Figure 2
Do you consider yourself a religious person?



% of Respondents responding "yes", WVS Waves 6 (2010-14) and 7 (2017-20). Where country is included in both waves (Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Tunisia, and Turkey), % is average of the two results.

Figure 3
How Often Do You Pray?





Figure 4
How Important is God in your life?

Scale of 1 to 10



Per cent respondents answering "very important" 10 on scale of 1 to 10 in Waves 6 (2010-2014) and 7 (2-17-2020) of the World Values Survey. For countries included in both waves, I result from Wave 7 appears here.

Figure 5
Overall Secular Values






Figure 6
How important is democracy?



Responses to Waves 6 (2010-14) and 7(2017-20) of the World Values Survey. For countries included in both waves, results are for Wae 7. Respondent asked to rate importance of democracy on a scale of 1 to 10. Order is based on medium plus high responses.

Figure 7
How democratically is this country being governed?



Responses from Wave 6 (2010-14) and Wave 7 (2017-20) of the World Values Survey. On scale of 1 to 10, "not much" = 1 to 3; "somewhat" = 4 to 7; Mostly or completely = 8 to 10. Where countries included in both waves, result here is from Wave 7. States order

■ Mostly ■ Somewhat ■ Not Much

Figure 8
"I see myself as part of the _____ nation."





Figure 9
Secular vs. Emancipative Values



Waves 6 (2010-14) and Wave 7(2017-20) of the World Values Survey. Indexes combining several questions each.

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1. Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History*, trans. Franz Rosenthal (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967).
 2. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*; tr. Elizabeth Trapnell Rawlings, abridged (Boston: Bedford/St Martins, c2009).
 3. Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963).
 4. Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, trans. Talcott Parsons (New York, Scribner 1958).
 5. Lucian W. Pye & Sidney Verba, eds., *Political Culture and Political Development*, (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1965).
 6. See Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba, eds., *The Civic Culture Revisited* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1989).
 7. Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992.)
 8. Ronald Inglehart, "The Renaissance of Political Culture," *American Political Science Review*, 82:4 (Dec., 1988), pp. 1203-1230.
 9. Richard J. Ellis and Michael Thompson, eds., *Culture Matters: Essays in Honor of Aaron Wildavsky* (Boulder: Westview, 1997); Geert Hofstede, *Culture's Consequences*, 2nd ed., (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2001), and Lawrence E. Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington, eds., *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress* (New York: Basic Books, c2000).
 10. Ellis and Thompson, p. 2.
 11. Ronald Inglehart, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990); Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political*

Change in 43 Societies (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997); Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

12. Ronald Inglehart, *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977).

13. Inglehart, "The Renaissance of Political Culture," p. 1203.

14. Christian Welzel, *Freedom Rising: Human Empowerment and the Quest for Emancipation* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 87. A version of this map appears below as Figure 9.

15. Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

16. Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997), 93.

17. Arend Lijphart originally termed a system such as Lebanon's consociational. Later he moved toward the term consensual. Arend Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy*, 2nd ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012).

18. Stephen Welch, *The Concept of Political Culture*, (London: St. Martin's and Macmillan, 1993), cited in Michael Coppedge, *Democratization and Research Methods* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 255.

19. Amaney Jamal and Mark Tessler, "The democracy Barometers: Attitudes in the Arab World (2008)," Chap. 5 in Mark Tessler, ed., *Public Opinion in the Middle East: Survey Research and the Political Orientations of Ordinary Citizens* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011), 117. For a measure of religiosity Jamal and Tessler used the frequency of Quran reading reported by the respondents: they

could respond “every day,” “several times a week,” “sometimes,” or “rarely/never.”

20. Ibid.

21. Mark Tessler, *Islam and Politics in the Middle East: Explaining the views of ordinary citizens* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015). The Arab Barometer surveys he used and the years in which they were conducted are as follows: Iran 2005; Iraq 2003, 2006, and 2011; Lebanon 2007; Palestine 2006; Saudi Arabia 2003; Sudan 2011; and Turkey 2001 and 2007.

22. Tessler, *Islam and Politics*, 143-144.

23. David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Volume 1 (London: J. M. Dent and Sons, 1961), 76-86.

The subsequent references to Hume are all to this section, but my summary probably reflects someone else’s interpretation rather than my memory of reading this work as an undergraduate at Carleton College.

24. Ronald Inglehart, *Culture shift in advanced industrial society* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990).

25. Tessler, *Islam and Politics*, 216.

26. Tessler, *Islam and Politics*, 219.

27. Welzel, *Freedom Rising*, 408.

28. Welzel, *Freedom Rising*, 355, 362, 370.

29. Steven Welch, *The Theory of Political Culture* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) 190.

30. The reference is to Thomas R. Rochon, *Culture Moves: Ideas, Activism, and Changing Values* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998.)

31. Lisa Wedeen, *Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).

32. See Clement Henry Moore, *Tunisia since Independence; the Dynamics of One-party Government*.

(Berkeley, University of California Press, 1965); and Lars Rudebeck, *Party and People: a Study of Political Change in Tunisia* (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1967) for favorable accounts of the early Bourguiba regime.

33. Robert D. Lee, "Tunisian Intellectuals: Responses to Islamism," *Journal of North African Studies* 13:2 (2008), 157-173.

34. Michael Coppedge, *Democratization and Research Methods* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012, 223ff, makes that distinction.

35. Coppedge, 255.

36 Jan-Erik Lane and Svante Ersson, *Culture and Politics: A Comparative Approach* (Hants, UK: Ashgate, 2002), 262.

37. Stephanie Lawson, *Culture and Context in World Politics* (Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 142.

38. Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004). page???

39. Welzel, *Freedom Rising*, p. 93, suggests that the U. S. position on the cultural map, conditioned by less secular attitudes than many post-industrial societies, nonetheless follows the trend line at the 95% confidence level.

40. Wedeen, *Ambiguities of Domination*, and *Peripheral visions: publics, power, and performance in Yemen* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008).