

REGIONAL POLITICS IN A UNITARY SYSTEM
COLONIAL ALGERIA, 1920--1954

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by
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I

THE POLITICS OF FINANCIAL AUTONOMY

1920-1940

CHAPTER 1
MINORITY RULE

Despite early French efforts to transform Algeria into a replica of rural France,¹ colonization became essentially an urban phenomenon. While non-Muslims (Europeans and native Jews) made up about 50 per cent of the 22 Algerian cities with 50,000 inhabitants or more in 1926, they were but a sixth or a seventh of the total population.² Moreover, while birth rates among the European population declined, they rose for Muslims as death rates declined.³ Largely unnoticed in the 1930's, the difference in growth rates became unmistakable after World War II. It is estimated that the European population of Algeria increased at an annual rate of 1.4 per cent; after 1950, the Muslim population of Algeria grew at a rate of 2.5 per cent.⁴ The most thorough investigation of the problem produced evidence that the Muslim population in 1976 might fall between 11 and 14 millions--about twice what it had been in 1936.⁵

European politicians could read the message: they represented a minority that was growing proportionately smaller. Under conditions of universal suffrage or in an

all-out war for which they lacked technical and organizational advantages, they would surely lose to the Muslims. Hence extreme solutions emphasizing either the oneness of Algeria and France or the separation of colony and mother country were equally unacceptable to the settlers. Too much autonomy might jeopardize their access to the military resources required for their protection, and too much dependence on the metropolis might subject them to the whims of unsympathetic, equality-minded legislators, who might grant full political representation to Muslims.

For Arabs and Berbers active in politics, however, the most salient aspect of the Algerian environment was the economic and social dominance, despite weakness in numbers, of the Europeans. The process of colonization had pushed Arabs and Berbers off 2.7 million hectares of the best land in Algeria. By 1955, farming large plots of land by efficient methods, Europeans produced 40 per cent of the cereals, 90 per cent of the wine, and 70 per cent of the fruits and vegetables; they held virtually all the important positions in industry, commerce, and administration.⁶ Moreover, the settlers and native Jews monopolized the use of educational facilities. Before 1940 Muslim enrollments in institutions of secondary and higher education were insignificant proportions of the total, and it was not until 1945 that Arabs and Berbers began to outnumber Europeans even at the elementary level.⁷

To be sure, not all Europeans were equally well off and not all Arabs and Berbers were deprived of economic, educational, and social advantages.⁸ Because Algeria remained essentially agricultural rather than industrial, even in 1954,⁹ a rural, landed elite disposed of financial and social influence quite disproportionate to its numbers. Although many European wage-earners enjoyed incomes that were unexceptional by continental standards, they still lived better than most Muslims. Similarly, while the tiny percentage of Arabs and Berbers who were large landholders, government officials, or professional persons enjoyed incomes much higher than the average European's, most Muslims were poor by comparison with the Europeans and even with their own ancestors. Even those wage-earners employed in European agriculture or industry probably lived less well than had their forefathers who had tilled the Algerian soil in the years before French conquest and the advent of the market economy.¹⁰ A fourth to a third of the potential Muslim working force was unemployed in the last years of the colonial period.¹¹ A new French-educated elite began to emerge after 1900, but its numbers remained small after World War II,¹² and even education did not guarantee economic and social success for a young Algerian. Muslims were systematically excluded from positions of responsibility and prestige in the army, in business, and in government. A professional directory of "all Algiers" for 1937-1938 included not a single name of obvious Arab or Berber origin.¹³

How does one justify such gross inequities in the distribution of roles and such obvious discrimination in the allocation of rewards? If the standards are the egalitarian, democratic ideals of the Third and Fourth French Republics, no justification would seem possible. And yet Algeria's legal status as three départements of metropolitan France invited such comparison. Democracy is said to be the system of government most receptive to the incorporation of new groups and hence most conducive to evolutionary rather than revolutionary change.¹⁴ Why did violence become necessary to give Muslims full participation in Algeria?

It could be argued that Algeria was only a colony, not a part of France itself, and that the democratic standard should not, therefore, be applied. It might be said that colonialism means the domination of one people by another and the acceptance of a double standard. But if one supposes that Algeria was "only" a colony, then how does one account for the remarkable loyalty of France to the settlers, most of whom could not claim French origin? The French conceded independence more readily to many other colonies and possessions where nationalist pressures achieved far less intensity than in Algeria. If Algeria was but a colony, why did the French body politic suffer so intensely in attempting to retain an unessential appendage?

From the perspective of independent Algeria, questions about settler strength matter less than queries about Muslim weakness. Why did Muslims always emerge as losers

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in a system designed, in theory at least, to guard them against the settler minority? Why did the dissident movements in Algeria, from the Young Algerians of the first part of the century to the MTLD after 1945 prove so ineffective in their nonviolent efforts to reshape French policy? Why did Muslims manage to generate so much less support in France than did the settlers? Better answers to these questions might provide greater insight into the sentiment that sustained revolution in Algeria from 1954 to 1962.

To respond to these questions one must first determine where power lay, whether in Paris or in Algiers. Although most political scientists now regard formal structure as an unreliable guide to political behavior, unitary government, which concentrates sovereignty at the national level, still tends to be equated with centralized government.¹⁵ French textbooks continue to treat problems of national government as politics and those of local government as administration.¹⁶ The theory of unitary systems would seem to point toward Paris as the center of decision making, and yet such a finding, if confirmed, would compound the difficulties of explaining how French republicans, practicing parliamentary democracy at home, could endorse undemocratic policies in Algeria. Faced with that paradox, one may wish to abandon the hypothesis and affirm instead that different policies must have come from different places: French policy from France, Algerian policy from Algiers. But this would

be to suppose that a regional government could operate autonomously within a unitary system. To explain why Algiers could act autonomously, if it did, or why one decision-making apparatus produced contradictory policies, if Algerian decisions originated in Paris, would be to advance a step toward understanding why the settlers remained entrenched in Algeria and why nationalists experienced frustration.

A next step would be to explain how Paris or Algiers exercised its power, formally or informally, legislatively or administratively. It is not obvious why, even if all policy was made in Algiers, settler views should have prevailed. Fundamental law gave Arabs and Berbers representation in the Algerian system. Why did they not achieve a significant influence over policy by these means? On the other hand, if Paris made policy for Algeria, it is even less apparent that the settlers should have won so consistently. Representatives of metropolitan France far outnumbered European Algerians in the French Parliament and in the offices of the executive branch.

To locate power and describe its use one must start from an understanding of the legal-constitutional structure, even though that understanding may prove to be inadequate. Political behavior always diverges from the normative patterns specified by the law, because people ignore the law or disobey it, and because the law provides incomplete guidelines for action. Yet every legal system, even the weakest, affects behavior in some measure. Even activity that does

not spring directly from legal prescription bears a mark of the institutional context. An act that is neither approved nor disapproved would not be identical in meaning and impact if its legal status were defined. Social scientists must seek to control for institutional factors, just as they try to control for social and economic conditions, but they cannot eliminate them as a variable.

The Formal Structure

Until 1944 the three Algerian départements--Constantine in the east, Algiers in the center, and Oran in the west--were governed in some respects precisely as were other départements north of the Mediterranean. Each was headed by a prefect appointed by the French minister of the interior and responsible to him. The prefect administered his département in consultation with a general council (conseil général), which was elected. Moreover, he supervised communal government, which was in the hands of mayors and their municipal councils (conseils municipaux). Like other French départements, the three Algerian ones elected representatives to both houses of the French Parliament.¹⁷

However, there were also important differences. In France members of the lower house, the Chamber of Deputies, were elected by universal manhood suffrage, whereas in Algeria only persons who had been born or naturalized into French citizenship had the right to vote in national elec-

tions. This group included virtually all of the European population, since non-French immigrants born on Algerian soil were automatically citizens after 1889, and most native Jews, who had been naturalized in 1870. It excluded all but a few thousand Arabs and Berbers who had individually applied for and received French citizenship. Thus about six-sevenths of the adult male population of Algeria lacked representation in the Chamber of Deputies.

Even the departmental and municipal councils, ostensibly identical to metropolitan institutions, operated under special rules designed to prevent Muslims from electing a majority of the councillors. In the communes de plein exercice--those inhabited by a significant number of Europeans and governed as those of the metropolis--Muslim males who met property, educational, or professional requirements could vote whether or not they were citizens, but they could elect no more than a third of a municipal council. Similarly, the departmental council provided representation for Muslim non-citizens but limited them to a maximum one-fourth membership. In the vast communes mixtes, which harbored three-fourths of the Muslim population and few Europeans, municipal councils were indirectly elected and confined to an advisory role. The administrators of communes mixtes, appointed by the prefects, wielded police powers unavailable to any official, appointed or elected, in metropolitan France.

Algerian government departed most radically from

the metropolitan pattern at the regional level, which was intermediate between the Parisian ministries and the departmental prefectures. The grouping of the three Algerian départements into a region, administered from Algiers by a bureaucracy known as the Government General of Algeria, distinguished the colony from clusters of metropolitan départements, even those with traditional historical affinities, such as Provence or Bretagne. At the head of this regional government sat a governor general appointed by the French government and responsible to the interior ministry. He turned for support to the "little ministries" of the Government General, which were called directorates.

This intermediate unit of government, unknown north of the Mediterranean, included representative as well as executive organs. But the Financial Delegation (Délegations financières) and Higher Council (Conseil supérieur) were regarded as administrative rather than legislative bodies. The Financial Delegations were actually four legislatures elected separately by distinct groups of electors--the colon, the non-colon, the Arab, and the Kabyle (Berber). Only citizens who owned rural property and who had lived in Algeria for ten years or more could participate in the election of the colon delegation, which nonetheless constituted 35 per cent of the total of the four delegations. Other Europeans who met the citizenship and residence requirements and who, in addition, paid income or property taxes, elected the non-colon delegation, another 35 per cent of the total.¹⁸ As

for the Arabs and Berbers, those qualified to vote in municipal elections could vote for members of the Arab or Kabyle delegations, depending on whether they lived in predominantly Berber regions, such as the Kabylia and the Aurès mountain regions, or in predominantly Arabic-speaking districts.¹⁹ Together, Arabs and Kabyles constituted but 30 per cent of the membership in the Financial Delegations, although they represented 85 per cent of the Algerian population.²⁰ And even the Europeans represented in colon and non-colon delegations were a minority of the adult, male French citizens living in the three départements.

In theory at least, this apparent lack of democracy did not hamper Algerian government. The purpose of the delegations was deemed technical and administrative rather than political. They were supposed to assist the governor general in the preparation of the Algerian budget, which had been separated from the general French budget by a law of 1900, and to provide each category of taxpayers with a voice in budget-making. Lawmaking, on the other hand, was entrusted to the governor general, the minister of the interior, the president of the Republic, and, in the final analysis, the French Parliament. Closest to the scene, the governor general bore primary responsibility for the protection and welfare of all the residents of Algeria, European and Muslim.

One might suspect from these differences in formal structure between France and Algeria that the colony enjoyed

a greater measure of autonomy than other départements, but this cannot be proved by reference to fundamental law. Although Algeria was said to enjoy "financial autonomy," acute observers, even jurists, recognized that the term did not do justice to the reality. Nevertheless, few writers then or since have concluded forthrightly that Algeria had a measure of political independence from the metropolis, so strong has been the myth that politics occur only at the national level in a unitary system.²¹

It is just as difficult to demonstrate persuasively that Algeria enjoyed either more or less autonomy as a result of the changes effected in its institutions between 1944 and 1947.²² The Financial Delegations were replaced first by a Financial Assembly, chosen from the three general councils, and then, as provided by the Algerian Statute of 1947, by an Algerian Assembly, endowed with some legislative powers in addition to the financial duties performed by its predecessors. Moreover, the Statute widened the electoral base of the new assembly to include all French citizens in one college and all Muslims eligible to vote in municipal and departmental elections in a second. Each college elected half the 120-member assembly. Thus the assembly, although it still underrepresented Muslims, was more representative and had a stronger claim to the exercise of political power than its predecessor body, the Financial Delegations. This claim might be seen as tantamount to greater autonomy.

However, postwar changes seemed in other respects to draw Algeria closer to metropolitan France. Muslims became citizens rather than subjects without giving up rights accorded them by Islamic law. As citizens, they acquired the right to elect members of the French Parliament-- a number equal to that elected by the settler community.²³ Voting was by college, as it was for the Algerian Assembly, but at least Muslim Algeria gained official representation in Paris. Moreover, the governor general acquired new titles: the first two postwar occupants of the office were ministre plenipotentiaire and ministre en mission, respectively, of the French government. The Statute emphasized that Algeria was an integral part of the French Republic, even if it had a legal personality of its own. It also promised that the Algerian Assembly, in cooperation with the governor, would effect the elimination of the communes mixtes and the extraordinary administrative powers associated with them, bringing Algerian local government into line with the metropolitan model. In short, for every inch of autonomy given to Algeria, an equivalent length seemed to have been subtracted somewhere else; to balance decentralization, the tutelle of the central authorities had been strengthened.

Although helpful in identifying constraints imposed on all participants, analysis of the formal structure fails to supply unambiguous conclusions about the distribution of power and its mode of use. As a consequence, I have turned for help to the writings of social scientists on the American

South, federal systems, administrative organization and French local politics. I have reshaped a number of their ideas into three hypotheses, which will be tested against six case studies of decision making for colonial Algeria. One hypothesis links variations in the distribution of power between center and periphery to the level of partisan agreement or disagreement between levels of government. Another suggests a direct relationship between minority influence and the degree of informality of decision making. A third proposition bridges the first two. It asserts that the degree of informality in decision making varies with the autonomy accorded regional officials. If supported by the evidence in the case studies, these propositions would supplement legal analysis and permit more precise answers to the questions of who had power and how it was used in colonial Algeria. They would contribute to an understanding of settler strength and Muslim weakness. They are offered in the hope that they might be useful as well to the study of minority rule and unitary systems in other times and places.

Hypothesis One: Autonomy

Although a unitary system of government precludes the sovereign exercise of power by subunits, a subunit such as a region may achieve de facto autonomy of action under certain conditions.²⁴ For example, the greater the degree of political agreement between regional representatives and

national government, the greater will be the tendency of the central authorities to permit the region to follow its own course in local matters. Conversely, sharp partisan disagreements between regional and national governments will normally produce a reduction in de facto autonomy.

The administrative apparatus is usually thought to manage tensions between center and periphery in a unitary system. The management role may permit the regional administrator, called a prefect in France and a governor general in Algeria, to exercise a measure of autonomy. In fact, Pierre Grémion has argued that a French prefect possesses autonomous political power as a result of pressures brought to bear on him from above and below.²⁵ Unable to satisfy all demands of both local notables and the minister of the interior, he must seek compromise. The greater the pressures he feels, the greater the opportunity for compromise and autonomous action.²⁶

However, it cannot be assumed that the executive branch will maintain a monopoly of communication between levels of government within a unitary system. For example, politicians may intervene and seek to mediate the tensions that are a source, as Grémion demonstrates, of the administrator's power. Representatives of a region may approach the national government with offers of support for general policies in return for freedom of action in local affairs. If successful, they would deflect the pressures that the

regional administrator would normally expect from his superior in the capital and leave him at the mercy of the local notables. By reducing the autonomy of the regional administrator, these initiatives would have enhanced the ability of regional elites to govern themselves. In short, they would have acted to increase regional autonomy.

Under what conditions do politicians succeed in intervening to mediate the relationship between center and periphery in a unitary system? Under what conditions does the administration lose its ability to manage tensions? Partisan tension would appear to be a key variable.²⁷ If national and regional elites agree on matters of national importance, and if the national government needs the support of the region's parliamentary delegation for its survival, regional representatives may persuade the central authorities to ignore regional issues or to pursue policies desired by the regional elite. It will be difficult for members of the national government to tell adherents of their own party that they, as regional representatives, do not know what is best for their region. On the other hand, if a region is dominated by parties that oppose the governing party or coalition of parties, local elites could expect no favors. A high level of partisan tension between national and regional officials would minimize opportunities to bypass the regional administrator and maximize the chances that the national government would seek to impose a policy on a reluctant region. Since central deci-

sion makers are often overburdened, actual direction of regional affairs might still fall into the hands of local notables. But, in general, the higher the level of partisan tension, the greater would be the probability of centralized direction of regional affairs.

Partisan tension between national and regional levels of government tends to arise under two sets of circumstances: when a party or coalition of parties in power at the national level lacks majority status at the regional level, or when a single, highly disciplined party dominates both levels of government, and its national leaders dictate local as well as national policies, creating local resentments in the process. The greater the congruence of party strengths at two levels and the lower the discipline of the governing party or coalition, the less partisan tension one would expect.²⁸

Of course, the absence of partisan tension does not secure regional autonomy in a unitary system any more than a high level of tension ensures that decisions will be made by officials of the central government. Partisan harmony merely facilitates the establishment of alternative routes of communication between regional notables and the central administration. Insofar as such paths serve as genuine substitutes for the normal, administrative channels, notables may be able to obtain better treatment than they would otherwise receive. The mere threat to utilize an alternative line of communication may be enough to pressure the administration

into concessions. To the extent that regional notables can effectively choose between channels of communication with the central government, they will exercise autonomy of decision.

An effective alternative line of influence must be capable of transmitting coherent political messages. Since a political party normally serves to transmit messages in a parliamentary system, it seems reasonable to expect that an alternative line would be effective only insofar as there was political homogeneity between central and regional levels. If a deputy is the principal intermediary, he must be influential both with local notables and with the appropriate ministers. Partisan differences at either end might hinder the flow of influence. Can one imagine a Radical relaying the demands of Monarchist notables to a Socialist-dominated government? One might expect distortion if not outright rejection of the demands, and the region would be forced back on administrative definition and interpretation of government policy.

The hypothesis, applied to colonial Algeria, suggests that autonomy of the colony-region ought to have varied with fluctuations in the level of partisan tension between Paris and Algiers. Autonomy should have been greatest when the parliamentary representatives of Algeria supported the French cabinet and could demand, in return, primary responsibility for the formulation of Algerian policy. The bargain need not have been explicitly articulated to be effective. For the settlers, a strategy of backing every government ought

to have minimized partisan tension and maximized opportunities for manipulation of national policy toward their region. To have opposed a French government would have been to risk "punishment," which could have entailed full enfranchisement of Muslims. The more effective the parliamentary representation of Algeria, the greater should have been the independence of the region from central direction.

Hypothesis Two: Informality

The ability of a minority to exclude the majority from influence in a system where democracy remains at least an ideal will depend on the degree to which power can be exercised informally. Informality gives advantages to those members of society who possess prestige, wealth, leisure time and familiarity with the intricacies of politics. It tends to reduce the power of those who must depend exclusively on the ballot box as a source of influence. Decisions made informally will tend to be more favorable to a dominant minority than will those where fundamental law requires adherence to specified procedures, even though those procedures may be relatively undemocratic.

Locally dominant forces, if they feel threatened by majority takeover, may seek to avert disaster by modifying the rules of the game. Many southern American states instituted poll taxes, residency requirements, and literacy tests in the late nineteenth century to disenfranchise black voters

and to insure against a repetition of black rule.²⁹ This is the simplest solution, short of the "final" one, for disposing of a minority group.

However, even if internal scruples or external pressures prevent the minority from changing the rules, it may be able to minimize the importance of formal procedure by pushing decisions into arenas where informal action can be taken. Such was the case in the American South, where even the most ingenious sorts of voting requirements did not prevent all blacks from participating in politics.³⁰ The relegation of political parties to a minor role in politics is one sign of informality. Heavy reliance on administrators to perform political chores is another. Both might be labeled "apoliticism," which is a strategy of the dominant minority for imposing its partisan political preferences on the majority.

Political parties have become the principal means by which masses of people convert their numbers into political influence in the modern era. Consequently, a system in which the importance of parties is diminished penalizes those who lack other sorts of resources. In the Old South one-party politics amounted to no-party politics, as Key so clearly demonstrated.³¹ In the resulting chaos of personalities and factions, the lines of battle were seldom drawn according to issue or even according to previous divisions among groups. Patterns of factional politics varied from state to state,

but nowhere did stable, two-faction competition develop to the point that anyone was tempted to achieve victory by wooing the black vote. The all-white primary helped ensure that the small black, Republican vote would be wasted in a meaningless general election. No-party politics deprived the black man of even that minimal political influence the formal structure seemed to accord him and elevated the political importance of money, machines, and demagoguery. The system obliged whites to vote against the black man without much assurance of what they were voting for. As a result, bankers and planters generally reaped greater rewards from the political system than poorer whites, not to mention blacks.

In most political systems bureaucrats probably cooperate with elected officials more frequently than they disagree with them. The formal distinction made between the two classes of public servants runs counter to the informal dependence each group feels toward the other. The elected officials need the good will of the bureaucrats to assure the execution of programs they enact and to provide special favors for their constituents. The bureaucrats look to the politicians for the protection of their pet programs, the regular increase of their salaries, and their job security. In practice, most systems blur the textbook distinction between politics and administration.

The blurring of boundaries becomes insidious only in systems where bureaucrats make decisions that would, according

to the textbook, be decided in the political domain. A shift in responsibilities from politicians to bureaucrats helps the dominant minority to protect its partisan preferences from review according to majority rule. Proponents justify the shift as a guarantee that correct solutions will outweigh political expediencies. But such a defense can barely disguise the hope that bureaucrats will be more likely than the majority to take the proper partisan actions. Informal cooperation between politicians and bureaucrats serves, under the cloak of apoliticism, the interests of political groups who capitalize on superior wealth, prestige and education to win the informal political game.

An informal "apolitical" style of decision making tends to preserve the status quo by preventing those who are economically and socially disadvantaged from using their numbers to challenge prevailing policies. As V.O. Key put it:

Organization is not always necessary to obstruct; it is essential, however, for the promotion of a sustained program in behalf of the have-nots, although not all party or factional organization is dedicated to that purpose. It follows, if these propositions are correct, that over the long run the have-nots lose in a disorganized politics.³²

There is no question about who were the haves and who the have-nots in Algeria. The problem lies in measuring degrees of disorganization and in assessing its impact.

The second proposition leads one to expect that Jews and Berbers would have fared least well in colonial issues decided in an "apolitical" way--by administrators, by negotiation between bureaucrats and bureaucrats in Paris. They should have had their matters could be brought to the attention of the French Parliament. Muslims ought to have been more influential at moments of colonial history when partisan differences within the European camp were most clearly defined and when organization, parties and elections would have been most significant. Since the settlers could claim to be acting in a non-partisan manner as long as they could muffle differences among themselves, Muslim chances for influencing the political process ought to have been inversely related to the intensity of partisan quarrels among the Europeans in Algeria.

Proposition Three: The Link

Subunit autonomy increases the opportunity for informal politics. The smaller the unit for decision making, the greater the chances that personal ties, unspoken assumptions, deference for social position and sheer wealth will shape policy. Consequently, the first proposition conditions the second, and one would predict that the ability of a minority to dominate a region would vary with that region's autonomy from central authorities.

McConnell has argued that politics tend to be more

informal as political affairs become simpler and political units become smaller.³³ As the size of the unit decreases, ethnic, religious and professional solidarities increase and threats of violence become more significant. Groups that might command respect in a larger framework find themselves isolated and intimidated in a more parochial setting. In the American South, territorial autonomy enabled whites to conduct government by virtue of assets other than numbers. Similar factors facilitated rural domination of even relatively-urbanized American states for years, and they still help activist, middle-class, business-oriented interests to exert disproportionate influence in state and local governments in the United States.³⁴ Subunit autonomy encourages informality, which strengthens the hand of groups dedicated to the preservation of the status quo.

Utilizing the third proposition, one would therefore predict that influence over Algerian policy would have varied inversely with the independence of regional government from central supervision. In times of high partisan tension between Paris and Algiers, Muslim power should have been greater than at moments when European Algeria felt comfortable within the governing majority in France. The more successfully the settlers could persuade metropolitan France to remain disinterested in Algerian affairs, the more likely it was that regional politics would be disorganized, "personalistic and hence favorable to a narrow internal

One can imagine a weakening of settler beliefs in autonomy only in the event that a national government, acting in a period of strong tension between Paris and Algiers, changed the rules to require greater formal participation by Muslims in regional politics. Then one might expect the settlers to have rediscovered merit in national direction of their affairs. For example, the Statute of 1947, which altered some political arrangements in Algeria to accommodate Muslim demands, should, according to the proposition about formality, have nudged the settlers away from their love of autonomy and toward greater dependence on France.

Together these three propositions may be said to constitute a model for explaining, in comparative terms, how an integral part of a unitary system of government could be permitted such autonomy of action and how a minority of residents of that part, Algeria, could dominate the affairs of the region so thoroughly that Muslims were eventually driven to revolution to alter the imbalance of power. The case studies have been selected with an eye to testing the validity of the model. They aim to provide information about where power lay and how it was exercised under differing degrees of partisan tension and formality of procedure. If the case studies offered confirmation for the hypotheses, one would scarcely be ready to chisel them in stone, but negative findings would certainly cast doubt on the usefulness of these ideas or at least suggest the need for qualification.

In selecting the case studies, I could not assume that the distribution of power along either the central-local or settler-native axis was static. Between 1920 and 1954, Algeria was undergoing rapid social change, which obviously affected power relations. Because it would be unprofitable to concentrate on a time period so short that change might be invisible, the cases have been grouped by pairs involving different moments in time. Assuming that World War II altered the pattern of policymaking in Algeria, I have divided the cases equally between the interwar and postwar periods. Similarly, assuming that decisionmaking patterns might vary from one policy area to another, I have chosen three different substantive areas, each represented by one case from the interwar and one from the postwar period.

The two best-known examples of French policymaking for Algeria have been omitted: the failure of the Popular Front governments to enact the Blum-Viollette proposal and the adoption of the Algerian Statute of 1947. Both were constitutional decisions that fell clearly within the decisionmaking powers of the French Parliament and can be understood in the context of French politics.

this study required exploration of cases which Algerian politics appeared least well meshed with those of France and least comprehensible in terms of traditional analysis.

The substantive areas were selected for their importance after the constitutional decisions had been set

Budgetary matters could hardly be ignored, since the purse has often been a key to power relations and since they were supposedly the realm of Algeria's "financial autonomy." The security domain was also an obvious choice, since settlers in colonial settings are invariably nervous about their safety at the hands of the native majority. Education was included because nationalists everywhere have emphasized its importance and scored colonial regimes for their neglect of indigenous populations in this regard.

The criteria for the selection of specific issues varied with the policy domain. The cases of security policy-- political and administrative reaction to the crises of 1934-35 and of 1945--offered themselves as the only significant examples of such policymaking within the time periods under study. In contrast, while one decision stood out in the educational domain--the adoption of the school construction program of 1944--it was impossible to find a comparable decision between 1920 and 1940. Furthermore, one could not be sure that decisions about school construction were as important as nondecisions about the teaching of Arabic and the regulation of Quranic schools, or even as important as decisions not to update the school construction programs once they were adopted. It thus seemed best to follow the two or three leading educational issues for each of two decades, 1920--1930 and 1944--1954.

The choice of two budgets for comparison seemed the

most logical approach to an analysis of financial policy. But the question was which budgets to choose. Unlike most of the others, the 1935 budget did receive some attention in Parliament. Moreover, the decisionmaking on the 1935 budget appeared most likely, on the basis of preliminary examination, to be an exception to the rule of "financial autonomy" and to run counter to the emerging argument of the study. The 1954-55 budget was chosen, on the other hand, simply because it was the last Algerian budget adopted before revolution disturbed Algeria's facade of tranquility.

The case study approach appeared most likely to yield information about actual rather than hypothetical patterns of influence--the sort of information required for the testing of the proposed model.³⁵ Detailed histories of Algerian politics after 1920, which might have provided the sort of information required, were lacking, and an attempt to supply such information in sufficient depth for all phases of colonial policy between 1920 and 1954 was unthinkable--especially since most of the archives for the period remain unavailable. Because information of public record was more adequate for some policy areas and issues than others, it seemed advantageous to concentrate on a few examples of decision making from which power relations between France and Algeria, settlers and natives might be extrapolated. Needless to say, the historical nature of the undertaking made it impossible to ask people who they believed to be influen-

tial in the policy process and to describe the contours of power by these judgements of reputation.

Unfortunately, the case study technique can deflect attention from variables, such as economic and social conditions and political structure, that change slowly. By concentrating on short intervals of political activity, one may be tempted to conclude that only informal interactions affect outcomes, although on reflection it is easy to see that institutions and environment establish constraints for that process. By dividing the cases into two time periods, subject to somewhat different institutional and environmental conditions, I have sought to mitigate this defect of the case method. Moreover, by sketching changes in the distribution of power from 1830 to 1920, when the formal structure of French-Algerian politics was evolving, I have sought to give some sense of long-term dynamics. Throughout this study I hope to show how constitutional arrangements condition but do not determine the contours of political behavior and how patterns of behavior affect, in turn, the system's ability to evolve structurally in response to changing environmental situations.

CHAPTER 2

SHIFTING LOCI OF POWER

The future shape of relations between France and Algeria was anything but clear in 1920. An acute observer might have predicted a continuation of the fluidity that had characterized the previous 30 years of Algerian history. The French Parliament would maintain its resurgent interest in Algeria, manifested in the Jonnart Law of 1919 facilitating the naturalization of Arabs and Berbers, and the settler role in Algerian affairs would be diminished, either as a result of direct French intervention in policymaking or as a result of increased Muslim participation. All these predictions would have been justified and all of them would have been erroneous, for the politics of the interwar period was to be characterized by stability to the point of rigidity and by an unprecedented domination by the settlers.

Yet, although it is not sufficient to know what had gone before, neither is it possible to explain why the system came to be frozen as it was without reference to the years when it was in flux. For instance, the first three case studies will show that the role of metropolitan France in Algerian policymaking was too small to be effective in

protecting Muslim interests and that Muslims were even less capable of protecting themselves within the system. They will also explain why Muslims could not expand their role and why the settlers could not reduce the participation of either the mother country or the natives to zero. But such studies cannot explain how the settlers came in the first place to play such an important part in policymaking. Only an account of French-Algerian relations from 1830 to 1920 can attempt to do that.

1830—1900: From Assimilation to Settler Control

From the French conquest in 1830 until the dying days of the Second Empire in 1870, France was represented in Algeria by military governors.¹ This concentration of power in the military could be justified in terms of security, for the winning of the colony had not been easy. Even after Algiers was taken, the army had had to proceed tribe by tribe, village by village, fighting and negotiating. The most distinguished of Algerian military leaders, Amir Abdel Kader, signed a peace treaty with the French in 1837, but not until 1847 did Marshal Bugeaud, who had arrived as governor general in 1840, quell the resistance.²

One might expect that the military would have been heroes in the eyes of the settlers who were beginning to trickle into Algeria, and villains and murderers in the eyes

of the Arabs and Berbers who had been "pacified" by methods that often included slaying, burning, and looting. However, quite the reverse was true. To administer the pacified territories, the army established a system of bureaux arabes, manned by army officers who soon developed sympathy for the indigenous culture. They saw that it was to their advantage to preserve that culture as well as local leadership structures. The army did not hesitate to drive Arabs and Berbers off their lands, when those lands did not appear to the European eye to be under cultivation. But the bureaux arabes opposed wholesale expropriation of native property, as evidenced by their support for the sénatus-consulte of 1863. They hoped this legislation requiring Arabs and Berbers to take individual titles for many of the lands they had owned in common would retard settler incursions. Although the effect of the sénatus-consulte was quite the reverse—natives were enabled to lose their land by selling it to the settlers—the settlers did not forgive the army its good intentions.

Neither did they pardon Napoleon III his support for the military regime and his suggestion that Algeria was an Arab Kingdom. Influenced by the indigénophile Ismael Urbain, a mulatto writer with Saint Simonian convictions, the Emperor expressed admiration for Arab society and Islamic civilization.³ The settlers translated those sentiments as a belittling of their heroic destiny, as restraint on their

of foreign immigrants in 1889, were more than ever a force to be reckoned with.

The newly naturalized immigrants played a key role in the crisis of 1897 and 1898, which once again transformed the structure of Algerian government. The crisis began as an outburst of antisemitism. Under the leadership of Maximiliano Régis Milano, a recently naturalized Italian immigrant, crowds protested the recall of Jules Cambon and denounced his replacement, Louis Lépine, who was said to have "sold out to the Jews."¹⁵ When Lépine was pelted with tomatoes and cabbages by a group of students, the army was slow to intervene. The recall of Lépine in July, 1898, failed to restore calm. Meanwhile, in the legislative elections that spring, Algeria elected antisemites to fill four of its six seats in the Chamber of Deputies.

Both the time and the place were fertile for antisemitism. The Dreyfus affair raged in France, the indigenous Jewish population in Algeria had been naturalized en masse by the Crémieux decree of 1871, and the French political parties regularly sought to outbid each other for the Jewish vote. At the same time, the number of foreigners in the country was increasing rapidly, and a law of 1889 making their naturalization automatic hastened their entry into the political system.¹⁶ The number of French citizens in Algeria increased by more than a third between 1889 and 1896, to

318,000.¹⁷ Many of these foreigners came from Catholic countries: the Spanish seemed to be taking over the département of Oran, the Italians the département of Constantine. Along with the Jews, who were often their creditors, they occupied the middle strata between the Muslim population and the French settlers, who continued to dominate the country economically, socially, and politically. Thus, the social frictions that usually accompany antisemitism encouraged tendencies that the immigrants had brought with them, which were also exacerbated by the antisemitic mind-frame of the Muslim population. French politicians of the 1890's were alert to exploit this potential.¹⁸

However, antisemitism was largely a facade for the deep resentments against France and French policy expressed in cries of "Algérie française" and talk of revolution.¹⁹ The antisemites claimed that France, run by Jews, was overly protective of the Arabs and Berbers in Algeria. The settlers feared that they would one day be overwhelmed by the Arabs and Berbers, who outnumbered them about nine to one. Once partisans of rattachement, the settlers now sought protection from the idealistic instincts of the mother country. As Desvages points out:

The problem for them was to obtain a kind of Algerian autonomy that was favorable to the European minority. They would try to profit from the current of hostility to assimilation in order to realize their wishes.²⁰

The creation of a new assembly, the Financial Delegations, and the modification of an existing consultative body, the Higher Council, together with the grant of financial autonomy to Algeria, are evidence of their success. Antisemitism ebbed into dormancy.

These reforms gave the settlers an important voice in policymaking. They acquired 70 per cent of the seats in the Financial Delegations and a near majority in the Higher Council, which was heavily loaded with government officials. It was they, together with the governor general, who exercised Algeria's newly won financial autonomy. Although the governor prepared the budget, the Financial Delegations were free to modify his proposals in the domain of expenditures classified as optional, which included about four-fifths of the budget. The Higher Council could reduce but not increase appropriations; in fact, its meetings tended to be short and routine. The two assemblies could decide on an increase over the previous year in other expenses termed obligatory, such as government salaries and expenditures for justice and the operation of schools, but if they tried to reduce these budgets, they could be overruled by the President of the Republic. The French Parliament retained the right to authorize the collection of tax revenues, which implied the right to approve the total, but not a breakdown, of Algerian expenditures.²¹ As Confer observes, "For all

practical purposes, the Délégations financières and the governor general controlled the finances of the country."²²

1900—1920: Reformers, Settlers, and Young Algerians

During the first decades of this century the settlers sought to extend their influence into the political domain, which was properly that of Parliament. But they met resistance from a new group of metropolitan reformers, who urged Parliament to take an active role in Algerian affairs to counterbalance settler power at the regional level.

The settlers had two instruments of power: the Financial Delegations and the nine Algerian seats in Parliament. Although theoretically concerned with budgetary issues alone, the Delegations used their financial leverage to influence the governor general on the broadest questions. Confer writes:

In a showdown between the Délégations financières and the governor general, the latter could technically resort to the higher authorities in France. But he was unlikely to make an open break with the local powers (which also carried some weight in Paris) if he wanted his administration to be called successful.²³

The settlers' numerical strength in Paris was magnified by the quality of leadership provided by Eugène Etienne, deputy from Oran and a minister, and Gaston Thomson, deputy from the

département of Constantine. They worked effectively in the committees and corridors as well as the ministries, watering down a reform bill they could not defeat and, in general, appearing sufficiently reasonable to make their opposition to major reform formidable and effective.²⁴ Etienne could count on the support of the "colonial group" in the Chamber and on a similar group in the Senate,²⁵ while such powerful lobbying forces as the Comité de l'Afrique française and the Union coloniale française might also be drawn onto the line of battle.²⁶ Moreover, the Algerian deputies usually sat in the center of the Chamber, as did most of the "colonial group,"²⁷ impeccable in their republican credentials, ready to support almost every government that presented itself before Parliament—at a certain price, of course.²⁸

For ideological support, the settlers looked to the concept of "association," which became the vogue after 1900 as a reaction to the "doctrine of assimilation."²⁹ Inspired by the practices of Galliéni and Faidherbe in Madagascar and Senegal and by the French experience in Tunisia, this new school of thought held that local factors such as geography, ethnicity, and social structure had to be considered in the formulation of colonial policy. The assimilationists were assailed for their willingness to sweep away traditional political, economic, and social institutions and to replace them with French institutions.

The Algerian reforms of 1898 and 1900 were rationalized in terms of the concept of association. As the rapporteur of the Chamber's budget commission explained in 1900:

It is agreed today that Algeria should no longer be considered a simple prolongation of continental France. Its geographic situation and, even more, its ethnic composition and economic development give it in fact a personality of its own.³⁰

It followed that the country should be governed by those who best understood these local factors. Since, by common consent, the Arabs and Berbers were not yet ready for a governing role, the task fell to the settlers. The association concept tended to legitimate settler trusteeship.

However, the idea was also used by the reformers. One of the principal exponents of association, Jules Harmand, believed with Jules Ferry that the governor general should be the instrument of enlightened colonial rule.³¹ Although he felt that social and economic reforms were needed in Algeria, he stopped short of recommending greater Muslim participation in politics. Another group of metropolitan reformers—among them Paul Bourde, editor of the prestigious Parisian newspaper Le temps, and deputies Albin Rozet, Abel Ferry and Henri Doizy—argued in favor of political concessions and were thus labeled assimilationists by their opponents. But they shied

from using the term themselves, so strongly was the policy of association in the ascendancy.³²

Besides their appeal to French idealism, the settlers enjoyed a circumstantial advantage: the coming of war in Europe created a need for manpower. Over the protests of the settlers, Arabs and Berbers were drafted to work in the factories and serve on the front lines, in return for promised reforms. At the end of the war, the settlers tried to deny promises had been made and to minimize the fighting role of the natives, in hopes of blocking reforms, but many metropolitan Frenchmen, including Georges Clémenceau, intended to honor the bargain. It became difficult for the settlers to resist the reforms of 1918 and 1919, which appeared to be just and reasonable.

Moreover, the reformers were strengthened in their campaign by a renewal of political interest among Arabs and Berbers in Algeria. Both the more traditional, religious, Arab, and conservative approach and the more modern, secular, culturally French, and politically active strategies were delineated with increasing clarity after 1900.³³ Some of the conservatives advocated reforms, but only those that would help resurrect the traditional values and culture of Algeria. Saadallah has explained:

In the case of Algeria, conservatism meant keeping the status quo in opposition to Western ideas, naturalization,

conscription, and all plans that might introduce radical change to Algerian society. On the cultural level, Algerian conservatism meant the maintenance of Islamic institutions, Arabic education, and old values. Politically, it meant submission to the will of God until a Mahdi or a miracle salvaged Algeria from the roumi [foreigners].³⁴

In general, the religious leaders (the ulama), veterans of the French army, landowners, and the heads of the powerful religious fraternities (marabouts) were associated with this strain of thought. A number of them, including Ben Mawhub, the mufti of Constantine, nonetheless believed in reform. Like Muhammad Abduh, the Egyptian reformer who visited Algiers in 1903,³⁵ Ben Mawhub called for a purification of Islam, for the spread of education by any and all means, and, more generally, for the rescue of Algerian society from what he regarded as the depths of decadence.

The Arabs and Berbers coming out of French schools in Algeria, who aspired to a modern life as a part of France, were more influential before World War I. Insisting that France practice the assimilationist ideals it had been preaching, they organized discussion groups, founded newspapers, and established social centers. Agéron writes:

All together, intellectuals, members of the liberal professions, bourgeois modernists or opponents, these

members of the young algerian circles were not numerous; about 50 well-known individuals, a hundred or so active persons; a little more than a thousand politicized évolués; it was doubtless an elite, a small modern elite for a people of 4,500,000 individuals. . . .³⁶

At first this modern elite called itself "Young Turks"; then, about 1912, when that label began to lose its sheen, the dissidents began to call themselves and be known as Young Algerians.³⁷

The issue on which the Young Algerians cut teeth was the military conscription of Arabs and Berbers into the French army. Although they petitioned against the imposition of military service, they claimed that they could be brought to accept the principle of conscription if the indigenous population were promised full civil rights. Their goals included an end to the special administrative rules (the code de l'indigénat, to which most Muslims but no Europeans were answerable), equality of taxation and hence abolition of the special impôts arabes, greater political representation, equal access to public office, an accelerated program of education, a more humane system of forest control, and French citizenship for Arabs and Berbers without necessary acceptance of the French civil code.³⁸ Two successive delegations of Young Algerians took those terms to Paris and were well received.

However, the efforts of Young Algerians and reformers to elicit positive action met with partial success at best. Although the special disciplinary system was eased, it was not abolished. Even when the impôts arabes were eliminated, indirect taxes continued to weigh heavily on Arabs and Berbers, and nothing prevented the settler-controlled Financial Delegations from increasing the burden. A proposal to create a Parisian council to supervise the work of the Delegations and the Algerian administration was lost. In 1919 the Jonnart Law extended the right to vote in municipal elections to a total of 421,000 Muslims and gave native councilmen the right to participate in the election of their mayors. But since Muslims were restricted to one-third or less of the seats on any council, the privilege was of more theoretical than practical importance.

If the reformers and Young Algerians did not win, neither did they lose. The settlers did not manage to defend all their prerogatives. The results were less satisfactory to Arabs and Berbers than they might have been if decisions had been taken exclusively by metropolitan elements of the French government, but they were surely more advantageous to Muslims than policies adopted at the regional level would have been. The outcome showed that the system possessed a capacity, however moderate, for reform.

Testing the Model

With the benefit of hindsight, it is possible to see that the capacity for change was largely a function of tension between the regional and central governments and that such tension had not always been characteristic of Algerian politics. There was some reason to think it might not be in the future. Reform was the work of strong governors general, and the failure of the system of rattachements showed, as Ferry observed, the impossibility of governing Algeria from Paris. If the governor general was weak, then the influence of France in Algeria was weak, and the chance that the rights of Muslims would be protected was correspondingly small. Reforms might be designed in Paris, but they could be executed only if the governor general could persuade his bureaucracy and the settlers who dominated the local administrative assemblies of their value. Thus the governor had to wield sufficient influence in Paris to be useful to the settlers in their battle to moderate reforms and also be able to obtain concessions from the metropolitan reform forces in exchange for settler compliance.

Jules Cambon (1891-1897) and Charles Jonnart, three times governor general between 1900 and 1920 (1900-01, 1903-11, and 1918-19), were strong Algerian executives, and it is not accidental that their names are associated with the two great attempts at reform on behalf of Muslims. Both

men possessed the political skills and the compromising temperaments necessary for the effective use of the governor's role. Both enjoyed the confidence of the reformers on one side of the Mediterranean and of the settlers on the other, although both ran into settler resistance when they tried to move quickly. Ultimately, their efforts had meager success, but it is impossible to imagine the reform efforts of the 1890's without Cambon or the reforms of 1918-19 without Jonnart.

However, the historical evidence also suggests that Cambon's and Jonnart's modest achievements were largely the result of tension between central and regional levels of government. In the same way, the military governors had been effective under the Second Empire, when tension had been high as a result of the settlers' distaste for the bureaux arabes and Napoleon III. When Algerian support for the Third Republic and the Republic's reciprocal support for the civilian rule and administrative assimilation desired by the settlers reduced this tension to insignificance after 1870, the power of the governor general diminished. Tension between colonists and mother country rose again in the 1890's, after Jules Ferry launched his investigation, and this pressure from above gave Cambon the opportunity to utilize his solid political connections in both Paris and Algiers. Similarly, although Jonnart had been only moderately effective

during his first two terms in office, Clémenceau's demands for reform coupled with the cumulative impact of the campaign for reform provided a climate of tension within which he could bargain with the settlers. His reputation as both a reformer and a friend of the settlers enabled him to profit from this tension.

The level of tension between center and periphery on which the system's capacity for reform depended was declining about 1920. The passage of the Law of 1919 deprived the reforming coalition of one of its strongest arguments: that Arabs and Berbers deserved to be rewarded for their wartime service. Now they had been rewarded—too generously, the settlers contended. Furthermore, the war had reduced the quality and numbers of the reformers. Albin Rozet, Abel Ferry, and Lucien Millevoye, all active in the prewar movement, were dead. George Leygues was a member of the government, Adolphe Messimy a general at the front.³⁹ Marius Moutet was one of few reformers to remain in Parliament and to retain an interest in Algerian affairs after 1920. The split of the French Socialists at the Congress of Tours further weakened the forces for change, as did the conservative swing of the French electorate in the elections of 1920.

In Algeria, the Young Algerians, stunned by the modesty of their gains in 1918 and 1919, were losing ground to a new dissident group, openly critical of the law of 1919.

The local elections of 1919 and 1920 reduced their representation and deprived the metropolitan reformers of their Algerian allies. The diminution of tension between Paris and Algiers augured a weakening of the governor general's position and greater de facto autonomy for the regional assemblies dominated by the settlers.

CHAPTER 3

ALGERIAN EDUCATION

Fundamental law placed responsibility for political questions concerning Algeria with the French ministries and Parliament, but no French cabinet in the decade from 1920 to 1930 possessed the desire, strength and determination to impose an educational policy on the colony. Even an aggressive governor general could not muster the support he needed from Paris to sustain his educational initiatives against the objections of the Financial Delegations. Nowhere did the legal-constitutional structure authorize the right to approve the budget as leverage on other policy issues, including education. Left without guidance from Paris, governors had little choice but to acquiesce. By 1930, the regional assembly was dictating school policy for Algeria, with protection from the settler members of Parliament, who blended into governing majorities in France and prevented the sort of partisan tension that might have jeopardized the illegitimate procedures.

Increasing autonomy augmented the degree to which decisions were taken informally. As decisions were pushed back into the parochial atmosphere of Algiers, Muslims were

isolated from their allies in the French Left. Moreover, the Delegations prided themselves on their "apoliticism." Political parties played no official role in the election of delegates or in the deliberations of the assembly, and as a result Muslims could not hope to recruit allies in the European camp who might have helped them construct a voting majority. Given the organization of the Financial Delegations into three, nearly separate bodies and given the consensus of the Europeans on "native policy," including its educational aspects, the settlers did not need parties to achieve their political goals. The Muslims did. Without them, they could only depend on the good will of bureaucrats, who sometimes protected them from the blandishments of European politicians.

Muslim influence over educational policy actually diminished over the decade as a consequence of these trends toward autonomy and informality. Their efforts to persuade the settlers of their needs for education failed to produce notable results. It was only the more generous instincts of metropolitan France, which made themselves felt intermittently through the governor general and the bureaucracy, that protected the Arabs and Berbers against still less favorable policies. School officials in Algiers at least listened when Muslim politicians protested against settler intentions. The French Parliament seldom heard

their complaints. Decisions of the Financial Delegations were reviewed in Parliament only as budgetary decisions, not as determinations of educational policy, which in fact they were.

That Muslims suffered injury from the de facto autonomy of the Financial Delegations and from the way in which the Delegations made decisions becomes apparent from examination of the principal educational issues of the decade: how many new schools should be built, how these schools should be allocated between settlers and Muslims, whether Muslim schools should be trade schools or regular primary schools, and whether Arabic should be taught in Arab and Berber schools. The Delegations prevailed in every area except one, the question of trade schools, where officials of the Algerian directorate of education resisted settler pressures and insisted on regular primary schools for Muslims.

School Construction

During and shortly after World War I, responsibility for school construction in Algeria passed from municipal authorities to regional institutions. The communes,

which had frustrate the efforts of two governors, Jules Cambon in the 1890's and Charles Jonnart between 1908 and 1912,¹ to overcome Algeria's severe shortage of classrooms, lacked both the will and the economic resources to do the job. Many mayors recognized this and sought to be relieved of the burden. At about the same time, Jonnart and the new governor of Algeria, Charles Lutaud, reached the conclusion that such a change was essential if further progress were to be made. On their recommendation, the French Parliament voted laws in 1915 and 1920 assigning the full cost of school construction in Algeria to the regional budget.

The laws made it possible for someone, either in Algiers or in Paris, to design a practical policy of school construction, but who could and would do this? The law made the governor general responsible to the minister of the interior for natives schools.² The Ministry of Public

Instruction in Paris retained direct supervision, at least in theory, of European education. While the Financial Delegations were charged with considering and adopting the Algerian budget, from which the schools would be financed, they were not entitled to make political decisions. Yet deciding how many schools would be built when and for whom was a political problem.

The Government General moved first and preserved the initiative through 1923. In 1917 it prepared a program for the construction of 1,000 classrooms for Europeans and 1,000 for Arabs and Berbers. Two years later it created an administration-dominated committee to prepare a general program of public works, including railroads, roads, dams, and the schools proposed in 1917. The committee's work became the program of 1919. Finally, when Algeria's finances appeared healthy, the administration proposed an ambitious development program for the year 1924.

However, the Financial Delegations quickly showed themselves unwilling to let the administration proceed on its own. In 1920 they created a commission of their own, composed of colon, non-colon, and native delegates, to rework the administration's program. The commission doubled the size of the public works program outlined in 1919, making what it called an "inventory of needs" of 3.4 billion francs and an "urgent program" of 2.43 billion francs to be

Table 3-1

Money Devoted to School Construction
(millions of francs)

Year and Program	Total Money	School Construction	% Schools of Total
1919 (administration)	1,640	87	5.3
1920 (inventory)	3,400	181	5.3
1920 (16 years)	2,600	155	6.0
1924 (5 years)	430	62	14.4
1929 (15 years, administration)	6,305	870	13.8
1929 (6 years, administration)	2,726	346	12.7
1929 (8 years, commission)	2,674	309	11.6

Sources: Jaillet Report, in France, Government General of Algeria, A. F. A., 1929, Ordinary Session, Annexes, p. 223; and Antonelli Report on Algerian Budget for 1930, Journal officiel, Chamber, Documents, 2nd Extraordinary Session, 1929, p. 576.

accomplished in 15 years.³ Both versions of the so-called Great Works Program of 1920 received the official approval of the Financial Delegations.

Education fared somewhat better in the urgent version. Informed by the administration that 155 million francs (5.3 per cent of the 1919 program) were needed for school construction, the interdelegatory commission increased this sum by 25.8 million francs in the inventory of needs (5.3 per cent) and said the school construction program would be completed in 10 years instead of 15 or 16. The "urgent" program included 155 millions (6 per cent) for education. But the whole exercise of drafting and revising the Great Works Program of 1920 proved academic, since it could not be executed for lack of money. Only after four years of uncertainty about Algerian finances did an interdelegatory commission decide Algeria could not afford to wait any longer.⁴ (The administration had said as much a year earlier but had been rebuffed by the delegates.) It proposed a 430-million-franc, five-year program that emphasized dams and irrigation projects over railroads. The Financial Delegations accepted the proposal and even voted some new taxes for 1925.

In this new five-year plan, school construction held a more important place than in the 1920 program. The goal was to build 510 elementary schools, 255 for Europeans and 255 for Arabs and Berbers, at a cost of 36 million francs.

Higher primary and secondary school construction would bring the total bill to 62.4 millions, or 14.4 per cent of the five-year development plan.

However, this sum was only two-thirds of what the school authorities and the Government General were asking,⁵ in response to overwhelming communal demand, and it was pitifully small when judged against overall Algerian needs. Delegate Luciani estimated the European school-age population (ages 6 to 13) at 141,588, of whom 106,106 (75 per cent) were in school. By the same formula, using 18 per cent of the total population, there was a total of 789,666 school-age Arabs and Berbers, 40,077 (5.8 per cent) of whom were said to be enrolled in school.⁶ It would have taken 700 classrooms at 50 pupils each to absorb the European school-age youth not in school; 7,500 classrooms of 50 pupils each would have been needed to accommodate Arab and Berber boys alone. Thus the program would have fulfilled only about a third of the primary school needs of the European population and about a thirtieth of the classrooms required for Muslims if population remained stable. In fact, it was increasing rapidly.

In rejecting the implications of Luciani's statistics as well as the pleas of the administration for a more ambitious program of school construction, the Financial Delegations showed themselves masters of school planning in Algeria. They espoused a policy based neither on the demand for schools,

registered by the school authorities, nor on the absolute needs of the colony, determined by comparisons of school enrollment with school-age youth. Although unable to ignore education, particularly since large numbers of settler children were not in school, they could and did subordinate school construction to other aspects of social and economic development, such as railroads and irrigation projects.

The performance of the Financial Delegations in the second half of the decade confirmed that body's superiority in decisionmaking on school construction. When Governor General Maurice Viollette sought to rejuvenate the administration's role, he was reprimanded. When it was time to draft a new development plan in 1929, the priorities of the Financial Delegations once again prevailed. Meanwhile, the program of 1925-1929 approved by the Delegations guided school construction efforts.

Educational policy represented only one aspect of a many-faceted quarrel between the settlers and Viollette,⁷ who believed himself responsible to the minister of the interior, not to the Financial Delegations. His clashes with them over school construction policy showed how determined the Delegations were to protect their prerogatives. When, in his first year in office, Viollette and his subordinates in the Academy of Algiers apparently authorized construction of schools costing 20 million francs that were not on a list

approved by the Financial Delegations,⁸ the chairman of the interdelegatory commission on public works reported this fact to the assembled delegates in 1926 and commented:

Gentlemen, this method is deplorable. It is important to note it. It is important that it be understood that we want the administration to respect our distribution of the funds we put at its disposal, in form and in substance.⁹

That same year, at the fall session of the Delegations, Viollette asked that an additional 10 million francs be appropriated for school construction, because runaway inflation had rendered it impossible to achieve the goals included in the program of 1925-29 with the sums of money set aside for the purpose. The Delegations granted Viollette the 10 million francs on the condition that he use 2 millions of it for the purchase of land for future schools. But when Viollette contended that any surpluses should be put toward the construction of still more schools, there was an uproar in the chamber, and Viollette received a stern lecture from Delegate Galle, author of the Great Works Program of 1920.

In 1927 Viollette tried once again to recover the initiative, proposing that the expenditures for school construction be increased by nearly 100 per cent over the level specified in his own budget proposal, based on the plan of 1925-1929. The interdelegatory commission rejected

the request without considering its merit, saying the governor had not specified where he would find the money.¹⁰ In the fall of 1927 the Algerian members of Parliament prevailed on the French government to remove Viollette.¹¹

The Financial Delegations showed their exultation over Viollette's departure in a wildly enthusiastic welcome for his successor, Pierre Bordes, who had previously served as secretary general of Algeria, director of the governor general's cabinet, director of Algerian security, and prefect of the département of Constantine.¹² The settlers knew he thought like one of them, not like Viollette, and he soon proved worthy of their confidence. In 1929, after the Finance Commission of the Financial Delegations upset the administration's budget, as was its habit, he declared, "We can do nothing but bow to your position; we do it, moreover, very willingly."¹³ Summing up this and other incidents, Eugène Antonelli, Socialist rapporteur of the Algerian budget in the Chamber of Deputies, concluded: "It seems that the governor no longer contests the constantly increasing prerogatives of the assemblies."¹⁴

With respect to school construction policy, Antonelli's observation appears to be correct. At the request of the Delegations, the administration submitted proposals for new development plans in 1929, one for fifteen years and one for six. The Delegations eventually devised an eight-year

proposal that reduced the amount of money devoted to school construction, both in absolute terms and relative to the overall size of the program (see Table 4-1). Education enjoyed a smaller share in the new program than it did in the five-year plan then in effect. But the administration apparently did not object.¹⁵

The priorities of the Delegations seem to have shifted away from education at a moment when Algeria was close to the pinnacle of its interwar prosperity and the centennial of French rule was at hand. The record of appropriations confirms this impression. The percentage of Great Works money allocated to schools fell from about 10 per cent in 1929—it had not been below that figure since 1924—to 5.5 per cent in 1930, 6.3 per cent in 1931, and 7.2 per cent in 1932—years of unparalleled prosperity in Algeria. This may have been due, in part, to the lag in actual construction, but it is still true that schools fared least well in those years when more money was available than at any other time between 1920 and 1940¹⁶ (see Table 4-2). This fact casts doubt on the thesis that only a lack of money prevented European Algeria from building more schools between the wars.¹⁷

How did Paris react to this growing differentiation of institutions between France and Algeria? Why did the Ministry of Public Instruction, legally responsible for every aspect of the education of non-Muslims in Algeria, permit the

Table 3-2
 PROPORTION OF YEARLY APPROPRIATIONS ALLOCATED
 TO SCHOOL CONSTRUCTION
 (millions of francs)

Year	Total Great Works	School Construction	% Schools of Total
1920	1.0	--	0.0
1921	125.0	10.0	8.0
1922	77.0	5.0	6.5
1923	.3	--	0.0
1924	93.0	13.5	14.5
1925	91.0	12.0	13.2
1926	97.1	12.0	12.4
1927	209.3	28.0	13.3
1928	270.2	28.0	10.4
1930	902.4	49.7	5.5
1931-32 (15 mos.)	973.4	61.0	6.3
1932 (9 mos.)	760.6	54.6	7.2
1933	509.9	--	0.0
1934	312.0	15.0	4.8
Totals	4,650.8	313.8	6.7%

Source: Borderès, "Exposé—Etude sur les budgets algériens de 1900 à 1934," A. F. A., 1934, Ordinary Session, p. 11.

Financial Delegations to determine school construction policy? Why did the minister of the interior, directly responsible for most Algerian affairs, permit the governor general to be pushed into a corner by the Financial Delegations? How did Parliament view the encroachment of the Financial Delegations into its legislative domain?

A paucity of information makes it difficult to answer any but the last of these questions with assurance. Published materials make almost no mention of either the Ministry of Public Instruction or of the Ministry of the Interior in the formulation or execution of educational policy, beyond explaining what were their respective legal roles. The few archival materials available, mostly pertaining to education in the 1930's, offer little help, although an anonymous note is perhaps revealing: it was standard procedure for the rector of the Academy of Algiers to send a copy of his budget to the minister of public instruction in Paris, the note said. Through 1931 the minister annually returned a copy to the governor, presumably with his stamp of approval. "Since 1932," the note added, "the service [in Algeria] has never received a thing."¹⁸ One may infer that the minister of public instruction had no comments to make.

The role of the Ministry of Public Instruction seems to have been one of setting salary scales, specifying standards for the recruitment of teachers for European schools, approving

the European school curriculum, furnishing the baccalauréat examination, approving course offerings at the University of Algiers, and providing other technical services. Ministry supervision helped keep regular European schools in Algeria up to French standards, which the settlers regarded as essential. Even dissident Arab and Berber groups held French education in high esteem and welcomed such technical intervention from the metropolitan ministry. Conflict between the ministry and regional authorities was rare, because there was political consensus on the sorts of decisions the ministry surveyed and because the ministry did not attempt to push out the boundaries of its authority.

The French Parliament was equally ineffective in influencing the course of school construction policy in Algeria. Parliamentary debates on French educational policy in the 1920's¹⁹ bore little relevance to Algerian problems, which were not discussed in the Chamber and the Senate more than twice in ten years, and then for only a few minutes each time.²⁰ Among the few other metropolitan members of Parliament besides Viollette who maintained an interest in Algerian affairs were the Chamber's budget rapporteurs, Georges Bureau and Etienne Antonelli. As the Finance Commission rapporteur from 1920 to 1927, Bureau prepared long annual reports in the Journal officiel²¹—one ran to 32 triple-columned pages. In all these reports, except that

of 1923, he devoted considerable time and space to education. The report on the 1922 budget, in particular, reads like an apology for Algerian backwardness in this domain.²² Bureau was not a radical reformer, but he was a fair, ambitious and voluminous rapporteur—and certainly a partisan of education.

While Bureau strived for neutrality, his successor, Antonelli, was forthrightly critical of the Algerian regime. A Socialist, Antonelli lambasted the autonomous tendency he discerned in his reports on the 1929, 1930, and 1931-1932 budgets. He criticized the Financial Delegations, the Algerian administration, and even the settlers as individuals:

Algeria is the most admirable poem to the individualist effort of the French peasant become the Algerian colon, but it is a poem to anarchic effort where each works for himself and where rare are those who think in terms of all.²³

But such observations carried little weight with the "party of order,"²⁴ which dominated the Chamber between 1928 and 1936. Parliament did not act either to correct the weaknesses of Algerian educational policy, evident in the Bureau reports, or to counteract the tendency toward autonomous decisionmaking, discerned by Antonelli, that perpetuated those weaknesses. Despite Antonelli's reports and despite Viollette's two-year stint as governor general, harmony rather than conflict characterized relations between Paris and Algiers in the 1920's.

As one would expect from the theoretical model proposed here, this harmony between regional and central governments lessened the importance of the governor general as an intermediary. His potential strength could be exerted only if, like a spring, he was caught between opposing forces. On educational matters, he was in fact dragged one way by the Financial Delegations, without the benefit of metropolitan guideposts to which he might cling. At the beginning of the decade the governor took the lead in planning a school construction program, but by 1930 he was merely executing the wishes of the Financial Delegations. He had lost even the prerogative to decide which sorts of schools were most needed and where individual schools should be built.

The Teaching of Arabic

The decline of the governor's role and the corresponding rise of the Financial Delegations reduced the influence of Arabs and Berbers in the making of educational policy. This was true although Muslims had no voice in the selection of governor generals, no representation in the

high echelons of the bureaucracy, and nearly a third of the seats in the Financial Delegations. Virtual representation was more effective than direct representation in this instance. Muslims would probably have fared better in terms of education if they had held no seats in the Financial Delegations and been forced to depend exclusively on the good will of the administration. The governor, the Ministry of the Interior, and the French Parliament might then have looked more skeptically at the decisions of the European delegates. As it was, Muslim representation served primarily to legitimize the actions of the European landholders in the eyes of metropolitan Frenchmen.

The progressive aspects of educational policy in Algeria—not only the number and kind of schools for Arabs and Berbers, but also the teaching of Arabic—had been the work of a pair of metropolitan deputies (Combes and Rozet). After the Financial Delegations acquired power over the budget in 1900, they consistently sought to limit the construction of schools for Muslims, to emphasize technical rather than academic training for Arab and Berber children, and to restrict the teaching of Arabic. During the 1920's the inclinations of the European delegates were unchanging, despite the eloquent pleas of forceful Muslim spokesmen. Their positions carried more weight, moreover, since the colony had assumed from the municipalities a larger share

of educational burdens and since the influence of the governor general was declining. Viollette, with his moral outrage and political experience, could soften but not reverse the policies pursued by the European majority in the Algerian assembly.

Muslim representation was at its best in the first three years of the decade, when the Amir Khâled and his friends were members of the Financial Delegations. Amir Khâled Ben Hashimi Ben Abdel Kader el-Jaza'iri, grandson of the great Abdel Kader, was a transitional figure. French educated, a graduate of the French military academy at Saint-Cyr, he served in the French army before and during World War I and put his political talents in the service of the Young Algerian campaign. Khâled subsequently broke with the Young Algerians over the naturalization question. Although the Young Algerians were themselves unhappy with the Jonnart Law of February 4, 1919, which tightened the restrictions on Muslim access to citizenship, Khâled denounced the law altogether and appealed to the traditional, religious instincts of his compatriots, calling for reforms that would permit a renovation of Islamic civilization in Algeria.²⁵ In 1919 he and Hadj Moussa headed a slate of candidates who won election to the municipal council in Algiers over a list of Young Algerians headed by the naturalized Dr. Benthâmi. The elections were annulled, but Khâled was also elected to the Financial

Delegations the following year, along with Hadj Moussa, Mohamed Ben Rahal and Kaid Hamoud.

In 1920 the chances that an Arab or Berber child might receive any formal education in Algeria were perhaps one in twenty. He stood an even smaller chance of gaining a satisfactory knowledge of Arabic. In this respect his opportunities were probably fewer than at the time of the French conquest,²⁶ for the French had destroyed much of the educational system they found in Algeria in 1830. Only the most elementary schools, the Quranic, which taught pupils how to read the Quran and little else, survived in number. In 1863 there were still some 2,000 of them, with 27,000 pupils, in Algeria.²⁷ But higher level schools, such as the médersas, associated with mosques, and the schools of the zaouias, outposts of the religious brotherhoods, virtually disappeared.

To replace the médersas, the French created médersas of their own in 1850 to train Muslim religious and judicial personnel. Then the Second Empire added a Collège impérial français-arabe in 1857, and two others in 1865, to train Muslim functionaries, drawn mainly from what the French judged were the great ruling families. At the primary level, the Empire established French-Arab schools that offered

instruction in Arabic in the morning and lessons in French in the afternoon. However, the settlers opposed this rather minimal effort on behalf of Arabs and Berbers, just as they opposed most other undertakings of Napoleon III.

The switch to civilian rule between 1870 and 1880 led to a fresh dismantling of the educational system. The collèges impériaux were converted into European secondary institutions. The médersas were Frenchified, their curriculum gutted, the teaching of Islamic theology eliminated.²⁸ The French-Arab primary schools gradually vanished, and in their place came the straight French primary school, adapted only slightly for the benefit of Arabs and Berbers. Arabic was thus almost totally neglected.

At the post-primary level, pupils were somewhat more likely to receive training in Arabic, but few Muslims got that far. The French lycées concentrated on a classical French education and taught Arabic as a foreign language. The higher primary schools, which offered a cheaper, more practical kind of secondary schooling than the lycées, taught more Arabic, but they enrolled almost no Muslim pupils before World War I. The médersas were producing about 45 graduates a year between 1910 and 1914. As for the University of Algiers, its Faculty of Letters had awarded 33 diplômes in Arabic and three in Berber, and 193 brevêts in Arabic and three in Berber by 1914.²⁹

Between 1920 and 1930, Arab and Berber members of the Financial Delegations repeatedly recommended that more Arabic be taught in French schools and that privately run Quranic schools be subsidized to do so as well, but their recommendations were always denied. During the debate on the inventory of Great Works projects prepared for discussion at the fall session in 1920, Mohamed Ben Rahal, a friend of Amir Khâled who had himself been active in politics for 30 years, noted that there was not a sou for the teaching of Arabic in the 3.4-billion-franc program.³⁰ Rector Ardaillon responded by calling him out of order, but Ben Rahal pursued his argument at the 1921 spring sessions,³¹ pointing out that in some primary schools pupils received one-half hour a day of instruction in the language. Arab and Berber students attending normal schools to become teachers took only four hours a week:

Well, can you imagine a people without a language to express its ideas, to understand the ideas of others, to cultivate its mind, to translate its emotions, to perfect its ethics, to live and to evolve, after all?³²

The reaction of the European delegates was unanimously negative, although one colon, Eugène Vallet, praised the "literary value" of Ben Rahal's speech. Governor General Abel, while maintaining that Arabic had not been sacrificed,

agreed that the principal effort should go toward the incultation of French. The debate ended on that note.

In subsequent years the Arab and Kabyle delegates turned their efforts toward the administration. In 1923 the Arab section adopted a resolution asking that instruction in Arabic be organized wherever French schools were unavailable. When, a year later, the administration replied, "Question under study,"³³ the Arabs renewed their resolution, but the administration gave little more satisfaction in 1925 than it had a year earlier. In the program for the ordinary session of the Financial Delegations, prepared before Maurice Viollette became governor general, the government said:

For the study of Arabic, young natives have the courses taught in the mosques at their disposition in the important centers of population and the Quranic schools in the countryside, for which the administration accords the necessary authorization, when it is appropriate to do so.

The government argued that it would cost too much to hire more mouderrès to teach in the mosques and that to allow them to teach in French classrooms, as the Arab delegates had suggested, would "constitute an infringement of the traditional organization of the Muslim cult."³⁴

After Viollette became governor general, Arabs and Berbers apparently did not renew their protests in the

Financial Delegations. Perhaps Arab and Kabyle delegates wished to avoid embarrassing a sympathetic governor general who had won the loyalty of many natives by his perseverance in the cause of reform against the wishes of the settlers. More probably, the interest in Arabic stirred by Amir Khâled and Ben Rahal in the early twenties was waning. The amir was in self-imposed exile, and Ben Rahal had retreated into mysticism.³⁵ The "liberals" headed by Dr. Benthâmi were once again in the ascendency. After 1930 Abdel Hamid Ben Badis and the Association of Ulama would revive the movement for renewal of the Arabic language and culture, but Muslim hopes appear to have shifted almost entirely to the French educational system between 1925 and the end of the decade.

The Distribution of New Schools

The strategy of Arab and Kabyle delegates changed from advocating programs they could see the settlers would never accept toward attempting to win maximum benefits for their constituencies from the school construction plans the Europeans had already approved. They sought repeated reassurances that equal amounts of money would be spent on European native primary schools. They eventually asked the administration to separate its accounts to show how much money was being spent on Muslim education.

In theory, there should have been no conflict over the distribution of funds. A single principle prevailed in

all the school construction programs proposed and adopted between 1914 and 1930: as many primary school classrooms should be built for natives as for Europeans in any given period. For example, the programs of 1917, 1919, and 1920 provided for 1,000 European classrooms and 1,000 native classrooms. Expenditures for higher primary, secondary, and higher education were not divided by ethnic group, since Arabs and Berbers supposedly had free access to these schools (see Table 4-3). In fact, all post-primary schools served primarily the settler and Jewish populations.³⁶ Yet, despite the blatant injustice of such a distribution of funds, Arab and Kabyle delegates never attacked the principle.

They did protest, however, when it became clear the principle was not being respected. In 1926, they asked that funds for Arab-Berber schools be separated from those destined for European schools. A spokesman for Governor General Viollette promised that 11 of 20 million francs for primary school construction in 1927-1928 would go for native schools—a response that contrasts sharply with the negative reaction of Governor General Théodore Steeg to the earlier resolutions. Viollette divided school construction funds for 1928 and relieved the academic authorities of centralized control over school construction. From then on, the Directorate of Native Affairs would plan and build Muslim schools, while the Directorate of the Interior would supervise construction

Table 3-3

DISTRIBUTION OF FUNDS BY TYPES OF SCHOOLS

Type of School	School Construction Programs				
	1920 Inventory	1920 Urgent	1925- 1929	1929- 1930	1931- 1935
Higher education	10.3%	8.8%	---	5.1%	6.9%
Normal	---	---	---	---	5.4
Secondary	18.5	23.4	11.8	5.1	13.7
Higher primary	19.8	18.1	30.5	24.1	14.3
European elementary	25.8	22.2	28.9	36.1	31.4
Arab-Berber elementary	25.8	27.9	28.9	29.8	28.2
TOTALS	100.2%	100.4%	100.1%	100.2%	99.9%

Source: Galle Report, 1920; Pantaloni Report, 1924;
Jaillet Report, 1929.

of European schools. Moreover, Viollette took the unusual step of appearing in person before the Arab section of the Financial Delegations to answer questions on this and other points.

Such actions won Viollette friends among Arabs and Berbers and enemies among the Europeans, who reproached him for splitting the school construction budget for the benefit of Muslims. The Finance Commission, dominated by Europeans, recommended that school construction services continue to be unified under the supervision of the academic authorities. The colon delegation endorsed this recommendation on May 18, 1927, over the protests of the director of native affairs, who argued that "the governor general has the exclusive prerogative for the organization of the services of the central administration."³⁷ The recommendation had no effect, since Viollette chose to ignore it, but such disregard for colon opinion undoubtedly cost the governor some of the little remaining support he had among European delegates.

Were the Europeans trying consciously to deprive Muslims of schools promised them by the Great Works program of 1920? The evidence is sketchy. "Difficulties of all kinds" were said to slow the construction of native schools. The authorities began with proposals submitted by the European-dominated communes, which were most eager to have European schools. The concentration of architects and

construction firms in the cities, and especially in Algiers, facilitated construction there where Europeans were clustered and slowed progress elsewhere, in overwhelmingly Muslim areas.³⁸ Finally, as the school construction program began to shift its attention to the tribal areas, other problems developed. If a community did not already possess a satisfactory school site, the procedure for the purchase of land could be long. Sometimes there was no road, and construction materials had to be hauled in by mule. Furthermore, in the outlying areas, housing for teachers had to be built at the same time as the schools.³⁹

It may be that European delegates schemed with their settler friends in the bureaucracy to sabotage native schools. Such "cooperation" would have been consistent with the attitudes of earlier generations of settlers, hostile to any but the most practical training for Arabs and Berbers. It seems more likely, however, that Europeans were simply more effective than Muslims in pressuring the European bureaucracy to build the schools they wanted. This fact should not be allowed to obscure the efforts of Arabs and Berber to guarantee their constituents a fair share of construction money. The evidence indicates that even after Amir Khâled had gone into exile, native delegates sometimes rose above the beni-oui-oui label pasted on them by nationalists of later generations. It also shows that native representation

in local elected bodies could be effectives in the short run if the governor general regarded himself as leader of an alliance between the administration and native delegates, as did Maurice Viollette. In the long run, however, such a governor could not survive in Algiers, the administration was forced to ally itself with the settlers, and Arab and Berber delegates found themselves a helpless minority.

Technical Schools

The continuing debate over technical vs. general education is a case in point. The issue had been important to educational policy in Algeria since the Ferry Commission of Eighteen had first proposed a serious program of primary school construction. Settler representatives argued that primary schooling was inappropriate for the mass of Arabs and Berbers. Most pupils, they felt, should be channeled into technical or apprenticeship schools where they could be taught "useful" trades such as the cultivation of vines (i.e. on European-owned farms). Such training would not cut them off from the traditional milieu, nor would it produce an alienated intellectual elite. However, the academic authorities, while they gave lip service to the settler objectives, did little to implement them before World War I. What little money there was for native schools went almost entirely for academic elementary schools.

The settlers revived the issue after the war. When the administration proposed 40 million francs for each kind

of primary schools, European and native, in the Great Works Program of 1920, the interdelegatory commission raised the figure for native schools to 50 on the condition that the additional 10 million francs go for 15 farm schools and 15 apprenticeship schools. In addition, some 30 million francs were included in the "colonization" chapter of the program for technical and professional education, but these were schools designed primarily for Europeans.

Arab and Kabyle delegates protested the commission's recommendation. A Kabyle delegate, Ou Rabah Abderrahmane, who was a member of the commission, said: "Decidedly, they are going to become a nuisance (maladie), these apprenticeship schools." He maintained that Muslim members of the commission who had been instrumental in obtaining the extra 10 million francs wanted it to go for primary schools,

For you cannot train good workmen in professional schools if the pupils are not capable of following the courses. I ask you then, Gentlemen, to adopt the principle of creating primary schools before thinking about establishing professional schools.⁴⁰

He proposed an amendment supported by the entire native delegation that would have put the 10 millions toward primary school construction. The European president of the interdelegatory commission, speaking as rapporteur for the majority, made his position no less clear:

Contrary to the opinion of Mr. Ou Rabah, it [the commission majority] deems that native education must be oriented toward professional schools. It is much more profitable for the natives themselves to be given a good trade than to be taught the story of Frédegonde or of Brunehaut.⁴¹

The Ou Rabah amendment was defeated, 23 to 17.

The impact of this decision was limited by a subsequent decision to start with a more modest, "urgent" program, which included only the administration proposals for education. The 10 million francs for farm and apprenticeship schools were left out. Furthermore, little money was voted for any aspect of the Great Works Program before 1925. By then, a new five-year program had been voted, again without special provision for these practical schools. Although the colons frequently campaigned for larger appropriations in the field of agricultural education under the budget rubric of "colonization," there is no evidence that any of the money voted for school construction under the education chapter was used for any but academic schools. The academic authorities, who were initially responsible for deciding in which order schools would be built, were traditionally hostile to technical and professional institutions.

The cooperation of the bureaucracy and of the governor general was invaluable to Arabs and Berbers in defending

themselves against trade schools as it was in obtaining their "fair" share of school construction funds. All governors seem to have retained a sense of duty to the Arab-Berber population, even if it was sometimes less sharp than that of a Jules Cambon or a Violette. Furthermore, the bureaucracy, whether by reason of its nonlanded status or by dint of an idealistic, Weberian understanding of a bureaucratic role, consistently proved more liberal in its instincts toward Muslims than the elected European officials.

However, any major modification of educational policy required the consent of the Financial Delegations. This might not have been disastrous for Muslims if the governor general had retained the initiative and, with it, enough influence over the Delegations to guarantee that his initiatives would not be derailed, or if European delegates had been less unanimous about educational policy. In fact, few seemed to think that the proportion of the Algerian budget devoted to education was insufficient or that the percentage of funds for Arab-Berber schools was too small. The question of teaching Arabic in French schools was not an issue that produced deep political divisions among them either, and their united stand on these issues reduced Muslim influence with the Algerian assembly nothing at all.

The augmented autonomy of the Financial Delegations produced an increasingly parochial, consensual atmosphere for decision, which deprived Arabs and Berbers of their principal political resources: the assistance of metropolitan liberals and the strength of their numbers.

The trend was temporarily reversed under Maurice Viollette, who attempted to reassert the prerogatives of the governor general in education as in other policy areas. According to the model, such a reassertion of authority should be an indication of partisan tension between center and periphery, a breakdown of the harmony that permitted decentralization to occur. However, the fluidity of party politics in the Third Republic, the tendency of Algerian representatives to support almost every ministry, and the apolitical stance of most members of the Financial Delegations makes it difficult to decide how much partisan tension there was between Paris and Algiers. The complexion of the French Parliament changed from Right to Left between 1919 and 1924, from the Bloc National, victorious in the elections of 1919, to the Cartel des Gauches, which emerged with a majority of seats in 1924. However, Algeria returned all five of its incumbent deputies running for re-election in 1924. Although none of the Algerian deputies ran on a ticket that included the word socialist, four subsequently joined the Republican Socialist and French Socialist groups in the Parliament. Other members of the group were Aristide Briand, who had presided over his seventh

government from January 16, 1921, to January 12, 1922, and would form his eighth, ninth and tenth in the coming legislature; Paul Painlevé, who headed two governments based on the Cartel des gauches, from April 17, 1925, to November 22, 1924; and Maurice Viollette, whom Painlevé appointed governor general of Algeria, May 12, 1925.

Despite such complications, it is clear that European Algeria did not share Viollette's socialistic views, that there was from the beginning an unspoken feeling of partisan tension and that this feeling was not resolved until the French government, back in the more conservative hands of Raymond Poincaré, had recalled Viollette in the spring of 1927. There were elements of partisan conflict at the start, when a number of Viollette's clashes with the settlers stemmed from projects that echoed his social concerns, such as assistance for new mothers and the subsidizing of school lunchrooms. Yet his crusade was actually more personal than partisan. He saw himself as the guarantor of the national interest, a representative of the entire Parliament. Although the power he managed to exercise derived from tension between Paris and Algiers, it was tension he created for his own benefit. Unlike his predecessors and his successors, Viollette refused to reveal the content of his correspondence with the Parisian ministries. He declined to let the Financial Delegations know who was proposing (certainly he) and who was agreeing to support (probably the ministries). He

understood how important it was that he should appear to have no choice. But the delegates saw through his tactics--his unwillingness to publish his correspondence gave it away--and the long-standing disinterest of metropolitan France in Algerian education rendered them useless, anyway, in that domain. In educational matters, where Viollette had only his wits and his less-than-perfect control over the bureaucracy as bargaining tools, it is not surprising that he enjoyed hardly any more success than his predecessors.

If educational matters are typical, the metropolitan role in Algerian policymaking diminished in the 1920's, because the governor general could no longer hold his own against the increasingly assertive Delegations. The lack of partisan tension between Paris and Algiers left him prey to the extortion of the European landholders who dominated the assembly. The low level of partisan tension can, in turn, be attributed in some measure to the work in Parliament of the Algerian representatives, who warded off Parliamentary and governmental intervention. The Algerian budget was not debated. Educational policy was not challenged. Of course, such neglect of Algerian affairs must also be charged in part to the general indifference of a country preoccupied with reconstruction, reparations, and inflation and plagued by revolving-door governments.

CHAPTER 4

THE SECURITY CRISIS OF 1934-1935

The chain of events connecting the riots in Constantine on August 5, 1934, with the Régnier decree of April 5, 1935, probably did not constitute a crisis in a strictly objective sense of the word. In the political realm, French sovereignty never appears to have been in danger, although the settler population of Algeria said that it was. There was perhaps reason to speak of an economic crisis, and yet objectively the Algerian economy seemed to be in somewhat better condition than that of France, which was feeling the full effect of world-wide depression.¹

Nevertheless, in psychological terms Algeria did undergo an eight-month crisis. In the minds of many settlers, political agitation by Arabs and Berbers threatened to break the French hold on Algeria. Only repression, they insisted, could resolve this "crisis of authority." Dissident Arabs and Berbers found this a figment of the European imagination and denied any intention of overthrowing French rule. But the more the Europeans insisted on repression, the more native Algerians began to regard the crisis as reality. In the end, they went along with crisis talk in hopes that it would serve

the cause of reform: the extension of political rights among Muslims.

They were disappointed. Muslims staked their hopes for favorable treatment on metropolitan arbitration of the affair, and for a few fleeting weeks it appeared as if those hopes might be fulfilled. The legal guardian of Algerian security, the minister of the interior, prepared to invoke his authority. But then the settlers worked their magic on the minister and his colleagues in the cabinet, persuading them to renounce the possibility of reform before investigating the need for it. The settlers supported them. The Muslims, of course, lacked any representation in Paris. The result of this unfair contest was not a reassertion of metropolitan authority, as the Muslims had hoped, but a reinforcement of regional autonomy. By giving the governor general greater liberty to suppress agitation among Muslims, the French government endorsed the settler contention that Algeria could be governed without advice from Paris.

Such action only magnified the gap between legal theory and political reality, which had put Muslims at such a great disadvantage in the first place. The gap produced twisted lines of authority and unpredictable, chaotic decision-making. With educational policy, it was at least clear that the Financial Delegations held the reins, albeit illegitimately. In the security flap of 1934-35 it was difficult to know where power lay. The mayor of Constantine, the conseil départemental, the Financial Delegations, the governor general, the

minister of the interior, and the French Parliament all participated in decisions of one sort or another. Muslim Algerians lacked the time, mobility, money, and proper racial credentials to fight on all these fronts. The settlers took advantage of the confusion and informality of the process to press their points in the antichambers of the governor general, in the corridors of Parliament and in conversations with the minister of the interior. They obtained further endorsement of Algerian autonomy, which further muddied the waters and weakened the already indefensible Muslim position.

Two Incidents: Constantine and Sétif

The trouble on Friday, August 3, 1934, began when a drunken Jewish soldier hurled insults at some Muslims preparing to say their evening prayers at the Green Mosque in Constantine.² The Muslims called in the police, but the soldier escaped to his home. A crowd of Muslims gathered there, determined on revenge. While police held them off, the soldier's Jewish neighbors pelted the crowd from their windows. The Muslims replied with rocks. Then the police managed to disperse the crowd, which was becoming a mob. But, regrouping elsewhere, Muslims sacked and looted Jewish property into the early hours of the morning.

Next day all was quiet, and it is not clear how the cinders from the Friday night clash were reignited on Sunday. All that can be said with certainty is that by the time order was restored shortly after noon some 23 Jews and four Muslims were dead, and twenty or so persons from each side had been wounded. Moreover, the disturbances had spread to surrounding towns, although the consequences were not serious anywhere else. Total damages were estimated at 20 million francs.³

It is important to note that no persons of European origin were harmed or even threatened during the violence. In fact, 110,000 Algerian Jews enjoyed political and economic privileges that reinforced the religious cleavage between them and 5.6 million Muslim compatriots.⁴ Naturalized en masse by the Crémieux decree of 1870, the Jews were full French citizens. Favored by the European community, they enjoyed better economic and educational opportunities than the Muslims.⁵ The Jews were often creditors, the Muslims debtors. What is more, the Muslims were subjects, not citizens. They could qualify for citizenship only as individuals fulfilling certain conditions and renouncing their civil statute derived from Islamic law.

Despite the political, economic, social, and religious barriers dividing Muslims and Jews, the two communities had always lived together in relative peace. Leaders of both communities were quick to say so and to denounce the riots. How then can the outburst of violence be explained?

There were certain points on which European and Muslim observers agreed. Almost everyone who wrote about the crisis noted that life was hard in 1934 and that Arabs and Berbers were suffering. At the same time, no analyst concluded that economic conditions were the sole or immediate cause of the rioting. European and Muslim writers agreed, in addition, that the government should be held responsible,

though they differed on how it might have prevented the violence. Arabs and Berbers blamed the government's failure to satisfy the political and cultural aspirations of native Algerians. Many Europeans argued, quite to the contrary, that the administration had been too soft on dissident groups. A stronger hand was needed to restore French prestige, they said.⁶ The Europeans believed the danger lay in the major currents of Algerian dissidence in the period: the "Communists" of Messali Hadj, the "neo-Wahhabi" religious reformers and the French-educated intellectuals.

Messali Hadj's movement was particularly susceptible to attack for its advocacy of Algerian independence and for its close alliance with the French Communist Party. Messali, a native of Tlemcen who had gone to work for Renault after World War I, was the principal figure in l'Etoile nord-africaine, which had put down roots in the 1920's among the 100,000 Muslim Algerians working in France.⁷ Dissolved by the French government in 1929, l'Etoile reappeared in 1933 as the Glorieuse étoile nord-africaine, and its newspaper, El-Ouma, printed in French with an Arabic title, resumed its harsh commentaries on colonialism in general and the Algerian administration in particular.

It was attacked in the wake of the 1934 riots by Eugene Vallet, a member of the Financial Delegations from Constantine. Vallet claimed that he and his friends had

recognized before August that the activities of l'Etoile, the North African Students Association and El-ouma, which was somehow slipping into Algeria, were "openly pushing, without meeting the least constraint, toward the collective assassination of the French of Algeria."⁸ But he did not try to explain the actual outbreak of rioting in terms of Messali Hadj alone.

The European commentators made less violent but more pointed attacks on Muslims dissidents living in Algeria. The reformist ulama led Abdel Hamid Ben Badis, regarded by some Europeans as a religious fanatic, were accused of encouraging the riots. Although Ben Badis practiced toleration and deplored the incident,⁹ well-informed European observers, such as Jean Desparmet, said the reformists were the source of the problem. By attacking the great native chiefs, marabouts, and religious brotherhoods, Ben Badis and the Association of Ulama had clashed with the administration, and the administration had not responded with agility and tact. In his view, the riots were an out-cropping of this continuing battle.¹⁰ Since it was true that Ben Badis opposed the marabouts, which had become pillars of the French administration, there was an element of logic in Desparmet's reasoning.

There was less rationality in the European denunciation of the French-educated Muslim intellectuals. Men such

as Ferhat Abbas, former president of the Muslim student association at the University of Algiers; R. Zenati, a Kabyle school teacher and editor of La voix indigène, and Mohamed Bendjelloul, a young medical doctor founder of the Federation of Muslim Elected Officials in the Département of Constantine, continued to believe in an Algeria tied to France, where Muslims would exercise the rights of citizenship but retain their personal statute as Muslims. They promised respect for French authority in return for French respect of Islamic civilization, renunciation of moral superiority, equal political rights, and more schools for Arabs and Berbers. In the midst of the rioting, Bendjelloul and other political leaders of Constantine agreed to walk the streets to help restore order. Nonetheless, E. F. Gautier, a professor at the University of Algiers thought to be sympathetic to the Muslim cause, wrote an article called "Threats to Algeria" for La revue de Paris in which he said:

Muslims who come out of our schools become automatically our worst enemies. And this is normal. In the old slave colonies, it was the mulattoes who were the ferment of insurrection.¹¹

The article infuriated Muslim intellectuals.

The elected representatives of European Algeria reacted as if all Muslims had been disloyal and as if the entire European community were in jeopardy. Emile Morinaud, the

deputy-mayor of Constantine, laid a six-point program before the governor general that included the mobilization of all able-bodied Frenchmen under the age of 60 in case of "serious trouble."¹² He also said the number of Jews and Muslims in the Constantine police force would be reduced by 50 per cent.¹³ The General Council of the Département of Constantine, meeting in October, hastened to vote money for the creation of new gendarmerie posts and for the improvement of old ones—projects they had been postponing for years.¹⁴ At the regional level, the Financial Delegations created a garde mobile similar to a force used for riot control in France. In the meantime, a decree of October 23, 1934, reasserted the preeminence of the governor general over the three prefects of Algeria, presumably to insure central control over police forces in case of future riots.¹⁵

Muslim dissidents were nonplused by this outburst of European fear and hostility. They said European wine producers, unhappy with the discriminatory treatment their wine was receiving in France, represented the sole threat to public tranquility. However, both the reformist and assimilationist strains of the dissident movement admitted that the policies of Jules Carde, governor general of Algeria since 1931, had produced a smoldering discontent among Muslims—"a discontent that has become despair." Born in Algeria, Carde had spent most of his career as a high functionary in

colonial Africa. Thus his background and his experience tied him to the settler milieu, and the dissidents reproached him specifically for cutting them off from Paris and harrassing the reformist movement. Twice the French-educated intellectuals led by Bendjelloul had sought an audience in Paris and twice they had been turned away. Moreover, the administration had issued a prefectoral order known as the Circulaire Michel which barred unofficial personnel from preaching in mosques in the département of Algiers. It seemed prepared to extend the circle to all of Algeria and to establish tighter supervision of reformist schools and the reformist press. An interministerial committee on Muslim affairs, meeting in Paris in May, made secret recommendations to this effect. When these recommendations leaked, there was an outburst of indignation among both assimilationists and reformists in Algeria. La défense, reflecting reformist views, published a special issue in protest.¹⁶

Thus dissidents were unhappy in August 1934, but it is not clear they had any role in sparking violence in Constantine on August 3 and 5. However, both Europeans and Muslims believed there was a connection between Muslim grievances and the violence. Hence the crisis atmosphere that ensued.

A second explosion occurred in Sétif on February 1, 1935, after a Jewish policeman had intervened in a fight and

killed one of the protagonists, a drunken Muslim soldier. A group of the victim's fellow "riflemen" sought immediate revenge, and one policeman was killed and two others seriously injured before the mob, which began sacking Jewish stores, was brought under control.¹⁷

Emile Morinaud, the powerful deputy-mayor of Constantine, lost scarcely a moment in exploiting the turn of events. He attempted to scuttle all remaining Muslim hopes for political reform by blaming the new outburst of violence on Maurice Viollette, the former governor general.¹⁸ Senator Viollette had submitted a bill that would have permitted certain Arabs and Berbers to take French citizenship without renouncing their personal statute as Muslims. Morinaud hoped to kill that bill before it came up for discussion. Moreover, he profited from the occasion to renew his proposal of a European militia and to seek the transfer of Muslim troops from Algeria to Europe. He wanted them replaced by French or Senegalese soldiers.¹⁹

On February 12, less than two weeks after the Sétif incident, the French minister of the interior, Marcel Régnier, announced he would make a trip to Algeria. Although he had planned to go at Easter, the need to investigate the Sétif affair was one consideration in the revised timing of the trip.

By contributing to the growing tension between the Muslim and European communities, the Arab and Berber dissidents had thus caused the French government to intervene in

the policymaking process. Of course, this was also their fervent desire. The August 30 issue of La voix indigène had carried an enormous banner:

The Explosion of Constantine Puts the Métropole under an Absolute Obligation to Acquaint Itself with the Feelings of the Muslim Population of Algeria. . . .
For that, A Parliamentary Investigation is Absolutely Essential!!

Six months later, after Régnier had decided to come to Algeria, the paper's editor, Zenati, was ecstatic: "This fortunate measure, this unexpected event that will perhaps save you from catastrophe can only firm up your confidence in French generosity and in her chivalrous people," he told his readers.²⁰

But such optimism proved unwarranted. Arab and Berber influence over policy decisions taken at the departmental and regional levels during the security crisis was, indeed, minimal—a fact that apparently led Zenati to put his hopes in metropolitan intervention. However, neither the Régnier trip to Algeria nor Viollette's interpellation in Parliament produced tangible benefits for Muslims. It was as if the shortcomings of the local decisionmaking process, confirmed in two aspects of the security crisis, had infected politics in such a way that national decisions reflected regional biases as accurately as those taken by departmental councils and the Financial Delegations.

The Muslim Response

At the departmental level, dissident Muslim intellectuals had achieved effective electoral organization for the first time in the fall of 1934. Under the leadership of Mohamed Bendjelloul and with the support of the reformist ulama under Ben Badis, they took seven of the ten seats allotted to Muslims in the 40-man General Council of the Département of Constantine.

However, the electoral victories were not enough to dissuade the general council of the département from taking a tendentious position in the security crisis. European members of the council asked the dissidents to join them in a statement presented by Eugène Vallet, which declared that the native population of Algeria was extremely mobile and therefore easily drawn into a mass movement. The Constantine riots were a case in point, and for this reason the French population had "reason to be moved." Vallet asked for a "gesture of solidarity" from his native colleagues in the council to combat what he called anti-French propaganda, to obtain indictment of the guilty parties and to calm spirits. In previous years he might have had it, but the responses of Ferhat Abbas and Mohamed Bendjelloul showed that the October elections had brought change. The dissidents blocked the Vallet-Morinaud effort to get unanimous approval for the statement.²¹

The Europeans showed no willingness to negotiate a more acceptable version. Instead, having caucused before

the meeting and agreed among themselves, they dropped the idea of converting their resolution into a motion of the entire general council and issued it as a "declaration of the European delegation."

The incident may have done the dissidents more harm than good. By declining to support the statement, they contributed to the image of stiffening native attitudes that lay at the base of European fears. Morinaud played on these fears in his efforts to tighten Algerian security against the Muslims.

The scene was replayed in March during Régnier's visit to Algeria. Again Vallet proposed a motion, this time calling for

the energetic measures necessary to respond to the anti-social and anti-French undertakings, which are authored from metropolitan territory and which have unctious or blind proponents in Algeria; these undertakings have created trouble among the native masses, who are always ready with unexpected and disconcerting reflexes, but are easy to bring back to order with a simple demonstration of authority.²²

Again the dissidents refused to sign, and again they probably suffered from the European maneuver.

If Arabs and Berbers profited little from their representation in the general council of Constantine, they

fared even more poorly in the Financial Delegation, where their representatives were electorally dependent on the administration. Here the security issue took the form of discussion of the mobile guard, and the administration made it clear that the brigade would be used against the dissidents.²³ Nevertheless, Arab and Berber delegates approved the idea once in the spring and again in November, after the governor had turned his theoretical proposition into a request for money. They began to show concern, however, for the composition of the force. When the administration's director of security said the government was anxious that at least ten per cent of the force be of native origin, an Arab delegate suggested the proportion should be "not half, of course" but on the order of 25 per cent, "because the native population will be less shocked to be repressed by a police force partly composed of their fellow Muslims."²⁴ The Kabyle section asked that one-third of the force be Muslim.²⁵

To these requests Guilhermet, the director of security, responded that he saw no reason why native participation should not go up to 20 per cent, as a maximum.²⁶ But three days later another government spokesman went before the colon delegation, again in secret session, and said there would be no time for local recruitment.²⁷ The force would be created on January 1, 1935, and would be composed solely of French gendarmes at the start. Further discussion of

composition was irrelevant. While Arabs and Berbers were still in the process of striking an unfavorable bargain with the administration, the war ministry's offer of French gendarmes had undercut the bargain and left Muslims without any representatives on the new mobile force. The metropolitan action magnified the biases of regional policymaking.

The Régnier visit was similarly unprofitable for Muslims. The minister arrived on March 4, 1935, and throngs of Algerians took advantage of a sunny day to see him. In the next 12 days, he met with high officials, local politicians, and anyone who requested an audience, and as a result of these conversations, became convinced that the economic aspect of the crisis was more serious than the political. Régnier did acknowledge one political problem, however: French authority in Algiers needed to be reinforced. The governor's powers had to be enlarged. Then, once calm had been restored, the reforms sought by Arabs and Berbers might be considered.

It was not difficult for either Europeans or Muslims to guess what Régnier had in mind. In February Governor General Carde had complained of his inability to repress criticism of official policies in the Muslim French-language press, which enjoyed the protection of the French press law of 1881. Control of the Arabic press, which was treated as a foreign press, presented no similar legal problem for the government.²⁸ Muslim dissidents could legitimately interpret

Régnier's statements to mean that reform would be conditional on a muzzling of the Arab-Berber publications, such as La voix indigène and La défense, which were the most vocal partisans of reform.

To mollify Arab-Berber grief, Régnier offered only kernels of sweetness. In an interview with Le temps, just before boarding ship for Marseille, the minister said the government would provide economic relief for Algerian agriculture, Muslim and European. In addition, it would see that naturalized Arabs and Berbers were guaranteed equal treatment, but mass naturalization of Muslims was out of the question, he said.²⁹ The French Council of Ministers, meeting March 20, approved Régnier's recommendations for measures to end subversive propaganda in Algeria and for loans to Algerian agriculture for 450 million francs: 400 millions for European farmers and 50 millions for Arabs and Berbers.³⁰

Muslim dissidents were now reduced to hoping that a Senate interpellation long planned by Maurice Viollette would steer French policy toward reform. Viollette began his interpellation March 21, three days after Régnier's return to Paris. In theory, government policy in Algeria toward the economic and political crisis was under scrutiny, but in fact the interpellation became a personal trial for Maurice Viollette and for his proposal, introduced in 1931, to permit some categories of Arabs and Berbers to acquire French

citizenship without relinquishing their personal statute as Muslims. Both fared badly. The government, represented by Interior Minister Régnier, rejected Viollette's criticisms as well as his proposal for extending citizenship and suffrage in Algeria.

The minister said that those Algerians who had been naturalized under the law of 1919, regarded as renegades by many of their compatriots, would be guaranteed equal treatment. He thus admitted that their rights had not always been protected in the past. "But that's enough," he claimed. "Why go further?"³¹ Viollette's reasons were ignored, his order of the day pushed aside in favor of a government-backed resolution approving a "fair and equitable policy toward settlers and natives alike," a policy said to be "indispensable to the maintenance of the general and liberal authority of France."³²

European Algeria was satisfied. Newspapers hailed Viollette's defeat. As for Arabs and Berbers, their last hopes of reform had turned to despair. A four-column headline in La voix indigène announced: "The decision of the Senate on the Viollette concept has caused an unbelievable disappointment in the Muslim Algerian world."³³

In the wake of the debate, the publication of the "Régnier" decree, April 5, 1935, was anticlimactic. It fulfilled the wishes of the governor general and the promises

of the minister of the interior to stamp out hostile propaganda, said to be "all the more dangerous since, for a native, a printed text has an almost sacramental value of a convincing sort."³⁴ The first article of the decree read:

Whoever, wherever he is and by whatever means, shall provoke native Algerians, natives of other French colonies or protectorates or foreigners residing in Algeria to acts of disorder or demonstrations against French sovereignty, to active or passive resistance to the application of the laws, decrees, rules or orders of the public authorities, shall be punished by a sentence of 3 months to 2 years in prison and a fine of 500 to 5,000 francs.³⁵

Article 2 described the penalties for employees of the government, which were more severe. The objective was to discourage school teachers with socialist or communist sympathies from stirring up trouble. Article 3 gave the minister of the interior power to execute the decree, issued under the authority of the president of the Republic.

The upshot of the crisis for Muslims was that they were locked more tightly than ever into the pattern of regional politics from which they had hoped and tried to escape. Far from obtaining greater metropolitan involvement in Algerian affairs, they had helped produce a reinforcement of the governor general's powers that would dampen any future

efforts to carry the Arab-Berber case beyond the confines of Algeria. Far from overturning the established patterns of policymaking, they had reinforced them. Far from equilibrating the unequal struggle between Europeans and Muslims, they had tipped the balance still further in favor of the settler element.

The Weakness of the Central Government

However deplorable, the outcome would not surprise most students of colonial affairs. Subject peoples tend to be ignored when they protest against the rules and procedures that hold them in subject roles. But it is genuinely surprising, if not shocking, that an imperial nation should react perfunctorily to a crisis that jeopardized, in the views of some observers, the security of a colony. Such apparent indifference or complacency about Algeria appears all the more remarkable, because it was supposedly a part of France itself. The French could perhaps justify in the name of efficiency their willingness to permit settler-dominated assemblies to control the Algerian budget. They could perhaps turn their heads and ignore the impact of budgetmaking on educational policy. But to forego authority over security matters is to recognize colonial autonomy bordering on independence. Sovereignty normally accompanies responsibility

for defense. How does one account for the attitude of the metropolitan government?

The burden for handling Algerian security fell squarely on Paris, and more specifically on the minister of the interior, who coordinated all policy for Algeria and managed internal security for the rest of France. But the minister lacked the staff to follow events in Algeria closely, and his other duties pushed the region to the periphery of his attention. Moreover, the French citizens of Algeria, nearly all of European or native Jewish origin, were generally content to be neglected. They realized that, without proper guidance and indoctrination, the minister might not understand the cardinal rules of Algerian politics: the "native problem" is above politics; the European preponderance must in no way be jeopardized;

the Muslims must be ruled with an iron hand, for force is the only language they understand; the press must be controlled because Muslims believe anything they read; elections must be managed because Muslims are incapable of making meaningful choices for themselves. A minister of the interior who did not understand the logic of these rules might not merely try to reform the system; he might succeed, so powerful was his legal leverage over Algeria.

Several of the Algerian representatives in Parliament opposed Marcel Régnier's decision to go to Algeria in March 1935. Since all of them supported the government of which Régnier was a member, and since the trip offered obvious opportunities for exposure in their constituencies, this abnormal behavior reflected obvious hostility.³⁶ There was also resistance to the trip from cabinet members more conservative than Régnier, who was a Radical.³⁷ They apparently thought he was being too conciliatory toward the rising Popular Front movement on the left and believed a visit to Algeria at a time of crisis would lend credence to native complaints.

Immediately after he had planned the trip, Régnier began to retrench, and his behavior throughout the remaining preparations can be interpreted as an effort to reassure the doubting European politicians of his reliability. First he hastened to say he was making a simple study trip, not an

investigation (enquête),³⁸ which would imply that remedial action was necessary. He also blocked rumors that the governor general would be replaced by delegating the planning of the trip to Carde³⁹ and meeting repeatedly with him as well as with Algerian politicians before his departure from Paris. Régnier declined to balance his preparatory talks by including in them Mohamed Bendjelloul, the head of the Federation of Muslim Elected Officials in the Département of Constantine.⁴⁰ Bendjelloul had telegraphed a request for an audience. In turning him down, on grounds he was coming to Algeria to listen to complaints, Régnier was sufficiently caustic to win praise and headlines in Algeria.⁴¹

Little by little the minister regained the confidence of the settlers by doing and saying the right things. In Algeria he met with delegates, general councillors, municipal councilmen, mayors, bureaucrats, farmers, anyone who wanted to see him. He went to Sétif to visit the families of the victims and to Constantine to view the scene of the August riots. He talked with dissident Muslims as well as with Europeans, although he denied that the so-called dissidents were dissidents; even Muslims wanted a reassertion of French authority, he argued.⁴² But while the dissidents equated "authority" with just government, Régnier clearly meant repression. He declared security had to be rebuilt before reforms could be undertaken, which is precisely what Europeans

had been telling him. Régnier had listened to Muslims, too, but as his adviser Augustin Bernard put it: "The native demands were sometimes expressed in a tone that was not sufficiently measured and which could only do them harm in the mind of the minister."⁴³ In short, Régnier showed by his speeches that he had absorbed the European community's mania about security—and its racism.

The final proof that Régnier had been socialized into regional politics during his two weeks in Algeria was his performance before the Senate. Echoing the line of Algerian senators, he praised the settlers' historic role.⁴⁴ There were good natives, too, he conceded: the so-called familles de grande tente who had remained loyal to France. (And who were, he neglected to say, supported by the administration for both elective and administrative positions. In fact, their status was often wholly derived from administrative support.) But these "good" natives had been rewarded for their service in World War I with a liberalized opportunity to become citizens under the law of 1919. This was a maximum effort.

By expressing his sympathy for European Algerians, Régnier achieved his major goal. He liquidated the crisis atmosphere in Algiers by reducing European fears and Muslim hopes. To insure that the tension level would not rise again soon, he approved the governor general's proposal to clamp down on criticism of the French administration. But

to call him the principal decisionmaker because of these actions would be to give him a positive, initiative-taking or veto-making role that he actually seemed to be renouncing. He merely confirmed the ideas others had set forth and thereby reaffirmed the precedent that the minister of the interior, despite his vast legal powers over Algeria, should not govern the country.

The chief lieutenant of the minister in Algerian affairs was the governor general. He was said to be more powerful than any man in France, and the pomp and circumstance of Algiers were designed to further that impression. When the governor left or arrived in the port of Algiers, he was treated more like a king or a sultan than a mere functionary. If the minister of the interior cannot be called "principal decisionmaker," one would be tempted to bestow the title on the governor general.

There can be little doubt that the governor played a central role in the security crisis of 1934-1935, flying to Constantine to inspect the damage, hurrying back to Paris to inform the minister, proposing a decree to curb dissent and accompanying the minister on his swing through Algeria. Nonetheless, it is difficult to assess with any precision his influence on the policy outcome, because of his place between the ministries on one hand and the institutions of local government on the other.

The Régnier decree represented the governor's principal success with the Parisian ministries during the crisis. Carde said in an interview in February 1934, that he was helpless to defend against attacks on French sovereignty in Algeria. He spoke of the dangers from Communist agitation and pan-Islamic propaganda. "But are you disarmed against this propaganda?" he was asked. "In fact I am," he replied. Was Carde, the discreet functionary who had just weathered a storm over electoral redistricting, now badgering Régnier in public? It seems much more likely he had already obtained the minister's approval for controlling the French-language native press that Carde termed "extremely dangerous" for "simple, credulous, mystic minds."⁴⁵ The decree was apparently approved February 19, 1935, by the Council of Ministers.⁴⁶

The governor's success in this instance can be explained as a function of European intransigence and Muslim discontent. Like a prefect in France, the governor was useful to the ministry only as long as he could count on cooperation from local notables.⁴⁷ Without this cooperation the governor could not obtain money from the Financial Delegations. Furthermore, there was a tacit understanding that a governor general, like a prefect, would be removed if he lost the confidence of local politicians. The ministries had the option of granting Carde's rather reasonable demands or treating directly with the Algerian politicians—namely with Emile Morinaud.

Carde's influence downward on the Financial Delegations and on other local political institutions was less impressive. His success in Paris was based on the assumption he commanded support in Algeria, but there was a difference between undercutting Morinaud with a decree that did not require local approval and winning the votes of a majority of the Financial Delegations for projects that required their consent. In this domain, Carde had troubles.⁴⁸ He succeeded in setting up a mobile brigade of gendarmes for use in riots, for example, only because he had won the support of the metropolitan ministries in those instances where the Financial Delegations controlled the purse strings and the support of local notables in cases where the minister of the interior's attitude was crucial. The riots in Constantine served his cause, for they rendered his proposal of the previous spring more popular at the local level and they brought the metropolitan ministries out of indifference. Actually, it was probably Emile Morinaud's insistent reports on the crisis that awakened the ministers of war and interior, and it was they who deemed it less expensive, politically and militarily, to shore up the governor general's position than to grant Morinaud's requests. The support of local notables, principally Morinaud, contributed significantly to the governor's success.

Settler Influence

The key to settler victory was Emile Morinaud, who operated at every level of decision, from the municipal

council in Constantine to the Parliament in Paris. At the local level, as mayor, he was responsible for stopping the riots. His newspaper, Le républicain, gave a dramatic account of his activities August 8.⁴⁹ On vacation at Djidjelli on the seacoast, he raced back to the city, called a meeting of civil and military authorities at City Hall, ordered ammunition distributed to the troops and let it be known that rioters who did not desist would be shot. He also persuaded municipal councilmen, Muslim and Jewish, to walk the streets appealing for calm. By nightfall peace had been restored.

The governor general, who was in Paris at the time, was upstaged. Carde took an Air France plane to Algiers and then, after a quick consultation with his secretary general, donned goggles and climbed into the rear of a military two-seater to go to Constantine. But by the time he arrived, all was calm and Morinaud was waiting for him with a list of six requests. There was little for Carde to do but offer his condolences and government money for reparations.

From then until Régnier came to Algeria, Morinaud never relaxed his pressure for tighter security arrangements. At the October meeting of the departmental general council, he backed (and perhaps wrote) Eugène Vallet's motion implying that Muslims were threatening European security.⁵⁰ Later that month, on his way to Paris to attend the fall session

of Parliament, he stopped in Algiers and reiterated his demands before the governor's staff.⁵¹ (Carde was in the South.) Next he took his concerns to the minister of war and the president of the council,⁵² while Le républicain decried the "red peril" and the general atmosphere of insecurity prevalent in Algeria.⁵³

The Sétif affair on February 1 set Morinaud off on another round of the ministries. It seemed to prove his point that drastic measures were needed. After seeing the ministers of war and the interior, he took the entire Algerian parliamentary delegation with him to see Premier Flandin. There, before the president of the council, he recounted "in all their horror the events of Constantine and the very serious military uprising of Sétif."⁵⁴ He also renewed his request for a citizen militia and for the transfer of more troops to Algeria.⁵⁵ Significantly, it was Morinaud who announced in the corridors of the Palais Bourbon that Régnier would make a trip to Algeria.⁵⁶

Thus Morinaud was the motor of the crisis. His agitation kept it moving even after the Financial Delegations voted money in November for the mobile police force. He made it appear that Algeria was in such a state of psychological disruption that the minister of the interior could not be indifferent. Not all of Algeria was behind him. The Dépêche algérienne disassociated itself from Morinaud's proposals,⁵⁷

and even referred to him indirectly as one of the "missionaries of the anti-French peril" who were sabotaging a movement led by Muslims friendly to France.⁵⁸ The more conservative Echo d'Alger called Morinaud's initiatives "premature,"⁵⁹ and other politicians were remarkably silent. Thus the protagonist was Morinaud and Morinaud almost alone.

Morinaud's three political roles, together with his personal qualities as a propagandist and 40 years in politics, made him the leading actor in the crisis. The fact that he was mayor of Constantine put him in the center of the drama. His seat on the general council of the département gave him first-hand contact with some of the men who represented the region in the Financial Delegations. Both offices provided access to the offices of the governor general. He was also a deputy whose influence in Paris gave him a voice in the governor's future. Thus to his constituents in Constantine, he was a man with friends in Paris; to the minister of the interior and the president of the council, Morinaud was a man with solid political connections in the province of Constantine; and to the governor general, he was a man whose ties at the grass roots as well as in Paris were probably better than the governor's.

In short, Morinaud rivaled the governor general as a channel of influence between center and periphery. In fact, Régnier seems to have gone to Algeria in response to

Morinaud's insistent and annoying pressure for the transfer of more troops to Algeria, and for the creation of a citizen militia. If so, then to have given any satisfaction to Muslim demands would have defeated the purpose of the trip, for it would only have further antagonized Morinaud. The Muslims stood nothing like an equal chance of being heard, in this instance, for they lacked a channel of influence to metropolitan France that approached the strength of a Morinaud.

The importance of partisan homogeneity of local notables and national government can be seen here. Morinaud was first of all a European dealing with a government of Europeans. The Muslims had to depend on the good offices of a Maurice Viollette, whose electoral mandate was from the Eure-et-Loire. Their misfortune was compounded by the fact that Viollette was ideologically out of tune with the government. Morinaud, in contrast, was a Radical negotiating with a government laden with Radicals. He could not be taxed with opposition to the government. Quite clearly he had easy access to the ministries.

Régnier's role in the security crisis of 1934-1935 should be seen not as an exception to the established pattern of regional decisionmaking but as one variation on that pattern. In the case of educational policymaking, the predominant pattern was one in which the Financial Delegations decided what should be done without significant interference

from the government general or the French ministries. A second pattern might be discerned in the years when Viollette was governor general; the governor acted as a restraint on the Delegations, but he was ultimately replaced by action of the European Algerian representatives in Paris.

The variation observed in the security crisis falls between the first two. Whereas the settler grievance was generic in the case of Viollette, it was specific in matters of security policy. The Europeans had no basic quarrel with Carde. To have sought his removal—and some Algerians apparently feared this would be the end result of the Morinaud initiative—would have been to risk being saddled with a less satisfactory governor. Whereas metropolitan intervention in a specific issue of educational policy would have done the settlers little good, such intervention was essential to them in security policy. Morinaud used his alternate channel of communication with Paris in the aim of altering the minister's directives to the governor general, who was subsequently better able to serve the settler cause.

This variation entailed risks for the settlers that may be equated with opportunities for Muslims. A minister might reach a verdict of his own and either recall the governor general or alter his directives to the governor in a way unacceptable to the settlers. Such risks were nonetheless minimized by the intimate relations the Algerian

members of Parliament enjoyed with the Flandin government. The fact that several members of the Algerian parliamentary delegation disagreed with Morinaud and voiced their disapproval of the trip apparently forced Régnier to narrow the objectives of his undertaking. His desire to placate Morinaud probably caused him to refuse Bendjelloul a preparatory audience in Paris. Thus, by the time Régnier left Paris, the risks to settler predominance in regional politics had already been reduced. By the time he returned they had disappeared. The settlers had used Régnier's trip to establish yet another precedent for regional autonomy. In the future they would be able to say in Parliament: "You found that we were right. We knew then what was best for Algeria, and we know now what is best. French policy toward Algeria must be one that permits Algerians (read Europeans) to manage their own affairs."

Although the historian may wonder whether settler policy served the best interests of France during the security crisis of 1934-35 or at any time thereafter, he cannot deny that the settlers profited from the tempest in the short run. By risking autonomy, they reinforced it, causing the board to tilt even more sharply against native Algerians. But Muslims learned how fundamentally immovable was the system built on informal manipulation of regional autonomy within a unitary framework. A few more such lessons would convince them of the futility of working within the system and the necessity of resorting to violence. The settler dexterity at domination compromised the capacity of the political system to move toward Muslim rule without bloodshed.

CHAPTER 5

THE 1935 BUDGET

Arabs and Berbers fared better in the area of economic policy than in either education or security. Budgetmaking for the year 1935 demonstrates that Muslims could in certain circumstances—albeit special ones—serve their own interests by opposing European policy designs. In fact, the formal structure of decisionmaking for the Algerian budget facilitated the appearance of such circumstances, although it normally precluded conflict between Muslims and Europeans.

The governor general shared powers of initiative with the Financial Delegations, which, like the Higher Council, were entitled to deliberate on the budget, and the Parliament retained the authority to levy Algerian taxes. Consequently, if Arabs and Berbers challenged European proposals in the Financial Delegations and lost, there was a theoretical possibility that Parliament would reopen the question and reverse the decision. This same procedure might have aided Muslims in the realm of school construction policy if Parliament had not in fact restricted its examination to the revenue side of the budget. In theory Parliament

might also have helped shape security policy, but its powers in that domain were not formal: the Régnier decree did not require parliamentary approval, and Parliament could scarcely have voted against the government's Algerian policy, after Régnier had become personally involved, without defeating the ministry.

Even in the budget making domain, however, it was unlikely that Muslims could play a meaningful role in policymaking. Excluded from the bureaucracies in Algiers and in Paris as well as from Parliament, they participated only as members of the regional assemblies. There the separate deliberations of the three delegations gave Europeans a chance to reach prior agreements and present a united front in the plenary session, rendering futile any Muslim effort at opposition. Rather than antagonize a majority that could not be converted, Arab and Berber delegates normally supported the budget—a fact that European senators and deputies could subsequently cite as evidence that Algeria was one happy family. Parliament usually voted the Algerian tax bill without debate. Between 1900 and 1934 such a bill had never been defeated or amended.

Thus the special circumstances that enhanced Muslim influence in 1934-1935 were not simply a product of the budgetmaking procedures. They resulted from a split among European Algerians over taxation policy. Budgetmaking placed

greater strains on the myth of apoliticism than educational decisions, but it did not create the unity in fear of Muslim numbers that security decisions produced. Such circumstances weakened the system's capacity to stifle Muslim-European conflict and, unlike the conditions of the security crisis, offered Muslims an opportunity to profit from the tensions that surfaced.

A Problem of Balance

When the Financial Delegations gathered in Algiers for their regular annual meeting in May 1934, the world, France, and even Algeria were gripped by economic depression and political instability. The franc remained overvalued, French products were priced out of the world market, and the country settled deeper into depression at a time when devaluation of the dollar and more imaginative fiscal policies had begun to bring relief in the United States.¹ In Algeria, although economic activity was slack, problems of public finance were less serious than in France. While rising defense expenditures aggravated the problem of growing budgetary deficits in France, Algeria continued to contribute only six per cent of its current expenditures toward the French military effort. Moreover, Algerian tax receipts remained relatively stable at a time when French sources of revenue were diminishing rapidly. Since a tax on business

deductions would yield 25 million francs, the Governor estimated. A small tax on wine would bring another 25 million, and an increase in customs duties on petroleum products, bringing Algerian rates up to those of France, would raise 46 million more.⁴ Carde also recommended that the public works program of Algeria be retarded.⁵

In the normal budgetary procedure, each of the three Financial Delegations—colons, non-colons, and natives, subdivided into Arab and Kabyle sections—examined the governor's proposal separately. They submitted their suggestions to the interdelegatory Finance Commission, which prepared detailed recommendations for the plenary session. The delegates then voted on the budget, or, rather, the Finance Commission's version of it. Finally the Higher Council added its stamp of approval.

The governor's original budget was sometimes hard to recognize in the final version. This was true of Carde's 1935 budget. At the suggestion of the Finance Commission, the delegates rejected the governor's proposed wine tax and voted to increase the petroleum duty by only one-third of the amount Carde had asked. Furthermore, the Financial Delegations decided that the salary deductions should apply to the base pay of Algerian functionaries but not to the 33 per cent supplements they received for working south of the Mediterranean. On the expenditures side of the current

budget, the Delegations reduced the governor's proposals by 3 per cent. At the same time they increased the stark capital improvements budget by 17 per cent in defiance of Carde's warning that the French Treasury should be spared as much as possible.⁶ Balance was achieved, but scarcely in the way that the governor general had suggested.

However, the budgetary process had only begun; the Algerian budget was never more than tentative after the May-June sessions. Economic conditions often upset calculations and necessitated budgetary revision in the fall. In 1934 the central government took a spoiler's role. The Doumergue government promulgated a decree-law July 6, reforming French tax laws and reducing the income tax. European Algerians, who paid most of the income taxes in Algeria, were naturally interested in seeing the reduction applied to them. Another Doumergue decree, this one raising the minimum percentage of alcohol required of Algerian wine for shipment to France, incensed Algerian wine-producers and caused further deterioration of the economic climate in the colony. Then the Ministry of Finance, examining the Algerian budget at the request of the Interior Ministry, struck out some items of expenditure and wrote in others, further upsetting the initial calculations.

Moreover, after the riots in Constantine on August 3 and 5, Governor General Carde offered 20 million francs to

those who had suffered damages and asked the Financial Delegations to establish a mobile police force capable of suppressing future riots at a cost of 33 millions. The budget was unbalanced.

The Financial Delegations normally met in extraordinary session during the month of November to reconsider the budget. Carde reconvened them November 5, 1934, and submitted a modified budget that took account of all that had happened since June. On one hand, he proposed to reduce the income tax as a part of the tax reform adopted in France and to increase expenditures by more than 100 million francs, mostly to cover riot damages and the cost of the mobile police force. On the other hand, to restore balance, he suggested higher duties on oil products, application of the salary deductions to the functionaries' 33 per cent supplements, higher telephone rates and some other minor tax increases. Capital and unforeseeable expenditures, such as the disaster relief, would be financed by larger borrowing through the metropolitan treasury.

For the second time, the Financial Delegations rapidly undid Carde's handiwork and created a new deficit of 30 million francs. The colons rejected higher duties on oil products, which their cars and tractors used so heavily, and insisted on tax relief. The non-colons would not reverse their spring decision about salary deductions,

preferring to leave the supplement untouched. The Finance Commission ruled out higher telephone rates.

The question then was where to find 30 million francs. It was not a large sum (2 per cent of the current budget), but no one was in a mood to pay higher taxes. The Algiers Chamber of Commerce had issued its warnings, which the non-colons could not fail to heed; the colons pointed to the September decree discriminating against Algerian wine to support their case of utter economic distress; the Arabs and Berbers protested when the talk turned to indirect taxes, which fell heaviest on their constituents, poor in good times and bad.

Most of the direct means of influence over budget-making were beyond the reach of Muslims. In the bureaucracy no Arab or Berber held even the rank of administrator in a commune mixte, a subordinate of the sub-prefect. In the Directorate of Finance, there were only Europeans. In the metropolitan ministries, as in Parliament, Arabs and Berbers were totally unrepresented.

Departmental and communal councils, where Arabs and Berbers had a maximum of one-third of the seats, gave them a voice in local budgetmaking. But these levels of government depended principally on their own levies and secondarily on the Algerian budget for revenues: a half of one per cent of the 1935 Algerian budget was destined for communal and

departmental needs. Therefore, although the influence of natives was greater at the local level than in the Financial Delegations, this influence was of little use in shaping the general lines of Algerian budget policy.

The only direct path of influence over the budget available to Arabs and Berbers was the Financial Delegations, but the obstacles along even this path were greater than the Muslim share of the seats might lead one to believe. On the basis of the fact that delegates were not usually elected by party label and were not associated in party groups within the assembly, where they identified themselves only as colons, non-colons, Arabs or Kabyles, Europeans had developed a myth and nurtured it with care: anything that smacked of politics had no place in the discussions of the Financial Delegations. Conversely, nothing discussed by the Delegations could be classified as politics.⁷ As long as the tradition of apoliticism was maintained and there were no parties in the assembly, the Arabs and Kabyles could not hope to forge permanent allies in either the colon or non-colon camps. With 21 votes out of 69, they were virtually powerless in an assembly that operated on majority-rule principles.

The compartmentalized structure of the Delegations also hindered political cooperation along class, ideological, geographic, or other lines. The Arab delegates deliberated as a group, as did the Kabyles, the colons, and the non-colons.

The colons and non-colons regularly aligned their positions before confronting the Arabs and Kabyles in the plenary session, but compartmentalization was almost total between the native and European delegations. Furthermore, the low quality of Muslim personnel in the assembly compounded the problem.⁸ Relatively few Arab and Kabyle delegates took an active part in the debates. Some did not speak French. Administration support was more important in many elections than high qualifications.

The effects of these weaknesses in organization and personnel can be measured in a rough sort of way by the amount of work done by the Arab and Kabyle sections. The Arab section, with fifteen members, and the Kabyle section, with six, each met for a total of nine hours during the crucial, extraordinary session of November 1934. The European delegations each met in separate session for about twenty-three hours. (See Table 5-1.) If it is assumed that all delegations enjoyed perfect attendance, then the native sections put in about 15 per cent of the total man-hours devoted to separate sessions. This figure is perhaps a better indicator of Muslim influence within the Financial Delegations than the fact that they held 30 per cent of the seats.

At the beginning of the November session, the Arabs and Berbers were confronted with a heads-you-win, tails-we-lose

TABLE 5-1
 DURATION OF NON-PLenary SESSIONS
 OF THE FINANCIAL DELEGATIONS
 NOVEMBER, 1934
 (in hours and minutes)

Date	Colon	Non-Colons	Arabs	Kabyles
Nov. 6	2:45	1:55	:50	:30
Nov. 7	1:00	2:05	:30	
Nov. 8	2:45	2:20	:50	1:05
Nov. 9	2:45	2:50	:30	
Nov. 12		3:00	:15	1:05
Nov. 13	3:10	3:25	2:25	1:35
Nov. 14 a.m.	2:05		:25	
Nov. 14 p.m.	3:25	3:35	2:20	3:20
Nov. 15		1:40	:15	1:15
Nov. 16	3:40	1:10	:25	:15
Nov. 17	:55	:55	:15	:15
TOTAL	23:30	22:55	9:00	9:20

Source: Proceedings of Financial Delegations.

proposition, for the commission seemed set on making Arabs and Berbers pay for the advantages being accorded the Europeans. It proposed either a head tax or a combination of tea and sugar taxes to replace the projected loss of revenue and to overcome the deficit of 30 million francs. Although the commission preferred the head tax, labelled "recovery tax," the administration interposed technical objections. The first proposal laid before the three delegations meeting separately included, instead, a large increase in the consumption tax on sugar (30 francs per one hundred kilograms) and a new consumption tax on tea of six francs a kilogram. (This proposal is referred to as Plan One in Table 5-2.)

Both the native sections and the non-colon delegation rejected the proposal, sealing its fate. Native support was dispensable to the colons, but non-colon support was not. Hence the Finance Commission, forced to reconsider, reverted to its original preference, the head tax of 15 francs on each taxpayer, 50 francs on those who paid income taxes (Plan Two in Table 5-2). The Arab section protested anew, and both the Arabs and Kabyles voted it down. But the colons approved, as did the non-colons (by a one-vote margin).

Having been accepted by two of the three delegations in separate session, the head tax seemed likely to win approval of the plenary assembly. When the showdown came,

TABLE 5-2

FORMULAS FOR BALANCING THE CURRENT BUDGET FOR 1935
CONSIDERED BY THE FINANCIAL DELEGATIONS

NOVEMBER, 1934
(in millions of francs)

	<u>Plane One</u>	<u>Plan Two</u>	<u>Plan Three</u>
RECEIPTS			
Salary deductions	-12.0	-12.0	-12.0
Farm property and profits taxes*	-11.5	- 8.7	- 8.7
Duty on oil products	- 9.8	- 9.8	- 2.9
Tax on tea	+10.8	+10.8	+14.4
Tax on sugar	+21.0		+ 6.8
Head tax		+18.5	
Telephone charges	- 4.0	- 4.0	- 4.0
EXPENDITURES	+ 5.2	+ 4.7	+ 6.6
BALANCE			
Total Losses	-37.3	-34.5	-27.6
Total gains	+37.0	+34.0	+27.8
Initial surplus	<u>+ 0.6</u>	<u>+ 0.6</u>	<u>+ 0.6</u>
New surplus	+ 0.3	+ 0.1	+ 0.8

Plan One: Changes in administration proposal suggested in printed report of Finance Commission. The sugar tax, and therefore the whole plan, was rejected by the non-colons November 14.

Plan Two: Changes in administration proposal suggested by Finance Commission but defeated in plenary session of

TABLE 5-2 (continued)

November 16 by Arabs, Berbers and a majority of non-colons. See AFA-DF, Non-colons, November 1934, p. 353.

Plan Three: Changes in administration proposal suggested by Finance Commission and approved by plenary session November 17. See AFA-DF, Colons, November 1934, p. 325.

* The property and agricultural profits taxes were both based on taxable valuations of property established as percentages of estimated real values. The colons were asking that taxable valuations be reduced ten per cent, which would have saved farmers about 11.5 million francs. But the non-colons argued that communal tax receipts, also based on the property valuations, would be too severely reduced. Therefore, they insisted that the reduction in taxable valuations be applied only to the agricultural profits taxes, and not to property taxes. The extent of the reduction was then increased to twenty per cent to give farmers 8.7 million francs in tax relief. This is the figure that appears in Plans Two and Three.

in a long, noisy evening session on Friday, November 16, all the Arabs and Kabyles voted against it, and all the colons voted for it. But the non-colons, who had approved it that morning, 9 to 8, now voted against it, 13 to 9. The head tax was defeated, 32 to 29.

The Arab and Kabyle sections tried to press their advantage. At a joint meeting of the two sections, Smati Abdelkader pushed through motions opposing any tax on tea of more than six francs a kilogram and any increase in the tax on sugar. To restore balance, he proposed higher gas taxes and a smaller reduction in the income tax than that included in the fiscal reform: three points instead of nine. Smati put these motions in the form of amendments, which were laid before the plenary session on Saturday, the 17th. Both failed for lack of non-colon support. European solidarity had been restored on the Finance Commission's new suggestion: a tea tax of eight francs a kilogram, somewhat higher oil and gas taxes, and a ten-franc increase in the sugar tax (Plan Three in Table 5-2). The plan was approved by the Delegations, although the tea and sugar taxes ran counter to Muslim interests and to the expressed desires of Arab and Berber delegates.

Official Algeria immediately turned its attention to France. Not only was parliamentary approval for the budget necessary, but the wine question was also in the fire.

To look after these matters, the governor general left for Paris November 24 and was soon followed by a troop of delegates, mayors, general councillors, and pressure group representatives.

Arabs and Berbers apparently had a single participant in the round of conferences in Paris. Nevertheless, Saiah Abdelkader, president of the Arab section, was one of two persons most frequently received by the governor general. Moreover, the Muslim viewpoint reached the ears of sympathetic French deputies and senators. The Chamber of Deputies Commission on Algeria, the Colonies, and the Protectorates raised doubts about the wisdom of levying higher taxes on tea and sugar in the wake of the August rioting in Constantine.

Those doubts were but a prelude to the furor that broke over the tea and sugar taxes when the Chamber Finance Commission took up the Algerian budget. Socialist members, with support from a majority of the Commission, objected to the burden being placed on Arabs and Berbers. They recommended that the budget be rejected.⁹ The government managed to move the budget out of commission only after agreeing to accept an amendment authorizing collection of the tea and sugar taxes for the months of January and February only. On the floor of the Chamber the Finance Commission was persuaded to withdraw this amendment, but it was understood that the Financial Delegations would be convoked in a second extraordinary session to reconsider the tea and sugar taxes. The

Senate added its approval to the arrangement next day without discussion.

The Arab and Kabyle delegates believed they had won.¹⁰ But, as it turned out, they had no great cause for rejoicing, for the administration discovered that France had raised the customs tax on tea by more than the amount of the reduction in the consumption tax suggested by the governor and approved by the delegations. As a result, Algerians paid even higher taxes on tea in 1935 than those to which Arab and Berber delegates had objected so vigorously during and after the November session (see Table 5-3). Victory was not far removed from defeat; the reduction by half of the sugar tax separated one from the other.

Dissidents like Zenati, Ferhat Abbas, and Bendjelloul, who believed in French institutions, were disappointed. Yet, judged against policymaking for education and security, Muslim success was astounding in this instance. Although an increase in customs duties more than offset a parallel reduction in the tea tax, who can be certain that both the higher tax and the new customs duties would not have been levied for the entire year, if Muslims had not protested and Parliament intervened? By comparison with the paucity of success in educational policymaking, with the disastrous impact on Muslims from the security crisis, these achievements appear monumental.

TABLE 5-3

TAXES ON TEA

AS PROPOSED AND LEVIED IN 1935 BUDGET

(in francs per 100 kilograms)

Kind of Tax	Budget November	Levied 1.1.35	Voted in February
Transport	25.00	25.00	25.00
Customs	353.60	775.00	775.00
Consumption	800.00	800.00	400.00
TOTAL	1,178.60	1,600.00	1,200.00

Source: Scattered speeches in Financial Delegations, February Session, 1935.

However, they were not so much victories for Arabs and Berbers as partial, temporary setbacks for European Algeria, occasioned by the split within the non-colon delegation on the head-tax issue. The question is why Europeans permitted themselves to be divided so that Muslims could sway the Delegations. The fact is that education did not stir political passions among Europeans in the same way that taxes did. While they sometimes differed on the kinds of schools that should be built and on the locations for new schools, they do not seem to have split on the aspects of educational policy that concerned Muslims. Similarly, security considerations did not require that Europeans preserve unity on tax questions. Furthermore, Muslim and European interests were not necessarily contradictory in this area, as they were in the domain of security policy. In fact, the non-colon delegation, representing a majority of the European electorate, shared a dislike of the head tax with the native delegations. The stakes of decisionmaking on the budget were more tangible than those of education or security policy. Hence compromise was facilitated and the minority position of Muslims in the policymaking process rendered useful.

"Financial Autonomy"

Some evidence of political autonomy might logically be found in budgetmaking, since in this area regional

institutions did enjoy a formal, legal role in decisionmaking. In the realm of educational policy, authority theoretically belonged to the metropolitan ministries and their delegate in Algiers, the governor general. Security matters were strictly the province of the French government, the minister of the interior and the governor general.

One might suppose that such authority would confer on regional representatives an even greater share of influence than they enjoyed in educational and security matters. But, strangely enough, that does not seem to be the case. Precisely because it was institutionalized, regional authority over the budget was more limited than in those domains where it was achieved informally. When there was no partisan division between center and periphery, the effective influence of the governor general was diminished, and he was forced to compromise with local notables whether or not they had a formal right to be consulted. Hence it is inconceivable that he would not have solicited their approval on budgetary matters, even if he had not been legally required to do so, but it is quite probable that Parliament would not have otherwise been involved.

The grant of financial autonomy to Algeria in 1900 regularized regional participation and reduced the possibility that the informal exercise of autonomy would one day be obliterated by the appearance of partisan cleavage between

France and Algeria. However, the law limit role in budgetmaking even as it institutionalized consultation of the regional assemblies. It ministerial review of the Algerian budget and the chore of examining and approving the Algerian budget. While these were by no means decisive powers over budgetmaking, the case of the 1935 budget shows that the Parliament and the Finance Ministry could influence the course of decision even against the wishes of European Algerian deputies. Given the lack of partisan conflict between France and Algeria and the weakness of the governor general, one may wonder whether such displays of metropolitan independence from settlers' wishes would have been possible if Algeria had not enjoyed "financial autonomy."

Such observations should not, of course, obscure the facts that parliamentary intervention was rare and relatively inefficacious, that the Finance Ministry prevailed only on technical issues, and that the governor general was, if anything, less effective in this instance than in questions of education and security. The final budget reflected, in the main, the desires of the Financial Delegations.

Given the time usually available for consideration of the Algerian budget, Parliament could do little but give perfunctory approval to the 1935 proposal. The four days available for its consideration were normal for the interwar

years, and most Finance Commission reporters in both the Chamber and particularly the Senate complained that they lacked time to do a conscientious job. Successive ministers of the interior promised to present the Algerian budget at an earlier date, but they seldom managed to do so. In fact, there was little they could do. It was regularly noted, for example, that early presentation of the budget was impossible so long as the Financial Delegations held an extraordinary session in November. Algerians always pointed out that the extraordinary sessions could not be moved up to October, because the general councils of the departments, in which many delegates participated, met then. Another source of delay was the Finance Ministry, which inspected the Algerian budget by request of the Interior but which was preoccupied with work on the French budget in December.

Parliament frequently lacked data as well as time for competent decisionmaking. Etienne Antonelli, the Chamber's Finance Commission rapporteur for the 1930 budget, noted that the sheaf of documents he had received from the Government General contained several versions of the budget and that expenditures eliminated from one part of the budget sometimes turned up later in another chapter and in larger amounts. Decrees, debates, special accounts, the administration's proposals—all were thrown together in the budget documents.¹¹ When the 1935 Algerian budget came up for consideration in the Chamber, no tax schedules were attached.¹²

These material barriers might have been overcome with the help and goodwill of the Algerian delegation. However, the settler deputies pursued a strategy of obfuscation and bullying designed to discourage their colleagues in the Senate and the Chamber from taking an active interest in Algerian affairs. In 1934 they built their strategy on two arguments, one rooted in law, the other in tradition.

From French law the settler representatives argued that Parliament could only approve or reject the entire Algerian tax bill. Consequently, they refused to discuss the substance of an amendment proposed by the Chamber Finance Commission limiting the authorization of the tea and sugar taxes to two months. At the same time they emphasized that, by tradition, Parliament had never touched their budget. In a statement endorsed by the entire Algerian delegation, Emile Morinaud pointed out that since 1900, 35 budgets had been approved by the Parliament "without the slightest observation."¹³

These arguments virtually shut off debate, which the Algerians maintained was damaging no matter what the outcome. In fact, the outcome was favorable for the Algerians: the Finance Commission amendment limiting collection of the tea and sugar taxes of two months was withdrawn and the budget voted as the government wished.

It is reasonable to suppose that the government was sensitive to direct pressure from the nine Algerian deputies.

Pierre-Etienne Flandin's government, formed in November, depended more heavily on Radical support than had its predecessor, headed by Gaston Doumergue.¹⁴ Six of the Algerian deputies belonged to the Radical Left and Radical-Socialist groups in the Chamber; the other three were members of more moderate republican groups.¹⁵ But all supported the government, and on Algerian questions they acted as a group, referring to each other as "we."

It is also possible that more subtle, indirect pressures conditioned the government's attitude. Flandin, the prime minister, was a former resident general of Tunisia and had spent four years of his childhood in Algeria. One of his ministers was André Mallarmé, deputy from Algiers, and, at a lower level, there was Yves Lavanant, adviser to Régnier at the Interior, whom the Algerians regarded as a "vigilant defender of Algerian interests."¹⁶ In addition, European Algeria had an ally in the governor general: during his three-week stay in the capital, Carde met with Régnier at least three times and with Flandin at least once.¹⁷ Meanwhile, he talked with Algerian deputies and senators, financial delegates and pressure group representatives at the Agency of the Government General, 16 rue des Pyramides, not far from the Louvre.

It is probable that the Algerians forced the government's hand by one or several of these means. But it is also

conceivable that the minister of the interior made his own decision on the floor of the Chamber or was influenced by an opinion of the Conseil d'Etat that the Government had solicited and that was apparently favorable to the Algerian thesis.¹⁸ Whatever the reasons for government policy, its long-term effect was reinforcement of Algerian claims to budgetary autonomy.

The weakness of Parliament did not necessarily characterize the entire government's relationship to Algeria. Decrees had the force of law in Algeria, except in areas in which Parliament specifically chose to act, and these decree powers were exercised by the minister of the interior with the advice of the Government General and, on financial matters, that of the Finance Ministry. In theory, then, Interior and Finance were as capable as Parliament of examining and reshaping the Algerian budget.

Although endowed with primary responsibility for Algerian affairs, the Interior Ministry showed weakness as a participant in budgetary politics: it lacked sufficient personnel to supervise Algerian affairs and technical competence to deal with a budget.¹⁹ As a result, it forfeited its key position in the administrative structure. Normally, the Ministry's only action on the Algerian budget was to pass it along to the Finance Ministry, where the work was actually done. The governor general often bypassed Interior

entirely, preferring to correspond directly with Finance on budget questions. In his report on the 1939 budget, Senator Jean Taurines wrote:

In fact, the Ministry of the Interior seems to be reduced to a simple intermediary's role. . . . The weakly staffed office finds itself incapable of reacting and appears even to have accepted the secondary role that Finance has left to it.²⁰

To evaluate the role of the Finance Ministry in the preparation and adoption of the 1935 budget, one must examine its action in three domains: budgetary receipts, current expenditures, and capital expenditures. The ministry enjoyed some success in getting the changes it wanted in current expenditures, but the affected sums of money were small. For instance, when the ministry cut out 605,000 francs worth of items that the Financial Delegations had added to the governor's budget during the spring session, the Delegations rejected the suggestions en bloc. But the ministry had the last word. Just before the ways and means bill was submitted to Parliament, it cut out 505,000 of the 605,000 francs a second time. Algerian deputies were too concerned about the tea and sugar taxes to object to the changes, which amounted to only .03 per cent of the 1.8 billion francs in the current budget.

Another suggestion about the current budget by the Finance Ministry involved more money but came to nothing.

When it recommended that Algeria allocate an additional five million francs to cover some of the operating deficit of the Algerian railroads, the governor general dutifully put the figure in his fall budget proposal. Then just before the Financial Delegations were to meet, the central government also asked Algeria to contribute 1.5 million francs to the cost of establishing air service from Casablanca to Algiers and Tunis. Pressed for the money on short notice, the governor took it out of the five millions intended for the railroad subsidy, which he reduced to 3.5 millions. The Financial Delegations eliminated the subsidy altogether but approved the money for air service.

It was in the domain of capital expenditures that the Finance Ministry's action was most effective. This was to be expected, since the entire capital budget of Algeria for 1935 was financed by loans floated by the French Treasury. Although the revenue formula had been half-by-taxes, half-by-loan for the Great Works program in 1920, by 1935 the depression had forced the Delegations to rely exclusively on borrowed money. Algeria had negotiated four loans since 1930 and could draw on this money at its own discretion, at least in theory.

In reality, at a time when French resources were under great strain, the Treasury was concerned about how fast the Algerians requested money. At the opening meeting

of the Financial Delegations in May, Governor General Carde explained the Treasury's desire that the Great Works program for 1935 be kept to a minimum, which he put at 325 million francs. However, some of the financial delegates believed it necessary to undertake new projects to combat unemployment. In the governor's proposal, only 8 million francs would be earmarked for new projects, according to the Great Works Commission; all the rest was owed or committed. The Delegations followed the suggestions of the commission and voted 58.8 million francs more for road construction and postal, telephone, and telegraph installations.

The force of circumstances—primarily the riots in Constantine—prompted the Algerian administration to propose a still larger capital budget to the Financial Delegations in November. The governor suggested, and the delegates approved, a total of 102 million francs in new expenditures.

After the budget was approved for a second time in Algeria, the Finance Ministry undertook surgery, without apparent regard for the feelings of either the Financial Delegations or the Algerian administration. It amputated 63.5 million francs from the capital budget, mostly from the public works program as expanded by the Delegations in the spring. In fact, 75 per cent of the cuts affected expenditures written into the budget by the Financial Delegations. The other fourth involved appropriations

endorsed by the governor general. Not without reason, a delegate said that the Finance Ministry action "reflected as badly on the governor general as on our assemblies."²¹

Even if the Algerian members of Parliament had chosen to fight, the Finance Ministry might still have had its way, as the case of the 1936 budget indicates. When the Algerians challenged the ministry's right to reduce the capital budget by 400 million francs, Parliament did not listen. For their efforts, the Algerians received only reassurances that the principle of financial autonomy was not in question.

When the Finance Ministry intervened on an apparently technical matter, as it usually did, it was as if a higher being had stepped into the game. Its motives, seldom known, were beyond question. When, on the contrary, the political ramifications of ministry decisions were clear to everyone, appeal became possible. For instance, the Ministry failed to extend the 10 per cent salary "deductions" levied on all government employes to the 33 per cent colonial supplements received by Algerian functionaries. It was as helpless on political matters as the Ministry of the Interior. To be effective, ministerial intervention in the Algerian budget had to be seen by European Algeria as a justifiable exercise of technical competence.

Even if the Parliament and the central ministries were incapable of providing political supervision of the

Algerian budget, the governor general might have done so. Indeed, the governor seemed to have all the advantages: he prepared the budget, submitted it to the Algerian assemblies, transmitted their decisions to the ministries, resubmitted ministry criticism along with revised estimates to the assemblies in November, and finally carried the budget to Paris for final approval. However, Governor Jules Carde had difficulty exploiting his advantages in the preparation of the budget for 1935.

The Governor General proposed a current budget of 1.47 billion francs to the ordinary session of the Financial Delegations in May. By the time the session ended, his proposals had been whittled by 44 million francs, or about 3 per cent in both receipts and expenditures. If the proportion was small in absolute terms, it was large for a depression year. In fact, the Delegations wrecked the governor's principal innovation, his proposal for new taxes on oil products, wine, and movie tickets. Moreover, the Delegations increased the Governor's capital budget by 58 millions, or 17 per cent, feeling that the French Treasury, and not Algerian taxpayers, would suffer.

Carde failed again in November to impose his vision of the budget. His only notable success in budgetmaking was the compromise approved at the extraordinary session in February, 1935. By then he had the Algerian members of

Parliament in addition to the central authorities behind him. Moreover, the convenient discovery of an increase in the customs duty on tea relieved him of the unpleasant task of finding a way to replace the revenue lost in the reductions of the tea and sugar taxes voted in November.²² To have opposed the compromise would have made delegates appear to want higher taxes, which was not the sort of impression delegates sought to cultivate. In fact, before they disbanded in February, the Delegations adopted a resolution asking that Carde refrain from proposing any new taxes in his preliminary budget for 1936. While giving the governor the compromise he wanted, they tied his hands for the future.

It was, of course, metropolitan influence that suffered from Carde's weakness vis-à-vis the Financial Delegations. Indirectly, Muslim Algerians paid the price. However, it would be simplistic to say that Carde was a reactionary. In fact, he apparently had liberal instincts. The crucial difference between him and, say, Maurice Viollette was that Viollette had seen himself as an arbiter between the European and Muslim communities. Carde, the career bureaucrat, accepted political subordination to the Financial Delegations without apparent discomfort. For him, arbitration meant keeping the peace in Algeria, nothing more.

It is clear that the central ministries and the governor general were ineffective as instruments of Parisian

control over the budgetary process, especially in its political dimensions. The conclusion seems inescapable that the principal political decisions about the budget were made at the regional level by the Algerian assemblies with or without the cooperation of the Government General. Examination of a list of 1934 budget decisions (see Table 5-4) with indications of who initiated or modified them confirms this suspicion.

The table underrates at least one source of influence, the work of the Algerian delegation in Parliament, which protected the decision of the Financial Delegations on the salary issue and kept the Chamber from amending the tea and sugar taxes. But to have included the achievements of the senators and deputies would only have emphasized further the domination of regional over national decisionmakers. It is apparent that the Financial Delegations participated in every important budgetary decision as the initiator or the modifier, except for that on the mobile police force.

While metropolitan supervision of Algerian budgetmaking was minimal, it was more significant than the French role in shaping educational or security policies. The Finance Ministry assumed an independent stance in the battle of the budget which has no parallel in administrative behavior on questions of educational or security policy. The Parliament, through its Finance Commission, showed greater receptivity to Muslim

TABLE 5-4
 INSTITUTIONS MAKING PRINCIPAL DECISIONS
 ABOUT THE 1935 BUDGET

<u>Decisions</u>	<u>Initiated by:</u>	<u>Modified by:</u>
To levy consumption tax on tea, raise tax on sugar	Delegations	Parliament ¹
To adopt French fiscal reform, lower income tax	Delegations ²	
To reduce taxable value of property	Delegations	
To apply salary deductions to Algerian functionaries	Governor	Delegations
To create mobile police force against riots	Governor	Finance Ministry
To increase duties on petroleum products	Governor	Delegations
To increase capital expenditures	Delegations	Finance Ministry

¹To give Parliament full credit for reduction of the tea and sugar taxes is perhaps generous. The Delegations voted the reductions themselves—under pressure, it is true.

²Nothing obliged adoption of the decree law in Algeria in 1934, or in any subsequent year. The tax structure of Algeria differed considerably from that of France.

concerns and acted on them more effectively than it did in the security crisis. It even considered amending the Algerian tax bill, to the horror of European Algeria. The fact that the Financial Delegations were required to reconsider their earlier decisions on the tea and sugar tax was evidence of greater metropolitan influence than was brought to bear in education or security.

It is thus necessary to reconsider the description of Algerian relations with France before 1940 as "financial autonomy." Rather than augmenting Algerian autonomy, the grant of financial independence appears to have tempered it. Although the dominant role of the Financial Delegations in the preparation of the budget was the key to its influence over educational policy and an important factor in delegate participation in policymaking in the security crisis, the formality of the budgetmaking process mitigated the freedom of European Algeria and made it less pronounced in that regard than it was in other important policy areas.

This apparent anomaly can be explained by modifying the model of central-peripheral relations to take larger account of formal structure. According to the model, effective regional autonomy may exist de facto even when all authority is concentrated de jure in the administrative representatives of the center. Local notables will tend to establish lines of communication between region and

central government that parallel those of the administration. A lack of partisan tension facilitates that communication and increases the likelihood that administrative directives will be altered or personnel changed.

In the cases of education and security, regional autonomy was achieved despite its lack of formal legitimacy. Now, in the light of the budgetmaking evidence, one is inclined to conclude that autonomy was maximal precisely because it lacked formal sanction. The institutionalization of financial autonomy restrained the power of the European minority in Algeria by expanding the number of persons and institutions involved in the policymaking process. In those Algerian matters handled informally, the Algerian members of Parliament and sometimes the Chamber Commission for the Interior and Algeria, which the Algerians dominated when Algeria was under discussion, would advise the Ministry of the Interior on what needed to be done. In the case of the security crisis, the Parliament debated the issue, but only as a result of an interpellation after all the principal decisions had been taken. Régnier did not consult the Senate; he told it what he had done. In contrast, the 1900 law formalizing budgetmaking gave the Finance Ministry and the Parliament legitimate roles. The Finance Ministry and the Chamber Finance Commission, both relatively immune from settler influence, took especially active parts in the

process. The chances that the interests of the Muslim majority in Algeria and of the French nation as a whole would be protected were thus better in the case of budget-making than in the cases of educational or security policies.

The settlers strove to defend formal financial autonomy because it stabilized autonomy, even if it did not maximize it. Informal autonomy was more efficacious as long as there was no significant partisan tension between Paris and Algiers. However, if an extreme leftist government had come to power in France, the informal arrangements would have offered European Algeria little defense against the encroachment of a reform-minded central power. Although guaranteed only by statute, financial autonomy would have offered the settlers some shelter.

Furthermore, a secure if not absolute control over the purse strings gave the settlers leverage in areas where their influence in the decisionmaking process was informal. Formal autonomy was the keystone of informal power. If financial autonomy had been exposed to the threat of partisan attack, as was the informal structure, the whole basis for settler domination of regional politics might have collapsed.

II

FROM WAR TO REVOLUTION

1944--1954

CHAPTER 6

SCHOOL REFORM

It would be tempting to see Algerian independence as an extension of the autonomy apparent during the interwar period, when metropolitan France played a small role in Algerian policymaking. If French influence had continued to diminish in the forties and fifties, independence might have been the logical endpoint, with the settlers dominating for a time until Arabs and Berbers had amassed the ideological and military weaponry to effect a quick and quiet revolution. But in fact metropolitan France reinvolved itself in Algerian affairs, and the revolution was long and bloody.

In view of the strain placed on them in the early fifties by intervention in Indochina, one may legitimately wonder why the French chose to defend Algeria. Perhaps they actually believed the myth that Algeria was just three départements of France, though a staunch defender of Algérie française has denied this.¹ The depression caused European Algeria to appreciate the worth of the French market for its wine, and with the inauguration of air and telephone communication, it became technically possible to govern the colony from the metropolitan capital.² Nevertheless, the

influence of the settlers remained sufficient to ward off intervention. The Blum-Viollette proposal did not even come up for a vote in Parliament, so successful was Algerian opposition to the measure. The government of Algeria continued to be a regional concern, centered in Algiers and dominated by the settler element.

Settler influence actually grew in the early years of the war, from the fall of France until the allied landing in North Africa in November, 1942. The discipline and authoritarianism of the Vichy government as well as its antisemitism struck sympathetic chords among the settler population.³ The Third Republic had few mourners in Algeria, the Gaullist appeal few friends. After the allied landing, Algiers was gradually transformed into the capital of Fighting France, home of the French Committee of National Liberation. When De Gaulle moved his headquarters to Algiers and assumed joint leadership of the newly created French Committee of National Liberation on June 3, 1943, a city accustomed to privacy on the periphery of French attention suddenly found itself the hub of a reemerging French government, and the French government subsequently found itself reinvolved in Algeria.

Partisan tension between central and regional levels of government peaked between De Gaulle's arrival in Algiers and his first retirement from government, in 1946. Neither the Gaullists nor the resistance forces with whom they shared

power sought to placate the settlers. European Algeria had never provided significant support for the Communist and Socialist parties, who now emerged strong from the resistance; and it had spurned De Gaulle in his time of need. Not since the crisis of 1898 had relations between the settlers and the central government been as strained, and tensions would not approach this level again until De Gualle began maneuvering France toward recognition of Algerian independence after 1958.

According to the three propositions proposed at the outset of this study, a sharp increase in partisan tension should have produced a notable decline in de facto regional autonomy, even without modification of constitutional arrangements. Increasing dependence on central decision making should, in turn, have produced greater reliance on the formal, partisan mechanisms of decision, and this development should have resulted in policies more favorable toward Muslims. Conversely, the reduction in partisan tension after 1946 ought to have brought a swing back toward regional autonomy with its attendant consequences.

An examination of educational policy from 1944 to 1954 lends support to those hypotheses. Under conditions of high partisan tension, the provisional government headed by General de Gaulle promulgated a school construction plan ^{other} and reforms in November, 1944. The Financial Delegations, which had shaped school policy in the 1920's, played no part

in the decisions. Algerian politicians, European and Muslim, offered advice when it was requested but otherwise watched from the sidelines as officials of the provisional government planned, legislated and began execution of a program to put every Algerian child in primary school by 1965. Muslims could not have hoped for such a result from the pre-war processes of decision, anchored by the governor general and the Financial Delegations.

However, metropolitan involvement in educational policy diminished with partisan tension between regional and central governments after De Gaulle's temporary withdrawal from politics. Although metropolitan France continued to fund the school construction program, the central government did not undertake reassessment of its endeavor until 1953, despite clear indications the rate of population growth in Algeria had rendered enrollment projections obsolete. When the French government did finally extend to Algeria authority of the Le Gorgeu Commission, which had already published a report on the needs of French education, it was a settler politician, René Mayer, then the prime minister, who championed the decision. Once again the center appeared to be acting by reacting to the wishes of local notables.

The Algerian Assembly ought to have taken up the slack. Created by the Algerian Statute of 1947, it shared authority over the Algerian budget with the governor general

and with the central finance ministry. Moreover, the Statute provided that Arabic should be an official language in Algeria, along with French, and that it was to be taught in French schools. The Algerian Assembly was charged with implementation. Yet, despite these handholds on educational policy--more solid than any the Financial Delegations had ever obtained--and despite a more favorable ratio of Muslims to settlers, the new regional body proved little more congenial to Muslim interests in education than its predecessor.

Assembly decisions on matters of educational policy suggest that a sort of apoliticism had reemerged to deprive Muslims of their due. A coalition of European moderates and Muslim "independents," backed by the administration, dominated decisions and kept the nationalist parties and the European Left from shaping policy. But unlike the all-settler, "non-partisan" coalition that had governed Algeria before World War II, the new majority shied from the concept of autonomy at any price. Perhaps because the settlers felt uneasy about Muslim unrest, perhaps because metropolitan money now lured cooperation, the postwar coalition never governed Algeria with the prewar assurance of the Financial Delegations. The system had returned to stability,

but its equilibrium point had shifted as a result of increased metropolitan involvement in Algerian affairs.

"That's Not Enough"

The school construction plan of 1944 stemmed from a decision of the French Committee of National Liberation. On December 11, 1943, a study commission was appointed by De Gaulle. It contained only three elected European Algerians of a total 17 members. For once, therefore, European Algerians lacked the political muscle to frustrate efforts at reform. To have tried would only have further blackened their reputation in the eyes of the Gaullists.

The administration laid before the commission a proposal to build 400 classrooms a year for 20 years in an effort to put an additional 400,000 children in school. By comparison with prewar planning, this was ambitious; but Rector Laugier, who had just returned from New York, where

he had headed the University of Free France, readily admitted that even this proposal did not match existing needs.⁴ He estimated a Muslim school-age population of 1.25 millions, of whom about 100,000 were then in primary school. Virtually all European children were in school—some 200,000 of them. Hence, the problem was to find classrooms and teachers for more than a million Arabs and Berbers.

In his appearance before the commission on January 24, Rector Laugier said that both General de Gaulle and Pierre Mendès-France, commissaire of finance, agreed the French government should contribute to the cost of school construction in Algeria. A final report on the total cost of all reforms considered by the commission also emphasized the need for metropolitan participation.⁵ In particular, it proposed that France give back Algeria's military contribution on the condition that it be used "for the work of social investment on Algerian soil."

In prewar terms, such plans were unprecedented, even daring, in the face of what would certainly be settler objections. But Charles de Gaulle examined the Laugier plan for school construction and found it too timid. "That's not enough. We must go further," he is said to have told René Capitant, commissaire of education.⁶ As a result, a new formula, two and one-half times more ambitious than the original, was worked out. It again called for the opening

of 400 new classrooms a year through 1947. But the rate of construction was then to be accelerated, reaching 2,500 in the year 1965.⁷ The capacity of Algerian primary schools would be expanded by a total of 20,000, rather than 8,000, classrooms in twenty years and would accommodate an additional one million pupils, compared with 400,000 under the Laugier plan. Since this figure approached Laugier's estimate of the number of school-age Muslim youth not in school, the new plan became one of scolarisation totale of Algerian youth.

In the main, the plan was faithfully implemented through 1954. The annual rate of construction reached the predicted 600 classrooms per year in 1953 and 1954.⁸ The increase in enrollments lagged behind predictions by some 25,000 pupils, mostly because average class size was closer to 40 than to 50, as provided in the plan. But this is probably an indication of the plan's lack of realism more than of a failure in execution.

In this case, the nominal decisionmaker was the actual one. The central government took the crucial initiative, promulgated the necessary measures, and secured their execution. But one should not regard an exceptional decision taken in exceptional circumstances by an exceptional man as typical of an entire decade. Indeed, the interesting question is why the 1944 plan was never modified before the

revolution began. Realistic and farsighted as the program initially appeared by comparison with prewar efforts, it soon seemed shortsighted and unrealistic by comparison with postwar developments. In view of the population growth, it would scarcely have put an additional third of Muslim school-age youth in school by its terminal date. Furthermore, nothing in the Algerian experience through 1954 indicated that its economic growth would permit the construction of even 2,500 classrooms a year by 1965 or that a sufficient number of teachers would be trained by that time. In short, there was reason for Arabs and Berbers to despair both at the inadequacy of the plan to reach its stated objective—the scolarisation totale of Algerian youth—and at the low probability of execution through 1965.

A Decade of Inaction

Although the nationalist parties, the UDMA led by Ferhat Abbas⁹ and the MTLD of Messali Hadj, had been complaining in the Algerian Assembly from its creation in 1948 that the school construction program was inadequate, the central government did not react until January 26, 1953, when Premier René Mayer, deputy from Constantine, extended the competence of the Le Gorgeu Commission to Algeria. The report of this blue-ribbon panel on Algerian needs was published in July, 1955. But by then the revolution was under

way, and Jacques Soustelle, the new governor general, had announced on his own that the rate of school construction would be doubled.¹⁰ In short, the central government maintained its financial support but not its interest in Algerian education between 1945 and 1954.

It is easy to blame the Fourth Republic for this indifference. The problem of school construction in Algeria was just one more demand on an overloaded system whose subunits avoided political issues and sticky problems, preferring to pass them along to Paris, where they could not, for lack of time and manpower, be resolved.¹¹ Ministerial instability further lessened government chances of dealing with the large questions of the day, such as economic recovery, the war in Indochina, dissidence in Tunisia and Morocco, and the subsidization of private schools, much less issues of regional or local concern.

But this argument is facile. It not only disregards the accomplishments of the Fourth Republic—economic recovery, entry into the Common Market, the end of the war in Indochina, and Tunisian and Moroccan independence—but also assumes that the French system of government was absolutely centralized. In reality, the Algerian Statute of 1947 created an Algerian Assembly as a successor to the Financial Delegations and entrusted this assembly with the management of the Algerian budget. Thus it restored the formal basis of

Algerian autonomy. Since schools cost money to build and operate, and since Algerian schools had to be financed through the Algerian budget even if French contributions continued to offset the cost of the construction program, one would thus expect to find a consequent decentralization of responsibility for school policy. Perhaps the silence of the mother country was less a sign of overload than of a shift in decisionmaking authority to the regional level.

Examination of all Algerian Assembly debates on the school construction chapter of the Algerian budget from 1948 to 1954 (see Table 6-1 for a concise summary) shows that the regional body did not take up the burden. The nationalist parties and the Communist Justrabo repeatedly proposed that more money be spent on school construction, and especially on primary school construction. They were sometimes joined, particularly in later years, by non-nationalist Arabs and Kabyles, such as Chekkal, Tabani, and Imalahyène. Amendments that might restore the spending level of the previous year tended to be adopted whether they concerned primary, TIC Primary, secondary, or technical schools. Expenditures for higher education were never an issue. Otherwise, amendments to increase expenditures for primary school construction tended to fail, unless they had prior endorsement of the Finance Commission, which they seldom did. Overall, assembly amendments altered administrative proposals

Table 6-1
 IMPACT OF ASSEMBLY DECISIONS
 ON SCHOOL CONSTRUCTION APPROPRIATIONS
 1948—1954

Types of Schools	Total Admin. Proposals*	Net Changes	Percentage Change
Higher	1,051	- 19	- 1.81
Secondary	3,799	- 45	- 1.19
Primary	15,216	+208	+ 1.37
Primary TIC (1951-1954)	2,655	+ 68	+ 2.56
Technical	<u>2,727</u>	<u>+541</u>	<u>+19.8</u>
TOTALS	25,448	+752	+ 2.95

* In millions of francs.

Note: The "freeze" of December, 1932, is not included as an assembly action, because it was proposed by the governor general. He suggested a three billion franc freeze. The assembly went along with 1.6 billions of it and specified that it be proportional by budget chapter.

for primary school construction by only 1.37 per cent over the six-year period. In contrast, settler-sponsored amendments for more technical schools fared well with or without Finance Commission support. The assembly added 19.8 per cent to the administration's proposals in this domain.

Primary school construction under the program of Travaux d'initiative communale (TIC) enjoyed better treatment at the hands of the commissions and the assembly than did ordinary primary schools to be built by the regional government. But the total impact of assembly decisions was marginal: a 2.95 per cent increase in administration proposals in six years. And the changes were not even this significant in the areas of higher, secondary, and regular primary school construction. The 20 per cent increase in money for technical schools, the favorites of the farmers, tends to distort the average.

In political terms, this seems to indicate that the assembly was weak by pre-World War II standards. The governor general appears, in the main, to have obtained what he asked for. However, his requests varied little from year to year and were designed to carry out the aims of the school construction program of 1944 and little more. To have done less would have been to invite metropolitan disapproval. To have proposed more would have been to create a need for more taxes and to invite assembly disapproval.

The assembly was in equally tight straits. Its freedom was limited by increasing metropolitan participation in the capital budget. France supplied 53 per cent of the financing for capital expenditures in 1952-53, 69 per cent in 1953-54, and more than 75 per cent in 1954-55.¹² But the costs of school operation rose steadily (from 4.7 billion francs in 1949-50 to 12.1 billions in 1952-53), even though the rate of school construction remained about constant. Because tax revenues did not increase at such a pace, the assembly had little choice but to hold the building program to a minimum and to plead for more metropolitan money.

The governor kept his requests within a range from which a majority of the assembly did not feel free to stray. Thus the bases of the political partnership were essentially the same as in the 1920's. Asked just how much power he felt he had exercised as governor general, Roger Léonard replied: "Everything ultimately is translated into expenditures."¹³ He was dependent on the Algerian Assembly and the metropolitan treasury for resources. The assembly needed the governor general for his prestige, his discretionary powers as head of the bureaucracy, his authority over police and military personnel, and especially his contacts with Paris.

However, the partnership had assumed a new purpose. With nationalist power posing a much greater threat, it was

maintained as a means of achieving closer relations with the mother country. The overt motives were economic, but greater financial involvement also reflected a subconscious need on the part of European Algeria to feel closer to France and her guns in the face of militant nationalism. The fact that France resisted seduction and that its increased support came in small amounts that Algerians always judged insufficient cemented the partnership between governor general and assembly.

If France had not been providing funds in this period, the assembly discussions would have been a replay of debates in the Financial Delegations between 1920 and 1930. But the difference is important. Between 1948 and 1954, the metropolitan role, while passive, was significant. The settlers were now demanding a greater French commitment to education, not a return to the autonomous decisionmaking of the prewar period. Even though they abhorred the limitations on self-government that additional metropolitan aid would entail, they solicited the assistance.

This change in attitude is exemplified by European Algeria's efforts to have the Le Gorgeu Commission, which had surveyed the educational and cultural needs of metropolitan France, continue its work in Algeria. When René Mayer, deputy from Constantine, warned the general council of the département that additional French assistance for Algeria might compromise Algerian autonomy, few settlers seemed to

care. The economic price of autonomy, and perhaps the psychological price for the settlers, had become too high. European Algerians joined Muslim moderates and the governor general in imploring the mother country for more help. Mayer himself, as prime minister from January to June 1953, complied with the wishes of Governor Léonard and extended the competence of the Le Gorgeu Commission to include Algeria. The Algerian hope was that France would be more generous with financial aid if Algeria's needs were authoritatively surveyed.

The reluctance of Algeria to pay for additional progress in education reflects financial conservatism, but it also must be understood as a part of a newly felt desire on the part of the settlers and of non-nationalist Muslims to draw themselves closer to the skirts of the mother country. The settlers had always understood that educated Muslims were a greater potential challenge to European rule than were their uneducated brothers. They preserved a united front on educational issues in the 1920's, and by the early 1950's the tie between education and security had become even clearer. The security problem had taken on such proportions that no issue could be considered in isolation from it. Hence educational policymaking between 1948 and 1954 might be more appropriately compared with the decision-making in the security crisis of 1934, when the settlers

forced the central government to listen and then profited from French attention to enhance their own security.

In 1953, with René Mayer as president of the Council of Ministers, partisan tension between France and Algeria was reduced to a minimum. The parallel line of communication between center and periphery suddenly converged with the official, administrative channel of influence and metropolitan intervention, long demanded by the governor general, was at last obtained. The decision was one more bit of proof that the Algerian political system, although it had been traumatized by war and Gaullism, still operated much as it had before 1940.

Nationalists and Loyalists

Even in a society ripe for revolutionary change, violence may be avoided if the governing institutions respond creatively to the demands being imposed upon them. The reforms made by France at the end of World War II seemed to be a step in this direction.¹⁴ An ordinance of March 7, 1944, expanded the rules for naturalization of Arabs and Berbers to include almost anyone who had received some education. The provisional government also undertook a program of social and economic reform: schools were to be built, health facilities improved, government service opened up to more natives, fellahs counselled on how best to till

their land. In the Algerian Assembly created by the Statute of 1947 Muslims held 50 per cent of the seats, compared with only 30 per cent in the Financial Delegations of the prewar era. Their representation in departmental and municipal councils was increased from 30 to 40 per cent.

An important question is whether the reforms of 1943-1947 resulted in a lasting augmentation of the Arab-Berber role in policymaking—or, more specifically in this case, whether Arabs and Berbers exercised substantially more influence over educational policy between 1944 and 1954 than they had between 1920 and 1930. Since the 1920's the nationalist movement in Algeria had grown to maturity. The modest progress in education coupled with social and economic modernization had led to increasing political mobilization, which in turn had produced an intensification of political demands. Did the political system as modified between 1944 and 1947 remain unresponsive to these demands, or had Arab-Berber influence increased enough to justify the politicians' continued efforts to work within the system?

The creation of a study commission on education may have been, in part, a product of pressure brought to bear on the administration by Ferhat Abbas. Profiting from a meeting of the Financial Delegations in December 1942, he whipped up support for messages that made Muslim support of the war effort contingent on the calling of a conference

for the "elaboration of a political, economic and social statute for Muslim Algerians." In February 1943 he collected about 50 signatures for what became the Manifesto of the Algerian people. Its declaration that Algerian Muslims no longer asked "anything except to be Muslim Algerians"¹⁵ was a clear break with the assimilationist viewpoint held by Abbas before the war. A more specific reform proposal, dated May 26, 1943, asked for recognition of Algerian political autonomy "as a sovereign nation" and for transformation of the government general into an Algerian government, in which Muslims would hold half the portfolios. The document assigned France a right of supervision (droit de regard).¹⁶

The slowness of the administration to respond caused Abbas and his friends to intensify their activity in the fall. But if De Gaulle was influenced by the Abbas activities, he gave no hint of it in his speech at Constantine, December 12, 1943. He spoke of French duty to the colonies and of colonial service to France during the war. In the commission created to study reform, Arabs and Kabyles had only slightly more representation—6 of 17 seats—than in the general councils and the Financial Delegations, and the makeup of the Muslim contingent obviated any chance of direct attack on the administration. The three principal nationalist leaders—Messali Hadj, Ferhat Abbas, and Mohamed el-Bachir el-Ibrahimi—were neither members of the commission nor represented on it.

Nonetheless, the Arab and Berber members of the commission expressed opinions distinct from those of the Europeans. They emphasized the importance of Arabic, arguing that it should be taught everywhere as a mother tongue rather than a foreign language, and favoring the establishment of a Great Council to supervise both religion and the teaching of Arabic. One Muslim member said the ideal sort of instruction was that being given in some of the "free," non-state schools.

Well, here is something inconceivable; it is these schools that for the moment have the most difficulty in opening [i.e. in getting state permission to do so]. It is feared that they constitute foyers of I do not know what ferment of social perturbation.¹⁷

The Muslim representatives received some support from European members, notably from the commission president, General Catroux. However, the report of Paul-Emile Viard, which became the commission's recommendation to the government, emphasized the French character of Algerian education,¹⁸ and the administration's November 1944 decrees clashed still more directly with the Muslim viewpoint. Although De Gaulle had insisted that the school construction program proposed by Rector Laugier be expanded, he took no positive step to see that more Arabic was taught in Algerian schools. The decree required that private elementary schools give 15 hours of courses in French each week.¹⁹

Although their advice was neglected in the formulation of policy, Arabs and Berbers managed to block application of the decree of November 27, 1944, requiring all private elementary schools to teach French. Their strength stemmed from the development of "free" schools encouraged by the Association of Ulama since 1930. By 1934-35, some 70 such schools, each with one or two classes, had already been established "to fight, concurrently with French schools, against ignorance and to hasten the renaissance of Arab-Islamic culture in Algeria."²⁰ They often gave little more than rudimentary instruction in Arabic and in religion, at least during the 1930's, but individual teachers might teach other subjects if they felt qualified to do so. The administration, which had always tolerated more or less willingly the traditional Quranic schools, had begun to restrict the reformist schools after 1936, and the French Committee of National Liberation appeared to be extending this prewar trend. But, as Lucien Paye, director of Muslim reforms in Algeria from 1945 to 1948, has explained:

In fact, the decree remained a dead letter and the administration, because of the inadequacy of official school construction and for reasons of local politics, abandoned application of the dispositions it contained. The school effort of the Association of Ulama continued without real hindrance and the number of reformist

schools functioning at the end of 1947 was estimated at about 100, of which about 60 were in the département of Constantine.²¹

By May, 1955, there were some 193 free schools (médersas) with 511 teachers and 35,150 full-time pupils in Algeria, and many pupils attended the médersas part-time, outside of French schools hours.²²

This success in maintaining and even solidifying a private educational system against the wishes of the administration not only testifies to the influence of the reformists but also indicates that the Gaullist takeover of Algerian politics, while it had temporarily bridged the gap between colony and mother country, had done little to close the gulf between formal impotence and informal influence of Arabs and Berbers. The decrees of November 1944 were products of liberal metropolitan thinking, not of Muslim desires. The one decree requiring native compliance, that governing private schools, proved unenforceable. The system had temporarily shifted against the settlers, but it had not given Arabs and Berbers a significant role in decision-making.

Four years later, however, Algeria had a new fundamental law, a new governor general, and a new legislature. These changes gave Arabs and Berbers greater representation in regional politics. Noncitizens elected half the members

of the assembly, and Muslims who were citizens could vote in the election of the other, first-college delegates. Almost immediately more than 1.3 million Muslims were registered in the second, noncitizen college, and 64,000 were registered along with 470,000 Europeans in the first college.²³ In contrast, only about 100,000 Arabs and Berbers had been able to vote in elections of the Financial Delegations before 1940.

It would be reasonable to expect, on these grounds, that Arabs and Berbers had a greater voice in the formulation of educational policy after 1948. But administrative intervention in second-college elections complicates analysis of Muslim influence, making it impossible to define a single Arab-Berber position. Between 1920 and 1930 native delegates had most frequently been united in their support for, or opposition to, the settler delegations. From 1948 to 1954 the normal voting pattern in the Algerian Assembly put the nationalist parties and the Communist, first-college delegates on one side of the fence and other Arabs and Kabyles along with the majority of the European delegates on the other. In addition to the influence exerted by nationalist parties from the opposition, therefore, it is possible that the "moderate" Muslim delegates influenced educational policy from within the majority.

The positions of the UDMA and the MTLD differed more in emphasis than in substance on the burning issues of

educational policy, the school construction program and the teaching of Arabic. The UDMA concentrated its criticism on the school program of 1944, which it said was inadequate and under-fulfilled. MTLD delegates spoke more frequently of the Arabic issue. But the MTLD also wanted more primary school construction, and the UDMA favored the extension of Arabic instruction. Both parties regularly voted against the Algerian budget in protest against its conservative approach to social needs, including education. The lone Communist delegate, René Justrabo, a European from Sidi-bel-Abbes, joined them annually in this stance.

The Arabic issue came up every year. In 1948 Benkhelil (UDMA) and Ferroukhi (MTLD) complained about the situation. In 1949 Belhadj (MTLD) asked when the administration was going to begin teaching Arabic in the primary schools, and in 1950 both the UDMA and the MTLD protested again. In fact, M'Barek Djilani (MTLD) attacked French educational policies with such gusto he was cut off by the presiding officer and removed from the assembly by policemen.²⁴ He renewed his protest in 1951 on a more moderate tone: "Can one speak of Arab culture when the Arabic language is almost proscribed and when Algerians are obliged to go abroad to learn it and when even the principle of a complete modern education is not yet accepted?"²⁵ Ahmed Boudaâ (MTLD) supported Djilani, saying in Arabic that a Muslim Algerian

might get half an hour a week, or two and a half hours a month, or 19 hours a year or 180 hours of Arabic in his entire educational career. Ten days later, Larbi Demaghatrous (MTLD) announced that he knew that the administration had submitted a bill to extend the teaching of Arabic and that the bill had been laid on the president's desk. The president, Marcel Flinois, said he had just learned of the bill and promised it would be published at the end of the week. He gave his word of honor that it would be ready for consideration at the next session.²⁶

In 1952 Mosetefa Ferroukhi (MTLD), in a long speech on educational policy, touched on the Arabic problem, but the assembly took no action. Ferroukhi came back to the problem in 1953, noting that no commission had done anything with the administration's bill on the teaching of Arabic. Even a "moderate" delegate, Cherif Benelhadj-Said, twitted the rapporteur of the commission on education for failing to discuss the question.²⁷ Larbi Demaghatrous asked again in 1954 why the Arabic bill was being held up.²⁸ Hadj Mohamed Tabani, who had prepared the report, indicated he would be glad to lay it before the assembly immediately but the president said it had to go through the commission.²⁹ The Communist, René Justrabo, noted that seven years had passed since the Algerian statute was adopted and yet nothing had been done to generalize the teaching of Arabic.

The question had "already been treated in its technical aspects" by the professional associations of primary school teachers, he said, but still the assembly would not budge.

From this rough sketch it is apparent that the nationalist parties and the Communist delegate were the principal champions of Arabic in the assembly and that their influence on the assembly's action was as small as their numbers. They prodded the administration into preparing a bill, advised the assembly president of its existence, urged its quick examination in commission, complained about delay, but did not manage to get it adopted. The nationalists and Justrabo stood isolated against the "moderate" Arab and Kabyle delegates and the European representatives of the first college.

This pattern of cleavage within the assembly also prevailed on questions of school construction. The nationalist parties were regularly defeated by a coalition of non-nationalist Muslims and moderate Europeans. Would administration support in an election have been sufficient to guarantee such discipline, or is it necessary to suppose that the administration also rewarded the most faithful element of its majority by shaping policies with them in mind?

Two decisions taken by Governor Naegelen might be cited as evidence of moderate influence. The first eliminated

the long-standing distinction between European and native primary schools. Governor General Naegelen has said his sense of moral right dictated his decision,³⁰ but Malan argues that it was taken under Muslim pressure.³¹ The measure provoked some protest from European parents, who threatened to send their children to private schools. However, since segregation in Algeria had been largely de facto, the decision to "desegregate" Algerian schools, as Naegelen calls it, must be regarded as one of symbolic, but nonetheless secondary, importance.

Naegelen's decision in 1951 to convert the three official médersas into French-Muslim lycées aroused even less controversy. These schools taught many more hours of Arabic than other Algerian secondary institutions,³² while offering a solid background in scientific fields that had been lacking in the médersas. They were undoubtedly an admirable improvement in Algerian education, yet they did not respond to the principal political demands of Arabs and Berbers for mass schooling and mass instruction in Arabic.

All in all, the pattern of Arab-Berber influence over educational policy between 1944 and 1954 is remarkably similar to what it had been between 1920 and 1930. In neither period did native Algerians have much say in the program of school construction. The Arabs and Kabyles did

not have significant influence, either, over the rate of implementation, and on the question of Arabic, postwar efforts netted almost as few gains as had those of the prewar era. The free médersas of the reformist ulama did flourish after the war because the administration did not dare apply its own policies, but this was as much a reflection of continued impotence in the policymaking process as a tribute to the reformists' extra-legal influence. In both periods the Algerian legislature oriented the school construction programs toward technical and professional education, which represented a settler preference.

What had increased in two and a half decades were Muslim expectations. More and more Arabs and Berbers had gone to school, moved to the cities, been exposed to modern thought and nationalist conceptions. The war awakened hopes of independence. The postwar period of French constitution-making aroused even greater expectations of peaceful change. Although the Statute of 1947 was supposed to fulfill some of those expectations, the influence of Arabs and Berbers after 1947, at least in educational policy, was not significantly greater than it had been in the 1920's.

From the partisan conflict between De Gaulle's provisional government and the settlers of Algeria there emerged important reforms in educational policy and eventually in the constitutional structure itself. These changes reduced Algerian autonomy in the short run and led to greater French involvement in educational policy through 1954. However, informal patterns of political interaction continued to minimize the ability of Muslims to utilize political parties as a means of influencing decisions. Postwar administrators in Algeria revived the old tradition of apoliticism in a new form: backing for "independent" Muslim candidates and for the alliance of European moderates and Muslim "independents" in the Algerian Assembly. The alliance prevented the nationalist parties, the advocates of radical change, from exerting any significant influence on educational policy.

The disengagement of metropolitan officials from active participation in Algerian decisions after 1946 pushed decision making back into the more parochial arena, where defenders of the status quo held the advantage. The advocates of change naturally became increasingly discouraged, frustrated, persuaded that the new system was as rigid as the old. From this position of weakness, violence was the only escape.

CHAPTER 7

UPRISING AND REPRESSION

May 8, 1945, was a turning point in Algerian history. The violence that erupted in the département of Constantine showed that Arab-Berber patience with peaceful change was evaporating, and the French reaction left little doubt that the colonial regime would seek to defend itself. In terms of the distribution of power between Paris and Algiers, however, the riots and the repression did not produce an interruption of existing trends. Indeed, the violence intensified feelings of ethnic identification in Algeria. It reawakened the European instinct for solidarity in the face of the Muslim majority. Even the Communist party, which had begun a play for Muslim support, reacted first as a European party and only later as a revolutionary one.

As a result, hope for an alliance of progressive Muslim and European forces committed to central direction of Algerian affairs diminished in 1945 and 1946, while the prospects for an "apolitical" unity of conservative elements improved. The violence strengthened the hands of the nationalists, on one hand, and of conservatives on the other --all of whom welcomed a return to greater autonomy for

Algeria. The settlers longed for prewar politics, and the nationalists saw autonomy as a step toward independence.

The intensification of the conflict between Europeans and Muslims conditioned the balance of power between Paris and Algiers. Progressive forces most favorable to central control were weakened with respect to the extremes, but the extremist forces that sought autonomy were not in a position to profit equally. While the violence caused conservative Europeans to band together politically under "apolitical" banners reminiscent of prewar Algerian politics, it divided and weakened Muslim dissidents. A return to regional direction of Algerian affairs thus represented, in effect, a boon to conservative Europeans.

The Sétif Crisis

On May 8, 1945, which was not only market day but also V-E Day, the Europeans of Sétif organized one element of a parade, the Arabs and Berbers another. Muslim Scouts, closely linked to Messali's Parti populaire algérien (PPA), headed the native contingent of 8,000 to 15,000 persons, and at least one of them, Saâ Bouzid, carried the green and white flag of independent Algeria.

The parade proceeded peacefully until the commissaire de police of Sétif asked Bouzid to take down the flag. He refused, and in the ensuing confusion someone shot him.

Panic set in. Nonetheless, the parade was re-formed and continued on to the Monument to the Dead. Then there was more shooting, and bedlam ensued. Bands of armed Arabs and Berbers roamed the streets attacking any Europeans they saw. The settlers, the police, the gendarmerie, and finally the army were not long in retaliating with an equal lack of discrimination.¹

From Sétif, the rioting spread to the surrounding countryside and towns. The pattern was not clear enough to suggest it had been planned, though it was sufficiently generalized to imply prior preparation. The revolt lasted four days; by May 11 the army was able to get anywhere just about as quickly as trouble broke out, and there were no more attacks.²

The facts of the repression are more difficult to establish, because wartime censorship still restrained both the Algerian and French press. But its obvious enormity set it apart from the original uprising and later gave it strong propaganda value in the hands of the nationalists. At least 1,500 Arabs and Berbers died—ten times the number of Europeans killed in the rioting—and estimates have ranged as high as 85,000.³ In addition, more than 4,500 arrests were made.

A bald economic interpretation of the uprising can be ruled out, since it occurred in the more prosperous

districts of the département of Constantine. However, the undeniable hardships of the war years may have brought the frustrations of many Arabs and Berbers closer to the surface. It also seems clear that the Parti populaire algérien (PPA), functioning clandestinely, urged Muslims to take up arms and to prepare for violence in the spring of 1945,⁴ then attempted to head off violence on the morning of May 8. It is unclear whether an order for revolt had been given and then revoked, or whether violence erupted spontaneously in tinder boxes the PPA had helped to construct. Where violence actually occurred, it appears to have been a function of official reaction to the PPA-planned demonstrations. Where the authorities were most adroit, the Bordj-Bou-Arriidj and Constantine, the demonstrations remained peaceful.⁵

However, polemics prevailed over analysis in the immediate aftermath. Perhaps if censorship had not prevented candid reporting, rumor would have won less ground at the start. Perhaps if the double fight against Vichy and Germany had been less fresh in everyone's mind, there would have been less talk of "fascist plots" and more attention to the details of who had done what and why. In any case, European reactions to the violence in the regions of Sétif and Guelma showed that apoliticism and unity were slogans of the past. The Europeans blamed each other for the violence with as much vigor as they blamed Arabs and Berbers. The Left

accused the landed "féodalité" of conspiring to provoke violence, while the farming interests replied with equally scathing denunciations of leftist treachery. Those Muslim politicians who escaped imprisonment assumed a moderate stance notable for its prudence rather than its courage.

The verbal war between the Left and the conservative settlers intensified despite government efforts to induce calm, reaching a peak just before the municipal elections of late July and early August. The Socialists and Communists jointly denounced the resolution of the European delegations, because it "demanded, in fact, the suppression of democratic liberties and the creation of civic guards patterned after the Hitlerian SS."⁶ The Confédération générale des agriculteurs of the département of Algiers, on the other hand, affirmed its support for the motion and denounced the "straying Frenchmen" and "Muslim parties" who were attacking colonialism.⁷

Although divided on what needed to be done, the Europeans of both the Right and the Left agreed on one fundamental aspect of the May violence: the guilt of the nationalists. The Algerian Communist Party's denunciation of the nationalists was as prompt and unequivocal as its accusations of colon complicity. It pinned the whole affair on the PPA, calling its members false nationalists and false Muslims and linking them to the Nazis.⁸ With the rioting

dismissed as a fascist plot, colons and nationalists were improbably lumped into the same basket of troublemakers.⁹

Non-nationalist Arabs and Berbers stayed prudently outside this debate. While the European delegates were preparing their resolution asking for militias, the Muslim members of the Financial Delegations drew up their own motion. They asked that the guilty be punished but refrained from pre-judgement of anyone. Instead, they called for an investigation and proclaimed their determination, "conscious of the seriousness of the times," to "allow no polemics to begin."¹⁰

Alliance of the Left

During the summer of 1945 the Algerian Communists moved away from their antinationalist position. They joined moderate Muslim politicians and their Socialist allies in a campaign to stop the ongoing trials of persons arrested after the spring's rioting and to offer amnesty to those already sentenced. In fact, the Communists spearheaded the movement that ultimately won freedom for Ferhat Abbas and Messal Hadj. For once a vast coalition of the European Left and all Muslim factions appeared to dominate Algerian politics. But it functioned effectively only in the cause of amnesty; once that objective had been achieved, the coalition collapsed.

This new position squared with Communist political ambitions in Algeria. Since 1936 the Algerian Communist Party had been nominally separate from the French Communist

Party. It aspired to be a Muslim as well as a European party. But to win a greater share of the Muslim vote, it had to move toward the nationalists or find itself outbid. The party was not organized to challenge the administration's supervisory role over electoral behavior in the villages, especially in the heavily colonized département of Oran, even if a shift to the right had been ideologically acceptable to the party. With any shift to the left in the second college, however, the Communists stood to lose European votes in the first. Thus the initial Communist denunciation of the nationalists had been sensible: the party could only expect to jeopardize its position in the first college by espousing the cause of amnesty and appealing for Muslim votes. If the gambit failed, and the Communists were not able to win the confidence of the Arab and Berber electorate, the party might well be reduced to insignificance in both colleges.

The Communists ignored the risks to snap up an easy tactical success. Communist and Muslim members of the General Council of the département of Algiers proposed resolutions favoring amnesty in early November.¹¹ By the end of the month committees were blooming all over the country, asking that the work of the military courts be halted, that death sentences be suspended, and that all Muslim prisoners be freed. The Communist deputies presented a bill to that effect in the Constituent Assembly¹² and met with Interior Minister Tixier¹³ and Governor Châtaigneau.

In the debate in the Constituent Assembly, Bendjelloul's group of moderate Algerians objected that the bill, even as amended by the Communists, was too narrow. He wished to see students reinstated in schools from which they had been expelled, free schools reopened, Muslim functionaries who had lost their jobs in the wake of the violence restored to the public payrolls. The Mouvement républicain populaire (MRP) was insisting that Europeans be included among those receiving amnesty and that persons guilty of "reconstitution of dissolved leagues" and "atteinte to the security of the state" not be eligible. Leaders of the PPA and the ANL would have remained in prison under the MRP plan. Unconditional support for the amnesty bill came only from the Communist and Socialist parties. This was enough to assure passage, but within the Algerian delegation Bendjelloul's group of seven votes was needed for a majority. Yet the future of such a coalition depended not only on the continued success of the Communists and the Socialists in Algeria but on the success of moderate Muslim politicians as well.

The majority took a step toward insuring its future success by modifying the electoral law. The Muslim electorate was to be further expanded to include anyone holding a primary school certificate. Moreover, Algeria would elect 35 rather than 26 deputies to the National Assembly—14 for the first college and 21 for the second—if the draft constitution were approved by the voters.

The very passage of the amnesty bill tended, however, to undermine the conditions that would have perpetuated a coalition of the European Left with moderate Muslim parties. The amnesty put the nationalists back in circulation. Freed about the middle of April, Ferhat Abbas put together a new political party, the Union démocratique du Manifeste algérien (UDMA), in phenomenally short time, quickly enough to win 11 of 13 second-college seats in the Second Constituent Assembly elected June 4. Abbas charted an independent course, calling for the establishment of an Algerian Republic—something a government party like the Communists could hardly do. His troop of eleven deputies proved to be a crucial independent force in the Second Constituent Assembly, often holding the balance of power between Left and Right.¹⁴

To this extent, the amnesty made the Left-Muslim coalition less homogeneous. On the other hand, the amnesty deepened the divisions between the majority and the minority. It is difficult to determine what the great Algerian landholders, who had traditionally dominated regional politics, were thinking in the fall of 1945 and the spring of 1946. One clue comes from Eugene Vallet's book, Un drame algérien: La vérité sur les émeutes de mai 1945,¹⁵ a series of essays which was an indictment of the administration for its leniency. In September 1945 Vallet wrote:

The danger was great everywhere in Algeria before the riots. It has increased everywhere as a result of them. It has affirmed itself everywhere since the trouble; it is increasing again, everywhere, with the measures of pardon that are being taken. . . .¹⁶

During the spring and summer of 1946 he deplored the amnesty, saying the old political groups were reforming and papers were circulating as early as April with the message: "Frenchmen, prepare your suitcases or your coffins!"

Another spokesman for ultra-conservative European Algeria was Paul Benazet, who wrote a series of scathing editorials for the weekly Radical paper Démocratie.¹⁷ He heaped abuse on the Communist party and Communist newspapers, on the nationalists, and on the administration, and hailed victory in November 1946, when 11 of 13 first-college deputies from Algeria conformed to his standards of conservatism. This belied the conclusion drawn by André Marti, deputy and secretary of the French Communist Party:

Yes or no? Has the vote of amnesty for all the Muslims picked up following the fascist plot of May, 1945, created a basis for friendship between the people of France and the Muslim population of Algeria? Obviously, yes. There is thus something changed in Algeria as in France.¹⁸

The achievement of amnesty occasioned the breakup of the coalition between the European Left and the Bendjelloul assimilationists who had fought for and won the measure. With the success of Abbas in the June elections, the reappearance of Messali in the fall and the creation of his new party, the Mouvement pour le triomphe des libertés démocratiques (MTLD), the unity of the Left with the Muslim representatives became increasingly difficult. At the same time, the amnesty widened the breach between the European Left and Right in Algeria. The freeing of Abbas and Messali added fuel to the European reaction. The MRP, the Radicals, and the parties of the Right all gained in the elections of the Second Constituent Assembly.

None of these political divisions originated in 1945, but the crisis exacerbated political tensions and contributed to the fractionalization of Algerian politics. The uprising served as a reminder that the cleavage between settlers and natives—the oldest, most basic source of division—ran deeper than the division among Europeans induced by the war. The cleavage between Right and Left, which had long been muted in Algeria as a result of "apoliticism" and the weakness of the Left, was deepened by the Communist change of heart and the Socialist role in obtaining an amnesty. The Arabs and Berbers had been suspicious of the Communist Party at least since the Popular Front days, but the Communist

denunciation of the PPA and the AML immediately after the uprising gave new weight to these suspicions. Mohamed Bendjelloul, Ferhat Abbas, and Messali Hadj were already headed in separate directions, and Messali's advocacy of violence in the spring of 1945, the imprisonment of Abbas despite his apparent innocence, and the success of Bendjelloul in avoiding prison made a rapprochement less likely than ever. The temporary cooperation between Bendjelloul and the European Left contained the seeds of its own termination, since its only goal was amnesty.

Such fractionalization weakened the moderate forces most sympathetic to centralized decisionmaking and strengthened extremist groups eager to see Algeria's traditional political autonomy restored. The amnesty lent greater credibility to the alarmist voices on the right and renewed organizational capacity to the nationalists, whose leaders were freed. The failure of the moderate Muslims and the European Left to cement an alliance that would endure beyond the amnesty left them incapable of sustaining a vigorous government guided from Paris. In this sense, then, the security crisis contributed to the renewal of Algerian autonomy evident in the study of educational policy between 1948 and 1954. Since liberal policies were invariably identified with Parisian initiative and pressure, the crisis may be said to have been detrimental to Muslim prospects of obtaining reform within the system.

Centralized Government

Between 1944 and 1948 the attitude of the French government toward Algeria shifted from one of domineering interest to one of virtual indifference. The years 1945 and 1946 were crucial to this transition. Partisan tension between the Gaullists, who governed France, and the local Algerian notables, who had shown their support for Pétain, was high at the outset but diminished as normal political life was resumed. The security crisis led De Gaulle to formalize Parisian domination over Algerian affairs, but decreasing partisan tension and imperfect party discipline partially eroded his efforts and produced an informal autonomy of action by regional representatives, evident in the adoption of the amnesty measure. Although Algeria did not obtain formal autonomy until passage of the Statute of 1947, that measure was merely the capstone of a trend that can be discerned by careful scrutiny of decisionmaking in the security crisis.

In its vigorous reaction to the crisis, the French central government paid little heed to local desires. The Financial Delegations were simply informed of the government's intentions. When the settlers grumbled and talked of the need for militias, De Gaulle announced he was uninterested in local polemics. The Constituent Assembly debated the government's plan and endorsed it. The Algerian Financial Delegations, which did not approve, were dissolved. In short, from May until September the important decisions were taken in Paris.

European members of the Financial Delegations, meeting for fifteen minutes on May 15, recommended no less than nine courses of action. The most controversial was the fifth:

. . . the immediate, careful arming of all [population] centers lacking military garrisons, notably small localities and isolated farms, with the immediate creation of civic guards, for which mayors and administrators would be responsible, under penalty of seeing a disturbed and terrorized population abandon all the territories they inhabit.¹⁹

The government's program of reform initiated by the ordinance of March 7, 1944, which had expanded Muslim suffrage and extended citizenship to many more Arabs and Berbers, was not

mentioned. Neither was there praise for the governor general or the government. In fact, the Europeans said that, while high functionaries should be strengthened, the "incapable" should be eliminated, if they were "unworthy to carry out their mission." The delegates probably had Governor Châtaigneau in mind.

The government responded with a statement by minister of the interior, Adrien Tixier, and a communiqué released in Algiers. The first was a categorical denial that the governor general would be replaced, and the communiqué was more specific:

The minister of the interior, informed that certain French elements in Algeria were propagating the idea that the application of the ordinance of March 7, 1944, would be suspended or abandoned after the recent incidents, confirms that the Government of the Republic, while taking the necessary measures for the maintenance of public order and French unity in Algeria, is unanimous in its intention to put confidence in the vast majority of French Muslims. The government is absolutely resolved to pursue the policy of progressive accession of French Muslims to French citizenship under the conditions foreseen by the ordinance of March 7, 1944, and to break all resistance to its policy.²⁰

Nonetheless, European elements continued to express undisguised distrust of centralized decisionmaking. There was obvious nostalgia for the interwar years, when European Algeria settled its own problems without a Charles de Gaulle to interfere. As Jacques Driand observed in Le monde, the members of the resistance who dominated the French Committee of National Liberation had contempt for the colon element in Algeria, which had welcomed Vichy. The Socialists and Communists, who had been active in the Resistance and were strong in the Constituent Assembly, had never had much support in Algeria, while the Radical party, which had been strong in Algeria before the war, was in disfavor.²¹ Hence conservative Algeria could only place its hopes in regional institutions. It was the parties of the Left that extolled the virtues of central control.

To induce calm, Governor General Yves Châtaigneau, a Socialist whose career was diplomacy, first made a conciliatory radio speech on June 13, blaming the uprising on "Hitlerian agitators"—the term could offend neither Right nor Left—and calling for reinforced solidarity, renovation and progress. Then he traveled to Paris, where he gave Tixier a "detailed account of the events of Sétif and of the measures taken to reestablish order."²² On June 20 Tixier announced he would go to Algeria.²³

Before embarking on his trip, the minister appeared with the governor general before a joint meeting of the Consultative Assembly's commissions for the interior and for Muslim affairs. Tixier outlined a series of reforms planned for Algeria: administrative subdivisions would be created; the Algerian assemblies would be transformed; there would be a "profound" reorganization of the Government General, including the creation of a Directorate of Social Affairs and Labor; and the administration would be "decentralized" to give prefects and sub-prefects more authority.²⁴ (One might read "centralized" for "decentralized" here, since strong prefects in Algeria would give the minister of the interior a firmer handhold on regional affairs.) Tixier was believed to favor the simple attachment of Algeria to France as départements like the others.

Tixier's arrival in Algeria occasioned less pomp and ceremony than Marcel Régnier had received in March 1935. "But there was no one among those present, officials or others, who did not feel the special gravity of the occasion," wrote Michel Rouzé of Alger républicain,²⁵ the Communist daily. Throughout his five-day stay Tixier kept repeating the familiar message: the ordinance of March 7, 1944, would be applied.

I do not hesitate to repeat what I telegraphed to Governor General Châteauneau last May 9: all resistance

will be broken, whether it comes for a certain Muslim minority or from a few aberrant Frenchmen. Those who oppose this just and humane policy will suffer the consequences of their attitudes.²⁶

One might be tempted to think he was witch-hunting, were it not for the Confédération générale des agriculteurs du département d'Alger, which had brought together two hundred Algerian farmers and adopted a pair of resolutions. The mildest portions of its first motion—those that escaped censorship—denounced "aberrant Frenchmen" and "Muslim parties" who criticized French colonization, declared it was impossible to govern Muslims by abdicating authority, requested application of the measures recommended May 15 by the European members of the Financial Delegations, and asked the government to put off all reforms until elections were held.²⁷

Tixier's radio speech of June 29, the eve of his departure from Algeria, was uncompromising. Those who harbored hopes that the March 7 ordinance would not be applied were "deceiving themselves." Moreover, contrary to the wishes of European elected officials who had come to see him in Paris, and to the desires of a group of Muslim leaders who had approached the president of the Consultative Assembly in his absence, municipal elections, postponed because of the riots, would be held soon.²⁸

The results of Tixier's trip were thus quite the opposite of those produced by Régnier's 1934 voyage. No elections had been held since the war, and although the ordinance of March 7 had opened the door to citizenship for some 60,000 Arabs and Berbers, settlers still constituted the bulk of citizen-voters. Tixier could only assume that his political enemies were dominant in Algeria. Therefore, quite unlike Régnier, he acted without reference to regional politics, choosing instead to please the government's majority on the national level.

The government kept its word. The municipal elections were held at the end of July and the beginning of August. The Directorate of Native Affairs in the Government General was replaced by a Directorate of Muslim Reforms. In September the government abolished the Financial Delegations and set up a Financial Assembly, elected indirectly through the general councils. Finally, it began to create "municipal centers" to replace the much detested communes mixtes.

These measures climaxed one of those rare moments when Paris effectively governed Algeria. The system of de facto regional autonomy had been overthrown and replaced by centralized decisionmaking that approximated, for once, the legal distribution of authority. However, the reforms soon produced fresh impetus for decentralization.

Algerians went to the polls about once a month between July and November: in July and August for the municipal elections; in September for the cantonals to select general councillors for the three départements; in October for a referendum on the question of a Constituent Assembly and an interim government, and then for the election of such an assembly. All these elections favored the disciplined parties of the Left and the equally disciplined Mouvement républicain populaire (MRP) in France and in Algeria. Then the Communist success reached a new peak in the elections of the First Constituent Assembly, October 21, 1945, when the party won 24 per cent of the vote in Algeria, passing the SFIO, which slipped to 21 per cent.²⁹ European Algeria seemed to have joined the progressive camp.

The government interpreted election results in the second (non-citizens) college as a further endorsement of its reform policies. After the first round of the municipal elections, in which 63 per cent of registered, noncitizen (second-college) voters went to the polls, the Government General issued a communiqué: "The Muslim population of Algeria has thus given tangible proof of its approbation of the reform policy inaugurated by the government of the Republic, March 7, 1944." The underground nationalists had counseled abstention, as they did again in September and October.

The government could take further comfort from the fact that "reasonable" Arab and Berber candidates were elected. Of 68 general council seats filled in September, 47 went to candidates who called themselves "progressives" or "traditionalists." Only five "extreme reformists" were elected, by the administration's count.³⁰ In the legislative elections, with Ferhat Abbas and Messali Hadj still in prison, the Union démocratique franco-musulmane headed by Mohamed Bendjelloul won six of thirteen seats. Since Bendjelloul persisted in his assimilationist views, he was not classified as a nationalist by the administration.

Citing these results, the Gaullist government could claim a majority in both France and Algeria. Progressive alliances controlled the major cities, and the three largest parties, who had shown their strength in France, appeared to provide a majority for the Socialist governor, Yves Châtaigneau. He also seemed to enjoy the support of "reasonable" Muslims.

However, the government's political position at the local level was less secure than these facts suggest. Although the cantonal elections in Algeria represented a moral success for the Left, the parties of the Center and the Right emerged with a majority of first-college seats in the general councils. The Communists, who had received 19.5 per cent of the first-college vote in the cantonals,

held only seven of 100 seats after the second round. The strength of the moderate and conservative Europeans in the general councils assured them of predominance among first-college delegates to the new Financial Assembly, as established by a decree of September 15. When the assembly met for the first time in early December, it elected a Socialist, Raymond Blanc, as president, but the majority was conservative. The Communists held only two seats, and there were a number of holdovers from the Financial Delegations. The assembly soon demonstrated itself faithful to the financial doctrines of the Delegations.³¹

While the government obliged its followers on a number of issues—such as the removal of a prefect, Lestrade-Carbonnel, who was suspected of having favored militia-style justice—and while Châtaigneau's repeated visits to the rural areas showed great solicitude for Muslims, it would have been foolhardy to accede to demands for restoration of the regional assembly to its prewar position of preeminence in the structure of Algerian government. The September 15 ordinance imposed procedural rules that gave the Financial Assembly less power than the Financial Delegations had enjoyed. The president of the assembly, Raymond Blanc, protested against this curb on regional power;³² Raymond Laquière, the imperious mayor of Saint Eugène, called it a "humiliating" situation; and

even the Communist Nicolas Zannetaci complained about the assembly's weakness. Understandably, however, the government ignored these protests for, although it included representatives of all parties, it owed its existence to a tripartite agreement among Communists, Socialists, and the MRP. To have awarded the Financial Assembly greater powers would have been to reward the government's most dubious friends, the parties of the Right. In sum, the differences in party strengths between the national and regional levels gave the government an incentive to continue its practice of centralized decisionmaking for Algeria.

In the two months following De Gaulle's abrupt departure from power on January 20, 1946, the Algerian crisis reached its apparent dénouement. Early in March the Constituent Assembly approved an amnesty for all Arabs and Berbers involved in the May 1945 rioting. By the end of the month Ferhat Abbas and Bachir el-Ibrahimi were free, and by September even Messali Hadj was back in Algeria.

The Reemergence of Regional Autonomy

The first public evidence of a new emphasis on reconciliation in government policy was the decision of the tripartite coalition government headed by Félix Gouin, a Socialist, to send Interior Minister André Le Troquer, also a Socialist, for another assessment of the Algerian situation. Press accounts of his visit, which lasted from February 14 to 19, do not indicate that Le Troquer referred

to reform on any occasion. Unlike his predecessor, he seemed more concerned about rallying disaffected settlers than about pleasing the government's closest friends. The key message of the trip, stated explicitly in a speech at Constantine and contained implicitly in everything he said, was that Algerians were "good Frenchmen."³³ This contradicted what the Communists had been saying about the landed settler interests.

The chief props of the new government were the MRP and the Socialists, who had together received 40 per cent of the first-college votes in Algeria in November. In terms of leadership, both of these parties were "progressive," but the MRP, in particular, could attribute its meteoric success to the equally spectacular demise of the Radicals in Algeria as in France. The party could not ignore the fact that the Radical voices raised in the Financial Assembly and the general councils in favor of renewed Algerian autonomy spoke for many of the same people it did. Thus, as Paul Viard correctly noted, something had to be done for the settlers if the government was to maintain its support.³⁴

Nevertheless, the Constituent Assembly's two decisions in March and April were slaps in the faces of the settlers. Not only was the amnesty covering persons arrested for almost every offense committed in May 1945 voted, but a new electoral law was approved. The law, which would govern the first set

of legislative elections if the constitution drafted by the First Constituent Assembly were approved, increased Algeria's representation from 26 to 35 but gave all but one of the new seats to the second, non-citizen college. Moreover, the rules for entry to the first college were relaxed.

The draft constitution itself contained guarantees of social and political equality for Muslims and a vague outline of a French Union that seemed to promise looser ties between France and its colonies.³⁵ It is not surprising therefore that the draft constitution was rejected in Algeria—and the electoral law with it—just as it was rejected in every French colony where Europeans constituted a majority of the participating electorate.³⁶ (Only citizen, first-college voters were eligible.) The margin of defeat in Algeria was roughly the same as in France as a whole (52 vs. 53 per cent). While the government's Algerian policies can hardly be said to have blitzed the constitution, it is clear that the Left did not improve its position in the colony. More specifically, since the MRP ultimately opposed the draft, the Communist and Socialist parties became its advocates. Yet these were the two parties most intensely interested in pursuing Algerian policies that offended a majority of first-college voters.

This apparent inconsistency stemmed from a decentralization of decisionmaking authority within even the most

disciplined of the parties, the Communist. All the major parties, rather than extrapolating Algerian policy from their basic positions on overriding constitutional issues, tended to follow the advice of their own Algerian members on Algerian problems. This advice may have been colored more by a desire to damage their enemies at the local level than by rational judgments about what would best insure passage of the constitution.

The non-Algerian members of the Communist, Socialist, and MRP majority in the assembly remained as indifferent about Algerian policy as had been their more conservative, less disciplined predecessors of the Third Republic. Only about fifty deputies remained.³⁷ The only persons besides Interior Minister Tixier to speak in a December 1945 debate on the Algerian budget were Algerians. Likewise, two months later, the amnesty question was a side-issue for an assembly preoccupied with finding a three-party compromise for a draft constitution. After the amnesty was voted, two Algerians, a European and a Muslim, began an interpellation of the government on economic policy in Algeria. Although discussion carried over to the sessions of March 5 and March 12,³⁸ it was again mostly Algerians who participated. But the majority members representing Algeria were just as jealous of regional prerogatives as their more conservative predecessors.

Thus there was a slippage of authority from the executive branch of the central government to the legislative, where the Algerian delegation—more specifically the majority party members from Algeria—set the direction of Algerian policy. These deputies were able to write a new electoral law for Algeria, widening the qualifications for the citizen college to include anyone with a primary school certificate and giving the second, noncitizen college eight more deputies in the National Assembly. The Left was trying for a knock-out of conservative forces in Algeria.

However, the strategy backfired. The new electoral law never took effect because the first draft constitution was defeated. A second Constituent Assembly had to be elected under the old rules. The newly liberated Ferhat Abbas and his new party, the Union démocratique du manifeste algérien (UDMA) won 11 of 13 second-college seats, while European Algeria, like metropolitan France, moved to the right. The MRP profited from its opposition to the constitution to nose past the Communists and become the first party of France.³⁹ In France as a whole, the Communist party maintained its share of the vote, but in Algeria it dropped two of four first-college seats it had held since November.⁴⁰ The Communist deputy-mayor of Algiers, General Tubert, was defeated.

Conservatives were thus able to exploit the pattern of parochial decisionmaking within the assembly that the Left had resurrected. They used reconstituted regional prerogatives to stall the question of an Algerian statute until the Communists had quit. the government and a Center-Left coalition had been formed. When a statute was finally voted in September 1947, the local autonomy it authorized promised still further protection for the European minority.

The slippage toward decentralization reconfirms the importance of partisan tension as an independent variable in explaining relations between center and periphery in a unitary system. However, while strong tension between center and periphery is a necessary condition for the centralization of authority in a unitary system, effective government by the central authorities may be a fleeting, fragile, unusual phenomenon. In the case of France and Algeria, partisan tension seems to have been an exception that neither the colony nor the mother country could afford to sustain. It arose only in extraordinary circumstances such as those that swept De Gaulle to power. But even De Gaulle felt the need for elections. And once those elections had shown support for the forces of the Resistance and the Left, it became difficult to argue that Algiers was yet disaffected from the government in Paris.

Although shortlived, centralized direction of Algerian affairs proved relatively advantageous to Muslims, as the hypothesis linking autonomy with informality would lead one to expect. Despite violence more severe than that which occurred in 1934-35, the government moved ahead with plans for reform and amnestied Arabs and Berbers who had been arrested. In the thirties, the crisis had started inauspiciously for Muslims and ended just as badly, with the Régnier decree. In 1945, once the repression had run its course, the prospects for Muslims became progressively brighter.

However, it would be incorrect to conclude that Muslims exercised greater influence in security decisions after May 1945 than they had ten years before. Their leaders were in prison. The government proceeded with reform because, as in the case of the school construction program of 1944, General de Gaulle had decided what his policy was to be and would not be deterred by local notables, Muslim or European. Thus, while Muslim failure in 1934-1935 can best be explained in terms of the domination of the center by the periphery, its relative success in 1945-1946 resulted from the domination of the periphery by the center. Direct Muslim influence was not an important factor, since in 1945 Algerian policy was being made by the central government.

Only an alliance of the European left with nationalist forces might have been able to exploit the possibilities for reform offered by the merger of Algerian and French politics. A claim to represent the "progressive" European elements as well as the Muslim masses carried weight in Paris, as evidenced by the struggle over amnesty. A disciplined alliance working through Paris might conceivably have sprung Muslims from their cage: the parochial, informal politics of Algiers. But the European reaction to the events of May, 1945, heightened nationalist suspicions of the European Left; the alliance faltered almost before it had been launched. Soon the nationalists were seeking more, not less, autonomy for Algeria, and the Left was demonstrating its inability to sustain centralized direction of the colony's affairs.

After De Gaulle left power, the majority consisted of the three most disciplined parties in France, and yet there was a continuing erosion of centralized decisionmaking. This should not be regarded as a conclusive finding against the use of discipline as a variable, however, because the parties revealed themselves as anything but centralized and disciplined on Algerian questions, and because three

highly disciplined parties may not add up to a coalition government that is highly disciplined. Indeed, rivalry among the parties in this instance may account for their inconsistent policies of placating both Europeans and Muslims in Algeria. Perhaps a centralizing impulse within a unitary system lacking partisan tension must be based on a single highly disciplined party with no important rivals in the region under study.

Of course, the distribution of influence over Algerian affairs remained more centralized in 1946 than it had been before 1940. The continuation of centralized rule through the governor general was a carryover from the changes in formal structure and from the appointments made when partisan tension was high. However, the impulse was now toward the resurrection of Algerian autonomy. Informally, power was beginning to slip from the hands of central authorities back into the open arms of regional representatives. Formally, the newly emerging state of relations between Paris and Algiers could not be consecrated until Parliament had been moved to pass a new statute for Algeria and until Yves Châtaigneau, the powerful governor general, had been removed. By 1948 both of these conditions had been met, and Algeria once again enjoyed a measure of official autonomy.

CHAPTER 8

THE 1954 BUDGET

The postwar reforms, in straightening out some of the legal tangle, gave the Algerian Assembly full responsibility for the regional budget. However, members of the Algerian Assembly complained more than once during the 1954 debates that there was nothing for them to decide. Some claimed that Parisian officials had narrowed the options to an unimportant few,¹ and others insisted that the governor general called all the shots.² Both arguments implied that the autonomy granted Algeria by the Statute of 1947 was a sham and that power was effectively exercised by the central government.

There was some truth in these complaints. Although the Algerian budget was no longer subject to review in Parliament, the French contribution to Algerian revenues had increased steadily since the war until it had become essential to the Algerian program of economic and social development. France now made loans to Algeria, and Parisian economic planners could insist that the metropolitan money be used only for specified sorts of economic and social development. The governor general could maintain in his

negotiations with the Algerian Assembly that his was the only budget proposal that could satisfy the requirements laid down by metropolitan officials. Therefore, while the formal process of budget adoption had been decentralized by the Algerian Statute of 1947, the decisionmaking power was probably more centralized in 1954 than it had been twenty years earlier.

Muslims ought to have profited from this combination of developments. They had always fared better when metropolitan authorities participated in decisions, and they possessed half the seats in the new Algerian Assembly, compared with a mere three-fifths of the defunct Delegations. Whether the Statute of 1947 solidified genuine Algerian autonomy or whether increasing dependence on metropolitan money tipped the balance of power toward Paris, Muslims seemed sure to do better than they had in the budgetmaking of the 1930's.

However, the case of the 1954 budget shows that Muslim influence again suffered from informal manipulation of the political system. To be sure, the new assembly had rendered inoperative the apolitical alliance of settlers, which had been effective in controlling the Financial Delegations. The settlers lacked a majority in the Assembly, and even if they had been able to muster a few compliant Muslim votes for retrograde policies, they would have encountered metropolitan resistance. But the settlers, if

united, could block any administration initiative, and the nationalist parties, if they had occupied all 60 second-college seats, could also have vetoed any measure. How then could the administration rally a majority of the assembly to policies that would be acceptable to the principal source of revenue, metropolitan France? How could increased financial autonomy for Algeria be reconciled with the increased financial dependence of Algeria on the French budget? The discrepancy between theory and reality had to be bridged.

From the first application of the Statute, the regional administration responded to this dilemma by fashioning its own majorities at the expense of the nationalist parties. Using a variety of tricks, the administration rigged elections in the second, all-Muslim college to favor "independent" candidates, who became dutiful supporters of government policies in the assembly. Together with a moderate minority of the European members they constituted a reliable, obedient majority. In return for modest concessions and perquisites, this majority stabilized the new system^{by} insulating it against the nationalists and against the most reactionary of the settlers. Once again, those who spoke with authority and authenticity on behalf of Muslims found themselves pushed aside in favor of those who would do the administration's bidding.

Muslims profited from their participation in the

governor's majority. In fact, a Muslim president of the assembly, Abderrahmane Farès, imitated the settler tactic of going to Paris to seek better terms than the governor general could offer. He embarrassed the governor but increased the influence of the regional alliance between the administration and the assembly majority. He warded off reductions in development expenditures that would have been damaging to Muslim interests. However, by using the same tactics that had preserved settler rule, Farès helped keep Algerian politics the parochial, informal, apolitical game it had always been. By helping to preserve the status quo, such informal maneuvers pushed the protagonists of radical change outside the system. The nationalist parties withered, and with them faded any remaining aura of legitimacy the system may still have enjoyed in the eyes of Muslims. The informal maneuvers designed to reconcile apparently contradictory aspects of the formal structure served to undercut constitutional legitimacy.

Making Ends Meet

In 1954 the basic budgetary problem was a shortage of resources for the social and economic program to which Algeria had committed itself. Capital improvements had been made and continued to be made on schedule, but once completed these improvements imposed a heavier burden on

the current operations budget without necessarily creating offsetting revenues. As more and more of Algeria's tax money was absorbed in the operations budget, less was available for capital spending, and it became necessary to depend on French loans for an even larger percentage of the funds for capital improvement.

The French Finance Ministry never supported this trend sufficiently in the eyes of some Algerians. The ministry resisted unlimited metropolitan assistance on the ground that Algeria was not making adequate efforts to raise the needed funds by taxation. The Finance Ministry argued that many Algerian tax rates were lower than in France.³ When, in the summer and fall of 1953, the governor general's director of finance, Claude Dixier, initiated conversations in Paris about the 1954-55 budget, he received assurances of greater metropolitan assistance than ever before. But the projected sum was inadequate to support Algerian development plans. Facing this problem squarely, Governor General Léonard suggested at the opening session of the Algerian Assembly in February that taxes be raised to generate an additional five billion francs in revenue.⁴ The personal income and value-added taxes were among those to be increased.

There was an immediate outcry of protest when the director of finance made his traditional appearance before

the Algerian Assembly a week later.⁵ Delegates objected to his suggestion that taxes on higher bracket incomes be raised to permit an easing of burdens on lower brackets. Farmers were already complaining of low prices, high costs, lack of credit, and insufficient markets. Indeed, the Algerian economy as a whole was showing signs of weakness, and many delegates had promised to remedy these conditions in their campaigns for reelection. Only the one Communist delegate, René Justrabo, and Raymond Blanc, the Socialist, spoke openly in favor of the taxes.

If the tax proposals failed, the investment budget would have to be trimmed, and this would offend many of the Arab and Berber delegates who had not expressed disapproval of the tax increase. Therefore, the president of the assembly, Abderrahmane Farès, decided to request more help from Paris, even though the Governor General's renewed efforts had been to no avail.⁶ Farès apparently succeeded where Léonard had failed by bringing home a loan of an additional three billion francs.⁷ To the general public he may have seemed to have achieved the impossible, but what he had actually obtained was a treasury advance for four years at 5 per cent interest. This he hoped to be able to convert into a 25-year loan at one and a half per cent.⁸ The funds were earmarked for the capital budget, but it was understood that Algeria would reduce its tax contribution

to the capital budget by a similar amount and use the liberated funds to balance its operations budget.

From that point budgetmaking went downhill. The increases in the income and value-added taxes suggested by the governor were quietly dropped. The Finance Commission held fast against all amendments proposing higher expenditures, but even without the Commission's support, the farm interests rammed through a 600-million-franc amendment to increase the availability of agricultural credit. Other amendments, together with small tax reductions in favor of the farmers, brought the deficit to 3.1 billion francs even with the loan Farès had negotiated.⁹ Many of the same delegates who had been vigorous in their objections to new taxes had jumped on the amendment bandwagon and contributed to the problem of budget balancing.

The Finance Commission proposed a two-barrel solution: increases in the stamp, gas, and alcohol taxes to raise 1.6 billions; and a reduction in the capital budget by a uniform 3 per cent in every chapter to offset the overall effect of the amendments adopted by the assembly.¹⁰ The assembly accepted the commission's suggestions and approved the budget as a whole.

Unlike the 1935 case, initial approval of the budget by the Financial Delegations was virtually the end of the story. After an earthquake struck Algeria in October, the

assembly met and approved budgetary revision to permit relief and reconstruction without additional taxation. By November, when it was customary to reassess the entire budget to allow for changing price levels or unexpected and unpredictable expenditures, it was too late to make major alterations in either expenditures or receipts. Much of the money had already been spent, and the taxes collected. In 1954, in response to an outburst of violence, which proved to be the beginning of revolution, the administration had to ask for an additional 1.5 billion francs to reinforce the country's police protection, but it managed to find the money without resorting to higher taxes.¹¹ Money said to be left over in the capital budget was temporarily transferred to cover the added security expenditures.

Although the increasing dependence of Algeria on French money for its program of economic and social development endowed the metropolitan authorities with opportunities to influence the course of decisionmaking that were at least as great as they had been before 1940, when Parliamentary approval for Algerian taxes had been required by law, neither the Parliament nor the Ministry of the Interior took an active part in this budgetmaking process. The Finance Ministry did exert significant influence on the outcome, but its concerns in 1954 remained largely financial rather than political, and parliamentary action had only indirect

impact. Most of the metropolitan assistance took the form of long-term loans through the Fonds d'investissements pour le développement économique et social (FIDES), whose subsidies were buried deep in the budget of the Ministry of the Interior.

If the government as a whole or the Parliament had decided to take an interest in the Algerian budget, the minister of the interior should theoretically have taken the lead in defending or modifying it. But the responsibilities of his Economic and Financial bureau, where three members of the staff of seven in the Directorate of Algeria worked, were so complex that it could not have afforded to study the Algerian budget in depth.¹²

The Algerian director of financial services always consulted the Ministry of the Interior as well as the planning and development agencies about the budget. But the deepest discussions and the most important work took place at the Ministry of Finance.¹³ The level of metropolitan aid to Algeria for a given year was usually worked out between the Algerian director of financial services and the director of the French budget.

The Algerian budget reached ministerial consideration only when an issue arose that was clearly political, as it did in 1954. The three-man Algerian delegation headed by Abderrahmane Farès talked with a long list of politicians and functionaries. But Farès attributed much of the delegation's success to Roger Goetze, director of the French budget.

Thus, the undeniable influence of metropolitan France appears to have been technically rather than politically inspired. Although this influence might have been transmitted to the French cabinet and brought to bear on the governor general, it was actually exercised in direct negotiations between the director of the French budget and the Algerian director of financial services. Formally, metropolitan influence took the form of pressure on the governor general, but in reality the line of influence often circumvented his office.

One might expect that the growing pressure of metropolitan France on issues of Algerian finance combined with the ever-present pressure from the Algerian Assembly on the governor general would have enhanced his position as an autonomous actor in the budgetmaking process. Without his help the French government could not persuade the Algerian Assembly to vote the higher taxes the Finance Ministry was demanding for Algeria. Without his intervention, the assembly could not ward off arbitrary metropolitan decisions that might conceivably overturn their budgetary expectations. Roger Léonard was by all appearances in the key seat.

But Léonard squandered his potential influence by a series of maladroit actions that belied his comfort in a political role. He left the negotiations with the Finance Ministry and with the Algerian Assembly in Tixier's lap and cast doubts on his own intentions by saying that France

could "do no more" than it was proposing to do and then, when confronted by the assembly's opposition to new taxes, by going back to France in hopes that it would do more. The coup de grace for his prestige was the success in Paris of Abderrahmane Farès. From Léonard's statement on returning to Algiers, one may guess that he had paved the way for the Farès delegation. It is nonetheless a fact that Farès came back to Algeria with something in his pocket, after Léonard had come home empty-handed.

The governor general maintained no control over relations between the French ministries and Algeria. When pressure was exerted from above, it passed from the Finance Ministry directly to the Algerian director of financial services. Léonard himself never seems to have been entirely persuaded by those pressures. He did not paint himself into a position of no possible retreat from which he might have bargained effectively with the Algerian Assembly. And when pressure was also exerted from below, he caved in. He attempted to renegotiate his bargain with Paris and failed. Then he relinquished center stage to the president of the assembly, who proved a more capable intermediary.

The alternative means of access to the French purse strengthened the Algerian Assembly, which otherwise would have had to choose five billion francs in new taxes, a five billion franc reduction in its development budget, or some

combination of the two. The president of the assembly offered a direct appeal for assistance as another option, which they accepted. But a decision that is itself exemplary of an institution's autonomous power does not necessarily reflect the long-term capacity of the institution to exercise that power. The assembly's solution to the taxes-or-no-development problem involved another, equally serious issue: the incompatibility of metropolitan assistance with Algeria's financial independence.

For one group of Arab and Berber delegates this was scarcely a dilemma. Abderrahmane Farès and a number of his assimilationist colleagues contended that Algeria deserved as much consideration as other départements of France. On the other hand, nationalist delegates and representatives of the European Left unhesitatingly favored higher taxes (if those taxes were progressive) to promote development and preserve Algerian autonomy. The Communist delegate, René Justrabo, was the only member of the assembly to say unequivocally in the wake of the governor's speech: "The taxes must be voted."¹⁴ The UDMA and MTLD delegates sought to inject additional funds into the development budget, even at the risk of higher taxes.

The delegates caught in the full force of the subsidy-or-autonomy dilemma were the conservative Europeans who abhorred the thought of higher taxes and shared the

colonial prejudice against Paris-based decisionmaking. They were quick with the clichés about high taxes—taxpayer was portrayed as "completely out of breath,"¹⁵ or "like a llama, one more straw. . ."¹⁶—and yet only a few of them were willing to see development sacrificed in the name of autonomy.

Nevertheless, a majority of the 1954 assembly was content to jeopardize its long-term decisionmaking autonomy for the promise of short-term gain. For Muslims the development issue was overriding; for the Europeans, the number one priority was to avoid higher taxation. Additional metropolitan assistance was the solution for all. One cannot dismiss the possibility that some Europeans also took comfort in the closer relationship with metropolitan France at a time when the underlying menace was believed to be nationalism.

The augmented role of metropolitan France was thus as much a product of local desires as of Parisian will. By the free exercise of this discretion, the assembly chose to trade future autonomy for increased financial aid. In the 1930's, faced with a similar choice between money and autonomy, the settlers had always preferred autonomy. However, this distinction between budgetmaking in two time periods should not obscure the basic similarity in patterns of decisionmaking. Although Algeria enjoyed "financial autonomy" in the 1930's, the French Parliament possessed powers of review

that, if utilized to their fullest, could have curbed Algerian independence. In 1954 the formal structure had been decentralized to correspond with pre-1940 practice, but the increasing financial dependence of Algeria on France tended to counteract the effects of this legislation. In both cases, Parisian authorities held powers they were unable or unwilling to use.

This discrepancy between the real and hypothetical powers of the central authorities in budgetary affairs of the region resulted from the normal operation of a unitary system in times when there was no significant partisan tension between center and periphery. In both instances, regional representatives capitalized on close political rapport with the French government to establish lines of communication and influence that paralleled the administrative hierarchy. All in all, despite the impact of World War II on Algeria, the growing importance of nationalism, the resulting sense of insecurity among Europeans and their growing willingness to depend on French money for economic and social development, the distribution of influence between France and Algeria over questions of Algerian finance changed very little in the twenty years before revolution began.

A Muslim Majority?

In making the 1954 budget, the Algerian Assembly tried for and succeeded in getting better terms than either

the governor or his subordinates could offer, but it is difficult to determine which persons or groups within the assembly wielded this power of choice. The body was not organized along party lines. Apoliticism, a tradition of the Financial Delegations, had returned in force, and only the Socialists showed discipline in their voting behavior.¹⁷ Furthermore, few Assembly votes were recorded, only seven in its session of February and March 1954.¹⁸ However, since those votes did concern the budget, much of the following discussion will be based on the outcome of the seven roll-calls. In addition, although the budget as a whole was approved by acclamation, a number of delegates announced ahead of time that they would vote against it. One cannot afford to neglect even such tiny bits of information.

The seven roll-calls divide easily into three Guttman scales, one of three roll-calls, the other two with a pair of roll-calls each.¹⁹ Table 8-1 shows the content of each scale together with the percentage of voting delegates who supported the Finance Commission (government) position on each.²⁰ All 98 delegates who voted in two or more of the roll-calls were placed on at least one of the three scales.

Two clusters of delegates—The European Left and the Muslim nationalists on one side, and the conservative European groups on the other—complained that the administration exercised overbearing influence on the assembly. And

TABLE 8-1
SCALING OF BUDGET VOTES

No.	Subjects of Roll-Calls	Percentage for Government
<u>SCALE ONE</u>		
1	De Sérigny's proposition (blocking total of expenditures)	64*
2	Baretaud's motion (abjuring new taxes)	78*
3	Munck's amendment (600 million francs for agricultural loans)	34
<u>SCALE TWO</u>		
4	Article 11 of ways and means bill (raising tax on alcoholic beverages)	76
5	Article 12 of ways and means bill (increasing tax on gasoline)	52
<u>SCALE THREE</u>		
6	Justrabo's amendment to article 21 (increasing basic exemption)	71
7	Justrabo's amendment to article 21, line 2 (raising high bracket tax rates)	86

*The difference in positive percentages between De Sérigny's and Baretaud's proposals on Scale One reflect a larger number of absences for the voting on Baretaud's. Only one delegate shifted his vote between the two roll-calls. Thus the two votes will be treated as one.

the comments of three administrators lend a certain credibility to their complaints. Roger Goetze, the director of financial services from 1942 to 1949, said that he always enjoyed good relations with the Financial Assembly because "they always did just what I wanted."²¹ Claude Tixier, successor to Goetze, said he expected to make concessions to the Finance Commission and always planned to have a few additional resources at his disposal for this purpose. But he aimed to have his way on the crucial points.²² Governor General Léonard also believed that the administration could get what it wanted if it persisted. Friends like Abderrahmane Farès were very helpful, he said. To be sure, the governor's budget was always "overloaded" with amendments. "If I asked for fifteen [million francs, for instance], I would get eighteen," he recalled. The assembly had its share of fevers and demogogy. But then it would come time to find a balance between receipts and expenditures, and the assembly would come back to the governor's propositions, only slightly reworked, according to Léonard.²³

The results of 1954 budgetmaking substantiate this view of the administration's effectiveness. After all their early objections to higher taxes, the delegates raised taxes on alcoholic beverages and gasoline to produce 1.6 billion francs in additional revenue; only the proposed increases in income and value-added taxes were definitively scuttled.

On the expenditure side, the assembly inflated selected chapters of the governor's investment budget by a total 1.34 billion francs. Then at the moment of truth the Finance Commission resorted to its old practice of cutting the capital budget across the board: the reduction was three per cent in all chapters, or 1.04 billions. The net effect of assembly action on the investment budget was an increase of about 300 millions, or less than one per cent. On the operations budget, the net result of assembly deliberations was a reduction of 462 million francs, or slightly more than one half a per cent. While the governor had suffered a moral setback in his efforts to hit higher incomes and to raise the value-added tax, his score for the budget as a whole was rather high.

Analysis of the seven roll-calls suggests that this success was due to a majority composed of a few European and most Arab and Berber delegates. The index in Table 8-2 represents roughly the number of times a delegate voted against the Finance Commission. A maximum score of dissent would be seven.²⁴ An announcement of intent to vote against the budget as a whole was also worth a unit of dissent. Where delegates' positions on more than one scale were uncertain, minimum and maximum dissent scores were calculated and averaged.

The table shows that a majority of the administration's most reliable supporters were Arabs and Berbers.

TABLE 8-2
INDEX OF OPPOSITION TO FINANCE COMMISSION

Index	Number of Delegates		Cumulative Total
	1st College	2nd College	
0	5	.9	14
1/2	0	5	19
1	4	6	29
1-1/2	3	11	43
2	1	3	47
2-1/2	3	2	52
* -----			
3	7	3	62
3-1/2	3	6	71
4	10	1	82
4-1/2	5	4	91
5	3	0	94
5-1/2	<u>4</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>98</u>
TOTALS	48	50	98
Absentees**	12	9	119
Pres. Farès	0	1	120

* Dotted line divides assembly approximately in half, into one group that tended to favor the Finance Commission position and another that tended to oppose. The line will be the basis for subsequent distinctions between "government" and "opposition" delegates.

** Delegates who voted on no more than one of seven roll-calls are classified as absentees.

Nearly 70 per cent of the governor's most faithful support was Muslim. The only Arabs and Berbers who voted at least three times in the opposition and who stood outside the governor's majority were six members of the UDMA, four members of the MFLD, and three delegates who appear to have been closer in attitude to the European than to the nationalist opposition.

One explanation for this phenomenon is the administration's effectiveness in influencing second-college elections, which had become notorious by 1954. Although it may be true that neither Haegelen nor Leonard sought specific electoral outcomes, as they stoutly maintain, the electoral fortunes of the nationalist parties, which had seemed brilliant in the fall of 1947, underwent reversal in the first elections to the Algerian Assembly in 1948 and never recovered. Out of those elections and those renewing the assembly in 1951 and 1954 came strange stories of nationalist candidates arrested just before the balloting and enormous turnouts in villages where storms had prevented many persons from voting.²⁵ The administration surely influenced electoral results in a number of more subtle ways, too. In metropolitan France, a cooperative prefect is said to be worth several

thousand votes to a party or coalition. His control of billboards, election meetings, security forces and his capacity to encourage turnout are not negligible factors.²⁶ In Algeria, sub-prefects and administrators of communes mixtes enjoyed similar advantages.

Whether or not they were elected by the administration, a number of Arab and Berber delegates probably believed that they were defending the best interests of their constituencies by supporting the government. In 1954, a number of the settlers wished to reduce the program of capital spending that many Muslims regarded as essential. The administration wanted the program maintained. If moderate Arabs and Berbers had backed nationalist propositions for more rapid development, the European forces of opposition would have been solidified and the administration's position undercut. As it was, a majority of European delegates opposed the administration-backed Finance Commission on four of seven roll-calls, and on a fifth, European delegates who voted were evenly divided. Yet the Commission prevailed in four of the five cases, thanks to a solid majority among the second-college delegates.

The defeat of Alain de Sérigny's proposition is one example. De Sérigny, conservative editor of the Echo d'Alger, wished to foreclose any possibility that taxes would be raised by having the assembly decide how large would be its

receipts before it voted on any proposed expenditures. (See Table 8-3.) The Finance Commission recommended defeat of the proposal, but first-college delegates voted 23 to 13 in its favor. The Commission, reflecting the views of the administration, prevailed only because 23 moderate Arab and Berber delegates voted against De Sérigny. A similar proposal sponsored by Henri Baretaud was likewise defeated by Muslim votes.

TABLE 8-3
STRENGTHS OF VOTING GROUPS IN ASSEMBLY

Groups	Delegates	Percentage of College	Percentage of Assembly
<u>FIRST COLLEGE (European)</u>			
Conservative	27	56.3	27.6
Government	16	33.3	16.3
Left (Soc.-Comm.)	<u>5</u>	<u>10.4</u>	<u>5.1</u>
TOTALS	48	100.0	49.0
<u>SECOND COLLEGE (Muslim)</u>			
Conservative	3	6.0	3.1
Government	36	72.0	36.8
UDMA	7	14.0	7.1
MTLD	<u>4</u>	<u>8.0</u>	<u>4.1</u>
TOTALS	50	100.0	51.1

Source: Table 8-2.

Yet the efforts of Abderrahmane Farès to resolve the tax dilemma clearly indicate that the Muslim majority did not fit the ideal "beni-oui-oui" type. Farès must have sensed either that there was mutiny in the Muslim element of the majority or that the European resistance extended even to the administration's most trusted allies in the first college. In that case, the assembly's leadership would have been forced to depend on what was regarded as the opposition, the European Left and the nationalists, for passage of its tax measures. While such a maneuver would, in theory, have been possible, it would undoubtedly have embarrassed the administration. Dependence on the Left and the nationalists would have given the conservative European deputies and senators an excuse to intervene with the minister of the interior. The Algerian majority would have been incongruent with that of Premier Joseph Laniel, and the central authorities would have had an incentive to replace the governor general with a man still less acceptable to Muslims. Hence, Farès gently shoved the administration proposal to one side and set out for France in search of the needed funds. His mission was as a reflection of majority power over, or independence from, the administration, and should be seen as an effort to save that majority from splitting over the taxation issue.

But whether the moderate Muslims who made up the largest coherent bloc of votes in the assembly were

legitimately representative of their second-college constituencies is a separate question. It is possible that the nationalist parties were the legitimate representatives of majority opinion among Muslims. Moreover, it is fact that the governing coalition did not represent a majority of European voters. Only a third of the European delegates were to be counted among the reliable supporters of the administration. An examination of minority influence over budgetary decisions is thus more important, in some respects, than analysis of majority effectiveness.

There was not, of course, any single, united opposition to administration policy. Even such labels as "the European Left," "the nationalists," and the "European Right" obscure important differences, so fragmented was the minority. Because it represented an opposition of extremes against the center, there was no prospect that it might be transformed into a majority.

However, not all of the oppositions were equally excluded from the governing coalition. The Communist and nationalist delegates were avowed opponents of the colonial regime. The four Socialist delegates also stand apart. On the right, it is much more difficult to draw a line, largely because most European delegates were elected without party label. Thus it was possible for individual delegates to move into and out of the majority, though a number of conservative Europeans preferred to stay outside.

It would be reasonable to expect from such a system of group relations within a legislature that the leftist minority, purposefully isolated from a majority role, would offer the more systematic, unconstructive opposition, while the minority on the right, as potential participants in the majority, would be a "loyal" opposition. However, the inverse of the proposition is more accurate. Whatever irresponsible opposition there was came from the European Right and the lone Communist delegate. The nationalist delegates of the second-college, to the contrary, supported the administration when to have opposed it would have lent strength to rightist designs. Not even the Communist Justrabo, much less the Socialists, can be taxed with systematic opposition.

The most intransigent, obstreperous and inflexible opposition to 1954 budget decisions came from conservative Europeans who represented the départements of Algiers and Constantine. Voting patterns show that the conservative Europeans split into four overlapping groups within the minority: those whose chief interest was to keep taxes from going up, even if development or agriculture had to be sacrificed; those who wished to see taxes reduced for the benefit of low income families, even if development or agriculture had to be sacrificed; those who believed the interests of agriculture superseded even the need to keep

taxes down (Gratien Faure and Pierre Vignau were the members of this group who belonged to neither of the first two); and, finally, those who shared the basic antipathy of the European opposition to new taxes but accepted the Finance Commission's judgment that new revenues were needed. The most intransigent Europeans, Jacques de Calan and Eugène Segond, did not let inconsistency of attitudes deter their opposition to the administration and voted with three of these four groups within the dissident minority.

Such a lack of solidarity would have been unthinkable for the European members of the Financial Delegations, for they would have opened themselves to influence by the Arab and Kabyle sections, which might have cast the deciding votes. But in 1954 even unity would not have changed the outcome of the voting on any specific issue. The Europeans did in fact achieve solidarity on one issue. Except for the Socialists and the Communist, they all opposed increases in the income and value-added taxes and blocked administration attempts to raise these levies. But, while this victory cannot be minimized, it was won because the governor general let himself be intimidated and because the industrious Abderrahmane Farès found a loophole through which the administration could jettison its proposal without too much loss of face. Whether the Europeans could have achieved the same result in a showdown vote of the assembly is difficult to say.

The European farmers also won significant concessions. They wrote an additional 100 million francs into the operations budget and 600 millions into the investment budget, despite opposition from the Finance Commission. Furthermore, the basic tax exemption for farmers was increased at a cost of 450 millions.

The configuration of the majority necessitated such concessions. Because the government could not or would not depend on nationalist support, it needed to hold at least a few conservative European votes. It needed to bid for the votes of moderate conservatives like Maurice Raoux, Gratien Laure, Louis Amat, René Borderès and Charles Brincat, all friends of agriculture whose voting records put them at the boundary of a minimum winning coalition. Such concessions probably prevented other Europeans from joining De Calan, Maretand and Segond in voting against the final version of the budget, since such a large proportion of the European opposition was sensitive to rural concerns.

Quite clearly, however, the domination of the majority had passed from European to Muslim hands. The breakdown of old-style apoliticism, the continued presence of some European representatives of the Left in the assembly, the amalgamation of the three Financial Delegations into a single legislature, and the Statute of 1947 had contributed to this change in power relations within the assembly and between

the assembly and the Government General. But these factors are not a sufficient explanation. In the light of the interwar experience, one would have expected the conservative Europeans to win over enough "beni-oui-oui" votes to reconstitute any strength lost to the European Left and to form a majority the administration would have been hard pressed to control.

Rens points out that the first session of the Algerian Assembly contained such a majority, conspicuously European, held together by opposition to the nationalists.²⁷ But the administration had already begun to intervene in the electoral process. The nationalist threat was small within the assembly from the start, and it diminished still further after the elections of 1951. The antinationalist motive for solidarity lost intensity, and the governing coalition gradually came apart. In response, the administration fashioned a minimal winning coalition from those delegates to whom it had always been closest, the Muslims and liberal Europeans. As a result, it achieved a control over the assembly that it had never had in the Financial Delegations. The political ineptitude of Roger Léonard prevented him from exercising personal power over the assembly but did not alter the basic dependence of the assembly on the administration.

Both Léonard and Naegelen before him wished to push ahead with development in order to keep Algeria in the French

sphere. They subdued the political machinery in their pursuit of this goal, and thus subverted the Algerian Assembly, rendering it representative of only the administration viewpoint. Instead of serving as an arena for conflict and bringing Muslims and Europeans face to face to resolve their differences, the assembly's artificial majority suppressed conflict and pushed it outside, where it would eventually be resolved by force.

The resulting calm lulled metropolitan France into a false belief that all was well. Neither Naegelen nor Léonard could attract the attention of harried French officials, precisely because Algeria was quiet while Morocco, Tunisia, and Indochina were not. The governors fashioned their own isolation from Algerian opinion on one hand and from France on the other. Their self-charted path eroded the legitimacy of Algerian institutions in the eyes of both the Arab-Berber and the European populations.

One result was increased fragmentation of both the Muslim and European political elites. The UDMA and the MTLD were undermined in their efforts to carry on the struggle within existing institutions. Furthermore, a majority of Europeans also began to doubt that the system would protect their interests. A minority became more systematic in its opposition to the administration than either the nationalists or the European Left. As Jacques Soustelle and Robert Lacoste

were soon to discover, it was increasingly difficult to lead such a fragmented policy in any direction whatsoever.

CHAPTER 9

THE NEXUS OF AUTONOMY AND INFORMALITY

Although colonial Algeria was often considered an integral part of France, it exercised substantial political autonomy as a result of a permissive legal structure, a favorable environment, and an informal system of power relations. Shrewd European notables utilized carefully collected IOU's to prevent successive ministers from taking an active part in Algerian affairs and from backing reform-minded, innovative governor generals. Without direction from Paris, or even support, governors could choose between humiliating dismissal and compromise with the local notables, who ultimately controlled the reaction of the central authorities. Most governors chose to curry the favor of European notables and acquiesce in a system of virtual self-government for the colony.

The de facto slippage of power from Paris to Algiers occasioned informality in decisionmaking. Within the smaller arena, French multipartism seemed irrelevant to the principal issues dividing the settlers from native Algerians. The structure of the Financial Delegation, formally entrusted with supervision of the budget, tended to discourage al-

liances across the ethnic frontier and to leave Muslims isolated in the face of settler unity. Even after 1947, when political parties had demonstrated their effectiveness in mobilizing the Muslim masses, French governor generals "saved" Algeria from partisan politics by promoting the election of independent Muslim candidates. Together with a group of European moderates, these men of the administration's making dominated the assembly and minimized the impact of the nationalist parties. Autonomy detached Algeria from the partisan political struggle in France, separating Muslims from possible allies and reducing the utility of their own efforts at political organization.

Moreover, administrators acquired great power in Algeria as a result of the inability or unwillingness of central authorities to govern the colony. Although forced to share power before World War II with the settler-dominated Delegations, administrators held important prerogatives in educational, security and budgetary policy. After the war, increased Algerian dependence on French money further magnified the importance of the regional administration. In many matters, only the administration could step into the breach between de jure authority, which lay unused in France, and de facto power, which rested illegitimately with the settlers. Only the administration could add the stamp of legitimacy to settler decisions. The bureaucracy in Algiers swelled into a monster, as a result, and the governor gen-

eral and his advisers came to resemble a prime minister and his cabinet, if not a king and his court. But the governor ^{was} neither king nor prime minister. Unlike the French cabinet, the governor and his advisers were not political representatives of a sovereign legislative body. The governor owed his job to Parliament, but tenure did not depend on the survival of a majority or a government. Few governors were even politicians. Algeria lived under administrative rather than Parliamentary government as a consequence of the de facto autonomy accorded the regional authorities.

It is true that Muslims always preferred bureaucratic to political decisions. They would take a chance even on an unsympathetic governor rather than confront a settler majority in the Financial Delegations. However, their modest successes with the bureaucracy barely justified the preference. Without firm direction from Paris, administrators needed to please the settlers, if they wished to keep their positions. Furthermore, settler politicians shared an ethnic identity, cultural background, and family ties with the bureaucrats; Europeans could be assured of a hearing no matter how strident their complaints, whereas Muslims risked failure for demanding too little, for demanding too much, and for not demanding whatever they were demanding in a

proper, European way. To say that Muslims received better treatment by the bureaucracy than by the settler-dominated assemblies is to say little. It is more important to note that informality, whether of the legislative or bureaucratic variety, hurt native Algerians by taking from them the weapon of the disadvantaged: political organization.¹

Thus the case studies appear to confirm the three propositions advanced at the beginning of this book: that a region may achieve autonomy within a unitary system under conditions of low partisan tension between center and periphery; that autonomy, by reducing the size of the constituency in which decisions are taken, tends to produce relaxation of these rules, exemplified by "apolitical" approaches to politics and administrative encroachment on the legislative domain, works to the detriment of disadvantaged groups. And yet, although most of the evidence conforms to these propositions, not all of it fits equally well and not all the hypotheses have been equally well tested in all of their aspects. Everywhere there are bumps and cracks and holes and rough spots around the areas where the fit between model and evidence is relatively smooth.

Autonomy

The ability of regional notables to accept or reject the mediation of the governor general enabled them to exercise more influence in Algerian politics than either

the law of 1900 granting financial autonomy or the Algerian Statute of 1947 seemed to guarantee. Their power of choice represented a key element in the political process by which structural and environmental possibilities were transformed into effective political autonomy. It enabled them to exploit their economic and social predominance within Algeria and to prevent Arabs and Berbers from capitalizing on their numerical advantages. The losers were metropolitan France, which was generally too preoccupied with its own problems to care, and the Muslim Algerians, who were perpetually underrepresented at the regional level and who depended on metropolitan protection from the settlers.

In general the Algerian legislature possessed this capacity to choose. By rejecting suggestions of the Finance Ministry and the governor, the Financial Delegations forced arbitration of the budget in Parliament in 1934. By contesting Governor Viollette's right to make policy for Algeria, they virtually obliged the Algerian deputies and senators to seek his recall. By rejecting Governor Leonard's tax proposals in 1954, the Algerian Assembly showed confidence that a better agreement could be negotiated with a different intermediary. In those areas where neither the governor nor the central government imposed directives, as in the cases of educational policy between 1920 and 1930 (with the exception of the Viollette years) and between 1948 and 1954, the legislature elaborated what little policy

was made. Occasionally individuals attempted to upstage the assemblies and establish autonomous positions for themselves. For example, in 1954 Abderrahmane Fares returned from Paris with more financial assistance than the governor general had obtained. But the outstanding instance of individual influence was Emile Morinaud's performance in the security crisis of 1934. As mayor of Constantine, general councillor and deputy, he possessed the credentials to move along either the normal administrative path, using the governor general as an intermediary, or the alternative route through Parliament. Morinaud personally opted to outflank the governor in an appeal to the metropolitan ministries. This strategy altered the course of decisionmaking.

One might be tempted to dismiss Morinaud as an unusual personality of unusual influence. In the light of Grémion's findings about French local politics, however, it is perhaps more reasonable to associate his success with his position as deputy-mayor. Grémion's reputational studies of French départements found that deputy-mayors of large cities were often mentioned as rivaling the prefect in importance.² I submit that this may be a result of the deputy-mayor's freedom to choose between the arbitration of the prefect and direct negotiations with Paris.

Most Algerian members of Parliament do not seem to have played important roles in regional decisionmaking. Even in the security crisis of 1934-35, most of them took

a wait-and-see attitude. They helped shape the outcome of the 1935 budget, because Parliament had formal powers of review; but in 1954, when Parliament no longer enjoyed those powers, they were uninvolved. Nor was educational policy of any concern to them. Although several were general councillors, and thus local notables, they were not the notables with whom the governor general had to deal regularly. They did not have the freedom to choose how decisions would be made.

Individually Algerian legislators were in an analogous position. Although many of them traveled frequently to Paris, they lacked the solid metropolitan footings that would have enabled them to become individual mediators. Members of the Financial Delegations and of the Algerian Assembly were legally unable to sit in Parliament. They needed the help of the parliamentary delegation if they wished to bypass the governor general, and that route was slow and costly. Members of the Algerian legislature were not necessarily close friends of their representatives in Parliament. Deputies and senators were reluctant to expend their influence to obtain the recall of a governor general who was not absolutely unacceptable to them, especially since his successor might have other policy preferences distasteful to the settlers. Consequently, the Algerian legislators were obliged to move collectively.

However, the regional legislature would not have

disposed of this critical freedom to disregard the governor general without the protection of the Algerian delegation in Parliament. On every issue besides the budget, the central government might have reversed the Financial Delegations on the ground that the budget alone was a matter of local discretion. The idea of autonomy required constant defense. Moreover, because the risk of suppression increased with the level of partisan tension between Paris and Algiers, the local notables needed help in fending off or taming unfriendly governments. Finally, they needed assurance that a governor general who did not accept the guidance of the Algerian legislature would be disciplined, not supported, by his Parisian superior.

The defense of autonomy proved less difficult in fact than it was in theory. Although the local exercise of political power in a unitary system lacked any sanction in the law, this fact was seldom thrown up to the settlers, probably because such a comment would have applied to local politics north as well as south of the Mediterranean. In every département of France there were questions that could be settled by the elected representatives of the département in consultation with the local prefecture. If these special, local issues were broader in Algeria than elsewhere, the settlers said it was because Algeria was enormous and because it contained millions of Arab and Berber inhabitants. They argued that these characteristics rendered it unlike

other départements. Only those familiar with its special flavor, therefore, had a legitimate role in deciding even the broadest questions, such as native policy and economic development. The opinions of metropolitan deputies were welcomed, as long as they coincided with those of the European Algerians. Dissenters were scorned and harassed.

The fact that the French government tolerated these attitudes can be explained partly by indifference, but the Algerian salesmanship deserves credit, and so does the plausibility of their case. The similarity between French politics at the departmental level and Algerian politics at the regional level was taken for granted. As defenders of their districts, French deputies influenced the retention or dismissal of prefects; they played strong roles in local as well as national politics and used one position to bolster the other. Peculiar as the pattern of Algerian politics may have been, it was understandable in the light of French experience. The Algerian deputies had only to argue that local "administrative" autonomy could legitimately be broader in Algeria than in France, not that something should exist in Algeria for which there was no precedent in France.

The defense against hostile governments also proved somewhat less difficult in fact than in theory. The settlers feared hostility from the Popular Front government headed by Leon Blum in 1936, but the dreaded outcome, passage of the Blum-Viollette proposal on Muslim citizenship, never materi-

alized. Among the six cases examined here, only two provide examples of a French government imposing its will on Algeria despite settler opposition. Both examples, the decision on school construction in 1944 and the reaction to the security crisis of 1945, involved the government of General de Gaulle. In 1944 and 1945 the Resistance and Left groups backing De Gaulle were openly hostile to most European notables in Algeria. Even after the Financial Delegations had been replaced by the Financial Assembly, elected by the General Councils, the regional majority was clearly more conservative than De Gaulle's. The three most disciplined French parties, the Communists, the Socialist and the MRP, monopolized power, but even these parties eventually showed a willingness to follow the inclinations of their Algerian supporters in questions of Algerian policy. A cabinet that wished to govern Algeria from Paris to effect partisan ideals or to improve its partisan position was the exception rather than the rule.

Nonetheless, the settlers may have helped make it the exception. Perhaps Algerian voters were largely responsible, since they repeatedly returned deputies and senators from the center of the political spectrum. Algeria elected more Radicals than members of any other political group, although it moved to the right or left with the French nation as a whole. Europeans of Algeria voted for parties that supported French governments, and the men they elected did in fact vote with virtually every government to hold

power between 1920 and 1954.

Indeed, the relative unity of the Algerian delegation and its rather extraordinary fidelity to government after government makes one wonder whether these were not consequences of strategy as well as of the ballot box, at least in the interwar period. A contemporary observer called the Algerians "ministerialists,"³ and detailed examination of their voting records bears him out. For example, a majority^{of} Algerian deputies supported every ministry at its inception, between 1932 and 1936, and left the ranks of government troops on only three confidence votes in a sample of 39--all three of them votes that toppled governments.⁴ The settlers did not prove a perfect bellwether for the movement of the majority, sticking with Albert Sarraut on November 23, 1933, and with Pierre-Etienne Flandin, March 15, 1935, in their moments of defeat. But these failures to join the winning side would appear to have been neither miscalculation nor genuine partisanship in French politics. A senator from the Aude, Sarraut had been minister of the colonies from 1920 until 1924 and again in 1932 and 1933. Moreover, he had written a book on colonial policy. Flandin was a former resident general of Tunisia who had spent four years of his childhood in Algeria; he had seen Algeria through the difficult times of late 1934 and 1935 without bending even slightly to Muslim demands for reform. It is comprehensible that the settlers should have demonstrated

special loyalty to these men, even at the risk of falling temporarily out of step with the majority. Otherwise, their record of running with the majority, whether it was led by Edward Herriot or Pierre Laval, suggests that ministerialism may have been an Algerian strategy. Extensive but as yet incomplete analysis of the rest of the interwar period lends further substance to the speculation. Algerian deputies behaved as if it were important that they work from within a governing majority.

Whether strategic or accidental, adherence to the majority of the day helped the settler deputies defend Algeria against overzealous administrators. The ultimate deterrent to independent action by a governor general such as Viollette or Châtaigneau, was recall to Paris. But recall required government recommendation and parliamentary approval. It is difficult to see how the settlers could have acted effectively against either Viollette or Châtaigneau from the banks of the opposition.

On a short-term basis the defense against administrators could be successful only with the help of the minister of the interior, charged with supervising Algerian affairs. The actions of the minister influenced the course of decision in the security crisis of 1934, the budget-making decision of that year, and in the security crisis of 1945. In other matters he affected outcomes by his inaction. It was as important to European Algeria that the

minister do nothing on issues where the governor general was "right" as it was that he rectify a "mistake" in the governor's behavior. Membership in the majority coalition gave Algerians privileged access to the minister's office and made it difficult for him to uphold a governor general whom they opposed.

The Algerian defense against hostile administrators faltered only in the case of the Finance Ministry, which remained beyond the reach of Algerian deputies in 1934 and again in 1954. Finance Ministry decisions on the 1934 budget withstood settler objections. Because the minister of finance was not responsible for Algeria and no section of his ministry devoted itself exclusively to Algerian affairs, he did not have to deal with the Algerian deputies on a regular basis. Furthermore, the Finance Commission of the Chamber was less weighted with Algerian deputies than the Commission of the Interior, Algeria and the Colonies. The governor general pleaded the Algerian case, but the minister of finance, invoking technical budgetary considerations, could and did insist on his point of view. In 1954 the Algerian deputies were even less successful in bringing pressure to bear on Finance. Parliament no longer had the right to examine the Algerian budget in even its prewar, cursory fashion. There was no longer an opportunity to berate the Finance Ministry's "irresponsible" and "arbitrary" actions. Thus when Abderrahmane Farès, president of the Algerian Assembly, decided that the terms worked

out between the governor general and the Finance Ministry had to be renegotiated, he was obliged to construct an ad hoc line of influence to carry his appeal. He himself went to Paris to reach the isolated Finance Ministry.

The difference between Finance Ministry coldness to the Algerian advances and Interior Ministry warmth was the difference between central decision making based on national considerations and regional decision making endorsed by central authorities. Under conditions of low partisan tension, the minister of the interior needed the support of Algerian deputies as much as they needed his. Concessions to the settlers cost him little in terms of metropolitan support, whereas the Finance Ministry could give ground to one region only by taking it from another. Since the governor general took his instructions from the minister of the interior, he found himself subject to the weight of settler opinion, exerted from above and below. Rather than a representative of the national will, the governor of Algeria became a partner of the Algerian legislature in the exercise of regional autonomy.

I argued at the outset that a reversal of this autonomy would occur under two sorts of conditions, both reflective of partisan tensions: when a party or coalition of parties in power at the national level lacks majority status at the regional level, or when a single, highly disciplined party dominates both levels of government, and its national leaders alienate local notables by dictating local and

national policies. The evidence from the case studies supports one part of the hypothesis. For example, the gradual decentralization of decisionmaking in the security crisis of 1945 went hand in hand with lessening political tensions between Paris and Algiers. But even the increasing domination of politics by the three highly disciplined parties did not offset this trend. Quite to the contrary, these parties showed a growing willingness to follow the inclinations of their Algerian supporters in questions of Algerian policies, and to hasten, as a result, the return to a more decentralized pattern of decision. One must thus either reject party discipline as a cause of centralized, administrative government in a unitary system or at least suggest that party competition offsets the effect of discipline. Perhaps party discipline would be sufficient to maintain tension between center and periphery if a single party dominated the system at both levels. Since there is no example of such a situation in Algeria, however, the difference in party strengths between levels of government must be regarded as the crucial variable.

Informality

Informal contacts between settler deputies and the Ministry of the Interior helped to preserve Algerian autonomy, and autonomy promoted the development of even greater informality in the form of apoliticism and administrative

decisionmaking. As predicted, these patterns diminished the influence of Arabs and Berbers, who lacked the resources to compete with Europeans in the politics of consensus, negotiation and pressure. What is more, the deemphasis on partisan politics and majority decision reduced the influence of the least advantaged among the Europeans.

In prewar Algeria Arabs and Berbers had held a significant minority of the seats in the Financial Delegations. Had they voted as a bloc, as they usually did, and had the Europeans been as divided among themselves as were deputies in the French Chamber, Muslims should have been frequent partners in winning coalitions. But the European delegates shut them out by declaring that the business of the Delegations was apolitical. They papered over their own political differences to achieve unity and defeat the Muslim minority on a regular basis.

A bit of this apoliticism was built into the Financial Delegations. Each of the four sections--colon, non-colon, Arab, and Kabyle--deliberated separately, on the theory that each represented a different sort of taxpayer. In fact, the landed interests were represented in the non-colon and native delegations as well as in the colon.⁵ Rather than serving as protection for any but farmer-taxpayers, the scheme merely facilitated European efforts to reconcile their own positions before confronting the Arabs and Berbers. Hence the 30 per cent share of the

seats held by Muslims was worth much less.

More than a feature of structure, apoliticism was so successful a strategy for preserving European domination in Algeria that it became an empirical description of reality. The European Algerians reasoned that they would be defeated and driven out of Algeria if they permitted themselves to be divided in the face of the Arab and Berber majority. United, they could prevent Arabs and Berbers from joining a winning coalition and from increasing their minority position in elected assemblies.

The strategy was most effective in the realm of security policy, which was the nubbin of it all as far as the settlers were concerned. Muslim influence probably never fell lower than in the security crisis of 1934-1935. At first Morinaud seemed to split with his friends and colleagues, demanding a more radical solution than they thought advisable. But Interior Minister Régnier found common denominator on which everyone--he claimed even Muslims--could agree: the authority of the governor general should be augmented. This was an apolitical solution as far as the settlers were concerned, but it was, of course, political defeat for the Arab and Berber dissidents who had pinned their hopes on reform.

In the security crisis of 1945 the initial Communist reaction, which condemned the nationalists as well as "fascist plotters," showed that the apolitical approach to security was not dead, even though the war had rent terrible gaps in

European unity. Those splits began to reappear by the end of the summer of 1945, much to the distress of conservative Europeans, who believed the Socialists and the Communists were traitors to the cause of French Algeria, because they had broken ranks on native policy. For the moment, the moral standing of the conservatives was so low in the eyes of the Left, and the Left's position so traitorous in the eyes of the Right, that apoliticism was impossible. The amnesty bill was passed in that fleeting moment. But in the legislative elections of the fall of 1946 multiparty tickets in defense of French sovereignty were victorious in Algeria. Apoliticism had been revived.

A united front was maintained more easily in the field of educational policy. Between 1920 and 1930 Arab and Berber influence was minimal, because the Europeans could not be divided on such questions. Thanks to the bureaucracy, and especially to Maurice Viollette, they were able to protect their small share of school construction funds. But they got nowhere with requests that Arabic be taught more widely and that private schools be looked upon with official favor.

After World War II the Muslims met with little more success, although Arabs and Berbers held half the seats in the Algerian Assembly. They had had as small a part as the settlers in the elaboration of the school construction

plan of 1944, which was the work of De Gaulle and his staff. After 1948 they still were unable to promote the cause of Arabic or gain subsidies for private schools. Apoliticism again prevailed, but apoliticism of a sort that now included moderate, independent Muslim delegates as well as non-leftist Europeans. The attitude was no longer anti-Muslim; it was more precisely anti-nationalist, anti-separatist. And since the separatists (the nationalists and the Left) were the most vocal partisans of educational reform, apoliticism helped frustrate those efforts.

If one excepts the 1945 security debacle, which occurred in a climate of high tensions within the European community, apoliticism failed as a strategy in only one domain: the budget. Perhaps the Europeans could not convince even themselves that taxes were not politics, for they allowed themselves to be split on the issue in 1934 and again in 1954. As one would expect, Arabs and Berbers were most influential in that area.

In 1934 the defeat of the sugar tax at the fall session of the Financial Delegations was a partial victory, later nullified, and led to no others. Had the Europeans been attentive, they would surely never have permitted it. But it was a victory nevertheless, and one of the few for Muslims in the interwar period.

In 1954 apoliticism again collapsed, this time because of European opposition to any new taxes. The Muslim portion

of the governing coalition was probably opposed to new taxes, too, but Muslims put maintenance of the development program highest on their scale of values. They were willing to vote some new taxes if necessary. In the ensuing melée, the Europeans were so divided among themselves that even the nationalist UDMA was at one point able to cast the deciding votes. The Muslim majority and the nationalists together helped defeat the most extreme proposals of the European conservatives.

These breakdowns in European solidarity—one of them fleeting, the other longer-lasting—call attention to the shifting distribution of benefits among categories of the European population. In 1934 the urban, commercially oriented members of the non-colon delegation had broken ranks to join Muslims in opposition to the head tax; to rejoin their European colleagues and prevent Muslims from achieving further victories, they had to agree to an increase in the tax on sugar, which they had also opposed in separate session. Apoliticism served the colon delegation and its allies among the non-colons, many of whom were also owners of agricultural land, as a tool of persuasion against more liberal, urban-based members of the non-colon body, especially those representing the département of Oran.

The conflict between a majority of the Europeans and Governor Maurice Viollette seven years earlier had revealed

the existence of such a cleavage. The conflict reached crisis proportions in June 1927, over administration proposals to build an ammunition factory in Algeria and to increase Algeria's contribution to the French military budget. On a pair of crucial votes, which sent against Viollette 35-30 and 34-30, all Arabs and Kabyles voted for the governor. They were joined in the minority by seven non-colon and three colon delegates. Six of the seven non-colons and one of the three colons came from the département of Oran.⁶

The majority against Viollette might be seen as a union of those delegates and regions who benefited from the malapportionment of seats in the Financial Delegations. All colon constitutencies had a stake in the system, since they held half the European seats with only a fifth of the electorate.⁷ Moreover, the département of Oran received no bonuses in recognition of its larger European population. Thus underrepresented from two points of view, the non-colons from Oran should naturally have been the most favorable toward reform. They suffered less than Muslims from the de facto promotion of the Financial Delegations from consultative assembly to legislative body, but they suffered all the same.

Apoliticism did not die with the Financial Delegations. In fact, the tenuous alliance between progressive settlers and non-nationalist Muslims, evident in the budgetary discussion of 1954, depended on a new variant of apoliticism, fostered this time by the administration rather

than settler representatives. The administration had begun using every means at its disposal to persuade Muslims to eschew the genuinely Muslim political movements and to support instead a course of non-partisan economic and social development within the boundaries established by the Statute of 1947. By coopting Arabs and Berbers into the majority, the administration hoped to avoid any real concession to the partisans of change;⁸ the reactionary settlers, who wished nothing more than a return to the old-style, apolitical alliance against Muslims; the European Left, which had been seeking either complete integration or meaningful autonomy; and the nationalists, who were increasingly bent on independence. The new apoliticism, like the old, served the status quo.

The new style of apoliticism also resembled the pre-war variety in its dependence on Algerian autonomy. It is inconceivable that the electoral manipulation on which the new majority depended could have been accomplished north of the Mediterranean, or even that the French administration in France would have dreamed of such massive intervention. It is difficult to imagine an administration so opposed to the nationalist parties in a context other than the Algerian, where it had been considered vital to keep the "native question" out of politics. The old apoliticism fostered a mentality conducive to the new. But the new apoliticism must also be understood in the long-standing Algerian tra-

dition of collaboration between politicians and administrators.

This collaboration assumed special importance in Algeria as a result of the stark, unrealistic distinction between the political responsibilities of the administration and the financial powers of the Algerian Assemblies. Formally nothing prevented all-out war and stalemate, since the assemblies could not remove the governor general or eliminate jobs in the Government General and since the governor general could not dissolve the assemblies. Nothing prevented the governor from pursuing administrative policies offensive to the settlers in areas such as native policy, where he was formally the sole source of legislation (by delegation from the president of the Republic and the minister of the interior), and nothing stood in the way of an all-out assault by the assemblies on any program the administration proposed: no new expenditures could be undertaken without the consent of the assemblies. In theory, the central government might have intervened as arbiter, bolstering the administration and overturning the judgements of the assemblies, but in reality it seldom intervened in Algerian affairs, as the case studies have shown. Hence the extraordinary need for informal links between politicians and administrators in Algeria.

A single example illustrates the power of these informal relations. I originally expected that the cleavage

between politicians and administrators might be significant for an understanding of Algerian politics. As an initial test of the hypothesis, I began searching for evidence of mutual hostility in decisionmaking on the 1955 budget. The results vitiated the hypothesis. Far from attacking one another, politicians fought first in Algeria and then in France to protect the colonial supplements paid Algerian functionaries from the salary deductions the French government had imposed on all of its employees--at a cost to the Algerian budget of some 12 million francs. And the bureaucrats obligingly listened to the perennial railing of the assembly against administrative excesses. The governor general told the Financial Delegations: "I am the enemy of inflated and complex organisms, which have all too often given cause to quite justified criticism."⁹ He even suggested the elimination of two members of the Conseil du Gouvernement, a body of administrative official whose duties were mainly formal but also included adjudication of land disputes. The two positions the governor proposed to eliminate were from a pool of seven councillor-reporters, who prepared reports for the council on such disputes. They had long enjoyed the distrust of the settlers for their reputed favoritism of Muslim interests.¹⁰ Thus the Finance Commission of the Financial Delegations not only accepted the governor's proposal but urged him to eliminate yet a third councillor-reporter. The administration was as eager to please the

delegates as the delegates, especially the non-colons, were anxious to protect the special privileges of Algerian functionaries ("We all defend them here; we are here for that."¹¹)

As one would expect, such transactions often occurred at the expense of Muslims. After the initiation of a school construction program in the 1920's, school officials directed more money toward European than toward native primary schools, although an identical amount of money was programmed for each. Governor Maurice Viollette was appalled to find that both the Delegations and his own director of agriculture opposed his efforts to encourage improvement in farming methods of small farmers, European and Muslim.¹² In the security crisis of 1934 the upshot of negotiations between Government General, central administration and Financial Delegations was that no Muslims were included in the mobile guard. In 1954, the informal contact between the administration and the finance commission of the Algerian Assembly deprived nationalists of the influence they might otherwise have had on fellow Muslims during floor debate.

Virtually no Arabs and Berbers had penetrated the higher levels of the Government General of Algeria by 1954.¹³ Before World War II there were none above the level of native assistant to mayors in communes de plein exercice and to administrators of communes mixtes. The settlers, particularly those of French stock, dominated the administration, which numbered 26,000 in 1934. Two-thirds of these persons were

classified as cadres métropolitains, as opposed to cadres coloniaux, but even many of the cadres métropolitains, who manned the postal service, the gendarmerie, the French system of justice, European schools, and half the posts in financial services, became permanent residents of Algeria. All the native affairs personnel and about 90 per cent of the central and prefectural administrative corps were cadres coloniaux. Settler politicians had friends and relatives everywhere within the administration.

For all of that, Arabs and Berbers invariably preferred settler bureaucrats to settler politicians. Some administrators earned Muslim respect for their impartiality. Others obviously thought all Muslims should approach on bended knee. How else can one explain Régnier's objection to the tone and manner of some of those Arabs and Berbers he encountered on his trip to Algeria in 1935 and his contention that others, presumably those who had been less frank, had concurred in his observation that French authority needed to be restored? The administration's differential attitude toward Mohamed Bendjelloul and Ferhat Abbas further substantiates this tendency to accept or reject for reasons of style rather than substance. Racism in an infinite variety of forms and degrees doubtless improved European chances for a fair hearing before the administration and diminished those of Muslims, even if the Weberian ethic made bureaucrats more responsive than settler politicians to Muslim

demands.

The informality of Algerian politics tended to brake political adaptation to the economic and social changes that were transforming the inert Muslim majority into an active political force. It rewarded those who already enjoyed high status within the system--the wine growers, the functionaries, the citizens of French stock, and settlers in general--rather than farmers, shopkeepers, recent immigrants, and Arabs and Berbers. It minimized the effectiveness of political organization and, as a consequence, reduced the impact of numbers, at least in the short run.

The Link

This political immobility at the regional level would have been less decisive had the central government possessed a desire to innovate and the power to impose its vision of the future. However, as a result of the informal pattern of relations by which settler notables told Paris what it should tell Algiers, this avenue toward change proved a cul de sac. Thus the argument seems to have come full circle: informality in the ties between Paris and Algiers protected regional autonomy, which permitted the operation of an informal pattern of regional politics injurious to Muslims. Actually, the system must be seen as a single integrated, settler response to the challenge of governing Algeria from a minority position. If the "apolitical" settler front had collapsed in the Financial Delegations and the Muslims had

been drawn into the majority, disaffected settlers would probably have sought to govern the colony through Paris, reducing the autonomous subsystem they had helped create. If, on the other hand metropolitan France had suddenly seized the initiative and, in an unusual burst of interest, assumed close direction of affairs in the colony, the utility to the settlers of their dominance of the Financial Delegations and even of their informal contacts within the administration would have diminished. Autonomy and informality were but two dimensions of political response to problems of minority rule within a subunit of a unitary system.

This interdependence of the two dimensions makes it reasonable to speak of them as a system--or a subsystem of the French system--capable of enormous resistance to change from the inside. The system blunted the force of nationalist agitation and metropolitan liberalism by coopting both and providing neither with significant influence. The most enduring political changes to occur in Algeria between 1920 and 1954 followed a temporary dismantling of the system from the outside, by the Germans in France and by De Gaulle in Algiers. Yet it reappeared, and by 1954 its inertia seemed as great as it had been in the 1930's. It should not be surprising that Arabs and Berbers felt obliged to go outside the system to achieve independence.

Of course, a measure of autonomy for Algeria probably

prevented the settlers from taking their independence from France fifty or sixty years earlier and maintaining it under conditions that would probably have been even less favorable to Arabs and Berbers. But that fact only reinforces the contention that autonomy, whatever its other virtues, is an instrument for those with a stake in the preservation of the status quo.¹⁵ By 1954 it was cutting both ways, against the reactionary settlers unhappy with the rapidity of postwar reform and against the nationalists who deplored the slowness of change. An understanding of this inertia may help to explain the violence of the ensuing conflict.

APPENDIX A

GOVERNOR GENERALS OF ALGERIA, 1920-1954

- Jean-Baptiste Abel 1919-1921
- Théodore Steeg 1921-1924
An eminent Radical senator, former minister and future president of the Council.
- Maurice Viollette 1925-1927
A social democrat who earned himself the hatred of European Algerian by championing modest reform proposals on behalf of Muslims.
- Pierre Bordes 1927-1930
A functionary whose long experience in Algeria made him a welcome, reliable replacement for Viollette in the eyes of the settlers.
- Jules Carde 1930-1935
A career functionary, born in Algeria, with experience elsewhere in French Africa, who identified himself with settler interests.
- Georges Le Beau 1935-1940
- Admiral Abrial 1940-1941
- Maxime Weygand 1941
- Ives-Charles Châtel 1941-1943
- Marcel Peyrouton 1943
- Georges Catroux 1943-1944
An experienced North African hand who moved with firmness against nationalist initiatives while at the same time initiating a Gaullist program of reforms.
- Ives Châtaigneau 1944-1948
A Socialist diplomat appointed by De Gaulle to pursue a program of Muslim reforms. Like Viollette, he became unpopular with the settlers.

Marcel-Edmond Naegelen 1948-1951

A former minister of education who, as an Alsatian socialist, favored reform and opposed separatism. When the aims proved incompatible, his hostility to the nationalist movement overrode his desire for reform.

Roger Léonard 1951-1954

A former prefect of police in Paris who was identified with the Radical party. He lacked political finesse to match administrative skills.

APPENDIX B

FRENCH PREMIERS, 1920-1954

ELECTIONS--November 16, 1919--Victory of the Bloc National.

Alexandre Millerand, non-inscrit (January 20--February 18, 1920) (February 18--September 23, 1920)

Georges Leygues, Républicain de Gauche (September 25, 1920--January 12, 1921)

Aristide Briand, Républicain Socialiste (January 16, 1921--January 12, 1922)

Raymond Poincaré, Union Républicaine (January 15, 1922--March 26, 1924) (March 29--June 1, 1924)

ELECTIONS--May 11, 1924--Victory of the Cartel des Gauches.

François-Marsal, Union Républicaine (June 9--13, 1924)

Edouard Herriot, Radical Socialiste (June 15, 1924--April 10, 1925)

Paul Painlevé, Républicain Socialiste (April 17--October 27, 1925) (October 29--November 22, 1925)

Aristide Briand, Républicain Socialiste (November 28, 1925--March 6, 1926) (March 9--June 15, 1926) (June 24--July 17, 1926)

Edouard Herriot, Radical Socialiste (July 20-21, 1926)

Raymond Poincaré, Union Républicaine (July 23, 1926--November 6, 1928) (November 11, 1928--July 27, 1929)

ELECTIONS--April 22-29, 1928--Approval for Poincaré.

Aristide Briand, Républicain Socialiste (July 29--October 22, 1929)

André Tardieu, Républicain de Gauche (November 2, 1929--
February 17, 1930)

Camille Chautemps, Radical Socialiste (February 21--
February 25, 1930)

André Tardieu, Républicain de Gauche (March 2--December
4, 1930)

Théodore Steeg, Gauche Démocratique (December 13, 1930--
January 22, 1931)

Pierre Laval, non-inscrit (January 27--June 13, 1931)
(June 13, 1931--January 12, 1932) (January 14--
February 16, 1932)

André Tardieu, Républicain de Gauche (February 20--
May 10, 1932)

ELECTIONS--May 1-8, 1932--Success for the Left.

Edouard Herriot, Radical Socialiste (June 3--December 14,
1932)

Paul-Bancour, non-inscrit (December 18, 1932--January 28,
1933)

Edouard Daladier, Radical Socialiste (January 31--October
24, 1933)

Albert Sarraut, Gauche Démocratique (October 26--
November 23, 1933)

Camille Chautemps, Radical Socialiste (November 26, 1933
--January 27, 1934)

Edouard Daladier, Radical Socialiste (January 30--
February 7, 1934)

Gaston Doumergue, former president of Republic
(February 9--November 8, 1934)

P. -E. Flandin, Républicain de Gauche (November 8, 1934
--May 31, 1935)

Fernand Bouisson, non-inscrit (June 1--June 4, 1935)

Pierre Laval, non-inscrit (June 7, 1935--January 22,
1936)

Albert Sarraut, Gauche Démocratique (January 24--June 4, 1936)

ELECTIONS--April 26, May 3, 1936--Victory of the Front Populaire

Léon Blum, SFIO (June 4, 1936--June 22, 1937)

Camille Chautemps, Gauche Démocratique (June 22, 1937--January 13, 1938) (January 17--March 10, 1938)

Léon Blum, SFIO (March 17--April 8, 1938)

Edouard Daladier, Radical Socialiste (April 10, 1938--March 20, 1940)

Paul Reynaud (March 21--May 10, 1940) (May 10--May 18, 1940) (May 18--June 5, 1940)

Philippe Pétain (June 16--July 12, 1940)

VICHY STATE

Charles de Gaulle (September 10, 1944--November 13, 1945)
(November 21, 1945--January 20, 1946)

ELECTIONS--October 21, 1945--First Constituent Assembly.

Félix Gouin, SFIO (January 26--June 12, 1946)

ELECTIONS--June 2, 1946--Second Constituent Assembly.

Georges Bidault, MRP (June 23--November 28, 1946)

ELECTIONS--November 10, 1946--First Legislature, Fourth Republic.

Léon Blum, SFIO (December 16, 1946--January 16, 1947)

Paul Ramadier, SFIO (January 22--May 9, 1947)
(May 9--October 22, 1947)
(October 22--November 19, 1947)

Robert Schuman, MRP (November 24, 1947--July 19, 1948)

Henri Queuille, Radical (September 18, 1948--October 6, 1949)

Georges Bidault, MRP (October 28, 1949--February 7, 1950) (February 7--June 24, 1950)

Henri Queuille, Radical (July 2--July 4, 1950)

René Pleven, UDSR (July 12, 1950--February 28, 1951)

Henri Queuille, Radical (March 10--July 10, 1951)

ELECTIONS--June 17, 1951--Second Legislature, Fourth Republic.

René Pleven, UDSR (August 10, 1951--January 7, 1952)

Edgar Faure, Radical (January 20--February 29, 1952)

Antoine Pinay, Républicain Indépendent (March 8--December 23, 1952)

René Mayer, Radical (January 8--May 21, 1953)

Joseph Laniel, Conservateur (June 27, 1953--June 12, 1954)

Pierre Mendes-France, Radical (June 19--September 3, 1954) (September 3, 1954--January 20, 1955) (January 20--February 5, 1955)

GLOSSARY

Algerian Assembly Legislative body established by the Algerian Statute of 1947 to replace the Financial Assembly. Delegates elected in two colleges, citizen and non-citizen.

AML Amis du Manifeste et de la Liberté. Party bringing together followers of Fernat Abbas and Messali Hadj in 1944 and early 1945.

Arabs Arabic-speaking peoples and their representatives in the Financial Delegations.

beni-oui-oui Colloquial expression for Muslims who supported French government.

Berbers Indigenous people of North Africa, identified in this study as Algerians speaking Berber languages.

bureaux arabes Military offices for handling Arab and Berber affairs, originally established by Marshal Bugeaud.

caid (qa'id) Originally a tribal leader; under the French, a local administrative official.

commune de plein exercice Unit of local government organized according to French law. Governed by elected council and mayor.

commune mixte Subdivision of Algerian territory where the population was overwhelmingly Muslim. Governed by administrator with consultative council.

colons European landholders in Algeria; by extension, their elected representatives in the Financial Delegations. Sometimes used (but not in this study) to refer to all Europeans in Algeria.

département Subdivision of French government.

fellah Farmer.

- Financial Assembly** Legislative body established in September, 1945, to replace the Financial Delegations. Elected by members of the three departmental councils. Replaced by the Algerian Assembly under the Statute of 1947.
- Financial Delegations** Legislative body created in 1898 and composed of colon, non-colon and native delegations. Abolished in 1945.
- Higher Council** Legislative body composed largely of government officials; played a minor role in adoption of Algerian budgets between 1900 and 1945.
- Higher primary school** (Ecole primaire supérieure) Technically oriented school accepting elementary school graduates not bound for lycées.
- Kabyles** Inhabitants of the mountainous regions east of Algiers known as Greater and Lesser Kabylia. By extension, all Berber-speaking peoples of Algeria and their representatives in the Financial Delegations.
- Law of 1900** French law granting financial autonomy to Algeria.
- lycée French high school.
- marabout (murabit) Sainly religious figure prominent in rural areas.
- médersa (madrassa) School of higher Islamic education before the French conquest. Later, French-established schools for the training of Muslim jurists, interpreters and religious personnel.
- mouderrès (mudarris) Teacher in a medersa.
- MRP** Mouvement Républicain Populaire French political party created in 1945.
- MTLD** Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques Party organized by Messali Hadj in 1946 from the remnants of his PPA.
- non-colons Algerian settlers who were not agricultural landholders; by extension, their representatives in the Financial Delegations.

PPA Parti Populaire Algérien Party organized by Messali Hadj after 1937 and driven underground by the Vichy regime.

rattachements A system of administration used in the 1880s, giving French ministers direct control over Algerian affairs and reducing the governor general's role to one of coordination.

Statute of 1947 French law superseding the Law of 1900, which created the Algerian Assembly and modified the conditions of Algerian autonomy.

tolbas (tu'ulabaa) Teachers in Quranic schools
(sing. talib).

UDMA Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien Party
organized by Ferhat Abbas in the spring of 1946.

Ulama Religious scholars; learned men (sing. alim).

zaouia (zawiya) Center of religious instruction and place of worship headed by marabout.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter 1

¹For a discussion of the failure of these efforts, see René-Eugene Passeron, Les grandes sociétés et la colonisation (Alger: Faculté du Droit, 1925).

²Samir Amin, L'économie du Maghreb, Vol. I, La colonisation et la décolonisation (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1966), p. 27.

³Louis Chevalier, Le problème démographique nord-africain (Paris: Presses universitaires, 1947), p. 29.

⁴Amin, op. cit., p. 22.

⁵Chevalier, op. cit., pp. 30ff.

⁶Amin, op.cit., pp. 118, 145.

⁷See Chapter 3.

⁸Amin, op. cit., pp. 155-156.

⁹For a discussion of this fact and the reasons for it see Jean Despoit, L'Afrique blanche française, Vol. I, L'Afrique du Nord (Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1949), Part IV, Chaps. 4 and 5.

¹⁰See André Nouschi, Enquête sur le niveau de vie des populations rurales constantinoises (Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1961), p. 743. His conclusion concerns the département of Constantine before 1914, but there is little reason to think the condition of Muslims improved radically in the first decades of the century.

¹¹Amin, op. cit., p. 155.

¹²Charles-Robert Agéron, "Le mouvement 'Jeune algérien' de 1900 à 1923," in Etudes maghrébines: mélanges Charles-André Julien (Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1964), pp. 217- 243; Augustin Berque, "La bourgeoisie algérienne ou à la recherche de César Birotteau," Hesperis 35 (1948), pp. 1-29.

¹³Carnet mondain, annuaire de tout Alger, 1937-38.

¹⁴Thomas Landon Thorson, Biopolitics (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), p. 204; Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale, 1968), p. 429.

¹⁵For a definition of a unitary system, see Charles Debbasch, Droit administratif (Paris: Cujas, 1971), p. 95. In fairness, it should be said that most writers on French administrative law recognize that a unitary system may be more or less centralized. Duverger speaks of centralized and decentralized aspects of the same system (e.g. prefects and mayors), in Les institutions françaises (Paris: Presses

universitaires, 1962), but he concludes: "French administration, taken as a whole, argues that federalism is merely an extreme form of decentralization." The point is that all such analysis is of formal structures rather than of power distribution.

¹⁶In the work cited above, Duverger treats "political institutions," "administrative institutions," and "financial institutions" in three separate sections. Local government falls under the administrative heading. See also Pierre Avril, Le gouvernement de la France (Paris: Editions Universitaires, 1969), p. 126.

¹⁷Each département elected three deputies and one senator until 1936, when Algiers acquired a fourth deputy. Postwar representation will be discussed later.

¹⁸Octave Dupond reported that the total number of French citizens in 1926-30 was 197,339. Of these, 93,106 could vote in the election of the Financial Delegations, 74,025 for the non-colon delegation. and 19,081 for the colon delegation. See Dupond, Les Délégations financières algériennes (Paris: Editions Godde, 1930), pp. 23,113.

¹⁹Originally, the creation of a separate Kabyle delegation reflected a French belief that the Berber-speaking peoples of Algeria were hostile to Arabic-speakers and that French policy should exploit this hostility. However, it

is impossible to make absolute distinctions between Arabism and Berberism or even between indigenous Jewish and Muslim cultures. See Pierre Bourdieu, The Algerians, trans. Alan C.M. Ross (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958), p. 94. The distinction between Arab and Berber, although it will be consistently used here, is in reality a distinction between two types of Berbers: those who have been highly Arabized and Islamicized in the last millennium, and those who, isolated in mountainous terrain or desert oases, have been less affected by the Arab conquest. A government study commissioned in 1910 and published in 1913 estimated the number of Berber-speaking persons at 1,305,730 in a total population of 4,447,149, or about 30 per cent. See Charles Robert Agéron, Les algériens musulmans et la France, 1871-1919 (Paris: Presses universitaires 1968), II, 882.

²⁰The total Muslim electorate for the Financial Delegations included about 100,000 persons after 1919--90,000 in the communes de plein exercice (with 22 per cent of the Muslim population), and 10,000 for the communes mixtes (with 78 per cent of all Muslims). Agéron, op. cit., II, 1220.

²¹In a preface to a book by Hervé Bourges, L'Algérie a l'épreuve du pouvoir, 1962-1967 (Paris: Grasset, 1967), Jacques Berque has written: "Contrary to widespread opinion, Algeria had a sort of internal autonomy after 1900. For the

benefit of the colons." Among other writers, Ferhat Abbas has been one of the few to emphasize this fact, in his Guerre et revolution d'Algerie, Vol. I, La nuit coloniale (Paris: Julliard, 1962), although historians of the pre-1920 period, especially those concerned with the crisis of 1898, have recently reached similar conclusions. See Agéron, op. cit., and other references listed in Chapter 2.

²²Among those who detected movement toward autonomy was Jacques Lambert, Cours de legislation algérienne, tunisienne et marocaine, Vol. I. (Alger: Ferraris, 1949), p. 62; L. Gray Cowan, in "The New Face of Algeria, I," Political Science Quarterly, 46 (September, 1951), p. 354, was less certain.

²³By 1954 the Algerian delegation in Parliament numbered 32 deputies and 16 senators--half of them from the first college and half from the second. In 1947, registration for the first college included 469,023 Europeans and 63,694 Muslims; the second college consisted of 1,301,072 Muslims. Michael K. Clark, Algeria in Turmoil (New York: Praeger, 1959), p. 46.

²⁴Relevant work has been done on governmental agencies serving more than one level of government and possessing unitary characteristics. See Philip Selznick, TVA and the Grass Roots (New York: Harper and Row, 1966); Bernard H. Baum, Decentralization of Authority in a Bureaucracy

(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1961); and David Bicknell Truman, Administrative Decentralization (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1940). In addition, students of federalism have been highly sensitive to the problem of power distribution. See Morton Grodzins, The American System (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966); William H. Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation and Significance (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964); and Grant McConnell, Private Power and American Democracy (New York: Random House, 1966). Arthur Maass laid the basis for comparison of federal and unitary systems with his "Division of Powers: An Areal Analysis," in Maass, ed., Area and Power: A Theory of Local Government (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 9-26; and Ivo D. Duchacek has taken a similar approach in his Comparative Federalism: The Territorial Dimension of Politics (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970).

²⁵For the empirical evidence on which Grémion bases his conclusions see Pierre Grémion, La mise en place des institutions régionales: l'administration face au changement, 2nd ed. (Paris: CNRS, 1966); Grémion and Jean-Pierre Worms, Les institutions régionales et la société locale (Paris: CNRS, 1968); Grémion, La structuration du pouvoir au niveau départemental (Paris: CNRS, 1969); Worms, Une préfecture comme organisation (Paris: CNRS, 1968); François D'Arcy and Grémion, Les services extérieurs du ministère de l'économie et des finances dans le système de décision

departemental: Rapport de pré-enquête (Paris: CNRS, 1969); Grémion, "Resistance au changement de l'administration territoriale: le cas des institutions régionales," Sociologie du travail, VIII (July-September, 1966), pp. 249-276; Charles Roig, "Théorie et réalité de la décentralisation," Revue française de science politique, XVI (June, 1966), pp. 445-471.

²⁶Pierre Grémion, "Introduction à une étude du système politico-administratif local," Sociologie du travail, 12 (January-March, 1970).

²⁷I have retained one of William H. Riker's propositions about federalism and turned the other around. He has argued (op. cit., p. 129) that a federal system tends to be centralized when a single party dominates both federal and constituent levels of government. I will maintain that such domination tends to produce, or at least permit, decentralization in a unitary system, if the party is not highly disciplined. A high level of discipline in the dominant party or coalition would appear to produce centralization in either a federal or a unitary context, although I found little evidence in the Algerian cases to support this proposition. For other arguments linking party systems with centralization, see Grodzins, op. cit., Chap. 10; and David B. Truman, "Federalism and the Party System," in Arthur W. MacMahon, ed., Federalism Mature and Emergent (New York: Russell and Russell, 1962), pp. 115-136.

²⁸See note 27.

²⁹See V.O. Key, Jr., Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York: Knopf, 1949), Part V; Donald R. Mathews and James W. Prothro, Negroes and the New Southern Politics (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966), Chap. 6.

³⁰See Mathews and Prothro, op. cit., for systematic treatment of the many non-legal deterrents to black voting.

³¹Key, op. cit., Chap. 14.

³²Key, op. cit., p. 307

³³McConnell, op. cit., p. 106.

³⁴Ibid., Chap. 4.

³⁵The case study technique is not new to North African political studies. I. William Zartman introduced it there with his Morocco: Problems of New Power (New York: Atherton, 1964). Edward C. Banfield's Political Influence (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1961), based on six case studies, has also been useful as a model.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER 2

¹Normally the military governors reported to the Ministry of Defense. The experiment with administrative assimilation under the Second Republic, 1848-1952, and Napoleon III's creation in 1858 of a Colonial Ministry, abolished in 1860, were brief and unsuccessful deviations from this practice. For a detailed account of the period, see Charles-André Julien, Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine, Vol. I (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1964).

²Belkacem Saadallah, "The Rise of Algerian Nationalism, 1900-1930," unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1965, offers an interesting interpretation of these early years of French rule in his first chapter, "The Genesis of Algerian Nationalism, 1830-1900."

³See Agéron, Les algériens musulmans, I, 397-414. I have leaned heavily on Agéron's superb study in this chapter.

⁴Ibid., I, 41.

⁵Ibid., I, 46.

⁶Ibid., I, 5.

⁷Speech to the Higher Council, December 14, 1880, Journal officiel de la République française, 1880, p. 12318.

⁸Kenneth Vignes, Le gouverneur général Tirman et le système des rattachements (Paris: Larese, 1958), argues that Tirman was the faithful executor of an unsuccessful administrative arrangement, p. 374.

⁹See Agéron, op. cit., I, Chap. XIII, "L'enquête de la Commission sénatoriale."

¹⁰Paris: Colin, 1892.

¹¹Ferry, op. cit., p. 80.

¹²Ibid., p. 57.

¹³Ibid., pp. 78-79.

¹⁴Agéron, op. cit., I, p. 512.

¹⁵Albert-Paul Lentin, "La crise entre Alger et Paris et la victoire des féodalités économiques (1893-1903)," Cahiers internationaux (November-December, 1960), p. 77.

¹⁶Children born in Algeria of non-French parents were automatically naturalized.

¹⁷Agéron, op. cit., I, 547.

¹⁸Ibid., I, 588-594.

¹⁹Ibid., I, 554-600; Hubert Desvages, "La Chambre de 1898 et la crise algérienne," Revue d'histoire et de civilisation du Maghreb (July, 1968), pp. 90-120; Lentin, op. cit., pp. 75-83.

²⁰Desvages, op. cit., p. 102.

²¹Augustin Bernard, introductory section in Jules Cambon, op. cit., pp. 269-271.

²²Vincent Confer, France and Algeria, The Problem of Civil and Political Reform, 1870-1930 (Syracuse: Syracuse University, 1966), p. 35.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Ibid., pp. 74-77.

²⁵See Henri Brunschwig, French Colonialism, 1871-1914: Myths and Realities, trans. William Glanville Brown (New York: Praeger, 1966), pp. 106-110.

²⁶Ibid., pp. 111-134.

²⁷Brunschwig says two-thirds of the Chamber group sat in the center. Ibid., p. 107.

²⁸See R. A. Winnacker, "Elections in Algeria and the French Colonies under the Third Republic," American Political Science Review (1938), Vol. 32, pp. 261-277.

²⁹See Raymond F. Betts, Assimilation and Association in French Colonial Theory, 1890-1914 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961).

³⁰France, Journal officiel, Chamber, Documents, November 22, 1900, p. 1411.

³¹Confer, op. cit., pp. 19-20; Agéron, op. cit., p. 996.

³²Confer, op. cit., p. 21.

³³See Saadallah, op. cit., Chapter III; Agéron, op. cit., II, Book V.

³⁴Saadallah, op. cit., p. 156.

³⁵See Ali Merad, "L'enseignement politique de Mohamed 'Abduh aux algériens, 1903," Confluent (June-July, 1964), pp. 643-690.

³⁶Charles-Robert Agéron, "Le mouvement 'Jeune algérien' de 1900 à 1923," Etudes maghrébines: mélanges Charles-André Julien (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1964), p. 227.

³⁷Ibid., p. 218.

³⁸Agéron, Les algériens musulmans, II, 1038-1040.

³⁹Speech by Henri Doizy in France, Journal officiel de la République française, Chamber, Debates, 1918, p. 2591.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER 3

¹See Agéron, Les algériens musulmans, I, 534-543; II, 936-948.

²Native schools, all of which were elementary, made some allowances for the language abilities and backgrounds of their pupils. "Good teachers take it upon themselves to adapt their teaching to the region where they work or the village where their school is located," advised the Bulletin de l'enseignement des indigènes de l'académie d'Alger (January-December, 1920), p. 96. European schools followed the French curriculum. Some Muslims attended European schools and some Europeans went to native schools in places where both kinds of schools were not provided.

³Galle Report, "Programme de travaux publics et projet d'un nouvel emprunt, 1920," Assemblées financières algériennes, 1920, Extraordinary Session, p. 45. The plenary session ultimately added a few other "urgent" projects to make the total 2.6 billions and decided to spread the work over 16 years.

⁴Pantaloni Report, A.F.A., 1924, Ordinary Session, pp. 2ff.

⁵A.F.A., 1924, Ordinary Session, Financial Delegations, Non-colons, p. 1093.

⁶Ibid., 1924, Ordinary Session, Financial Delegations, Plenary, pp. 505-550.

⁷See Maurice Viollette, L'Algérie vivra-t-elle? Notes d'un ancien gouverneur général (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1931).

⁸I found no lists of elementary schools included in the 1925-29 program, although such lists were included in later programs, such as those for 1929-30 and 1930-1938. If there was an unpublished list of projects bearing Delegation approval, the governor may have regarded it as tentative. Decisions about where schools were to be built were theoretically the province of the Administrative Council for School Construction, composed entirely of functionaries and technicians. As a result of the incident described here, Viollette authorized the three prefects and the presidents of the colon, non-colon, and native delegations to sit with the Administrative Council and to participate in such decisions—an action that the colon president called "great progress." He said delegates might come to prior agreements among themselves on priorities. See A.F.A., 1926, Ordinary Session, Financial Delegations, Colons, pp. 123-124. By the end of the decade, as I have said, delegates were approving published lists of elementary schools as soon as an over-all program was adopted. The power of deciding which schools should be built had thus slipped from the hands of the administration.

⁹Ibid., 1926, Ordinary Session, Financial Delegations, Plenary, p. 121.

¹⁰Pantaloni Report, ibid., 1927, Ordinary Session, Financial Delegations, Plenary, p. 374; Morard Report on 1928 Budget, ibid., Ordinary Session, pp. 130-31.

¹¹For Emile Morinaud's colorful account of Viollette's recall, see Cahiers du redressement française, No. 16 (1935), quoted in Claude Paillat, Vingt ans qui déchirèrent la France, Vol. 1 (Paris: Robert Lafont, 1969), p. 249.

¹²A.F.A., 1928, Extraordinary Session, Financial Delegations, Plenary, p. 102.

¹³Antonelli Report on Algerian budget for 1930, Journal officiel, Chamber, Documents, 2nd Extraordinary Session, 1929, p. 576.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 577.

¹⁵See the Jaillet Report, A.F.A., Ordinary Session, 1929, Annexes, pp. 165-167; Antonelli Report on 1930 Budget, loc. cit., pp. 583-587.

¹⁶Rector Georges Hardy put his finger on the problem in a memorandum to the governor general dated March 15, 1937. "It is not for me to judge the financial possibilities of Algeria," he wrote. "However, since it has been possible to find hundreds of millions for dams and for port facilities,

I want to believe that this great social and human undertaking that is the complete organization, at last, of public education in Algeria would not be less favored. France, Archives d'Outre mer, Aix-en-Provence, Algeria, Carton 7.S.

¹⁷Jacques Morel, "L'école et la formation des élites en Algérie de 1919 à 1939," essay presented for the maîtrise d'histoire, mimeographed (Aix-en-Provence, 1968), p. 105.

¹⁸France, Archives d'Outre Mer, Aix-en-Provence, Algerie, 40.S.1.

¹⁹See John E. Talbott, The Politics of Educational Reform in France, 1918-1940 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969).

²⁰Marius Moutet raised the educational issue in a discussion of the Algerian budget for 1921, noting that only 45.8 million francs were allocated to education of a total budget of 666 millions, and that less than a fifth of the 45.8 millions were for native education. But the European Algerians fended off his attack. France, Annales de la Chambre des Deputes, Debates, 1920, Extraordinary Session, pp. 652-565.

²¹France, Annales de la Chambre des Députés, Documents, XCVI (Extraordinary Session, 1920), pp. 502-533; CXVIII (Extraordinary Session, 1921), pp. 614-632; C (Extraordinary Session, 1922), pp. 514-532; CII, (Extraordinary

Session, 1923), pp. 520-521; Extraordinary Session, 1924, pp. 403-430; CVII (Extraordinary Session, 1925), pp. 434-451; CIX (Extraordinary Session, 1926), pp. 216-223; CXI (Extraordinary Session, 1927), pp. 424-429.

²²Ibid., XCVIII (Extraordinary Session, 1921), pp. 614-632.

²³Antonelli Report on the Algerian budget of 1930, loc. cit., p. 591. See also report on the Algerian budget of 1929, Journal officiel, Chamber, Documents, 1928, 2nd Extraordinary Session, pp. 303-320; and his report on the budget of 1931-1932, Annales de la Chambre des Députés, Documents, 1931, Ordinary Session, pp. 692-711.

²⁴The term is that of François Goguel, La politique des partis sous la Troisième République (2 vols.; Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1946), Part II, Books 2 and 3.

²⁵See L'Emir Khâled, La situation des musulmans d'Algérie, Conférences faites à Paris les 12 et 19 juillet 1924 (Alger: Victor Spielmann, 1924).

²⁶For a description of Algerian education in 1830, see Agéron, Les algériens musulmans, I, 317-318; Ali Murad, "Regards sur l'enseignement des musulmans en Algérie (1880-1960)," Confluent (Nos. 32, 33, June-July, 1963), p. 597.

²⁷Agéron, ibid., I, 324, note 3. In later years the administration professed ignorance of the number of Quranic schools in Algeria. Ibid., II, 958, note 2.

²⁸France, Journal officiel de la République française, Senate, Debates, 1894, p. 533 (report by Combes).

²⁹Agéron, Les algériens musulmans, II, 960, 962.

³⁰A.F.A., 1920, Extraordinary Session, Financial Delegations, Plenary, pp. 488-489.

³¹Ibid., 1921, Ordinary Session, Financial Delegations, Plenary, pp. 669-684.

³²Ibid., p. 670.

³³Ibid., 1924, Ordinary Session, Financial Delegations, Arab section, p. 26.

³⁴Ibid., 1925, Ordinary Session, Program, p. 42.

This more-Muslim-than-the-Muslims point of view was a weak excuse for inaction; the colonial administration had already taken over the support of official Islam, after depriving religious institutions of the financial resources on which they had depended, to cite only one fundamental example of French infringement of Islamic tradition in Algeria. See Agéron, Les algériens musulmans, I, 293-316; II, 891-922; and Merad, Le réformisme musulman en Algérie de 1925 à 1940 (Paris: Mouton, 1967), pp. 53-75.

³⁵Jacques Berque, Le Maghreb entre les deux guerres (Paris: Editions Seuil, 1962), p. 73.

³⁶In 1929-1930 Muslims were 296 of 4,752 pupils in higher primary schools; 53 of 508 in normal schools; 777 of 10,016 in the lycées and collèges; 97 of 2,013 in higher education. France, Government General of Algeria, Annuaire statistique de l'Algérie, 1930.

³⁷A.F.A., 1927, Ordinary Session, Financial Delegations, Colons, pp. 344-345.

³⁸Even in the 1950's there remained a high correlation between the distribution of the settler population and of Muslim school enrollments. See Robert Malan, "Espoir d'instruction," L'Algérie et sa jeunesse (Alger: Editions du Secrétariat social d'Alger, 1957), pp. 43-94.

³⁹A.F.A., 1929, Extraordinary Session, Financial Delegations, Arab section, pp. 24-25.

⁴⁰A.F.A., 1920, Extraordinary Session, Financial Delegations, Plenary, p. 514.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 515.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER 4

¹This was the impression of Interior Minister Marcel Régnier expressed in a declaration to journalists, March 7, 1934, and reported in La dépêche algérienne, March 8, 1935.

²Merad, Le réformisme musulman, pp. 169-170. The following interpretation of the actual rioting relies heavily on Merad's careful evaluation of source materials.

³Ibid., p. 170.

⁴Figures from 1931 census, cited by Michel Ansky, Les juifs d'Algérie du décret Crémieux à la libération (Paris: Editions du Centre, 1950), p. 46.

⁵Ibid., pp. 50-52, citing Maurice Eisenbeth, Les juifs de l'Afrique du Nord.

⁶For examples of the European point of view, see L'echo d'Alger and La dépêche de Constantine, August 7-15, 1934; also L. Mohendis, "A l'assaut de l'Afrique française du nord," L'Afrique française, XLIV (September, 1934), pp. 537-447. For Arab-Berber viewpoints, see La voix indigène, August 16, 27 and 30, 1934, and La défense, August 10, 1934.

⁷Jean-Jacques Rager, Les musulmans algériens en France et dans les pays islamiques (Algiers: University of Algiers, 1950), p. 62.

⁸Eugène Vallet, Les événements de Constantine 5 août 1934: quelques documents (Alger: Bacconier, n.d.).

⁹Merad, op. cit., pp. 175-177.

¹⁰Desparmet, op. cit.

¹¹E. F. Gautier, "Menaces sur l'Algérie," La revue de Paris, XL (September 1, 1934), pp. 38-56.

¹²Mohendis, "A l'assaut de l'Afrique française du Nord," L'Afrique française, XLIV (September, 1934), p. 522.

¹³La voix indigène, September 27, 1934.

¹⁴France, Département de Constantine, Rapport du préfet et procès verbaux des délibérations du Conseil général de Constantine, session of October 27, 1934. See pages 34, 57, 166, 186, 193ff., 225, 278 and 296.

¹⁵See J. Menaut "Les raisons d'un décret," L'Afrique française, XLIV (November, 1934), pp. 649-653.

¹⁶La défense, May 12, 1934. See also issues of May 25 and 27, 1934; and L. Mohendis, "En Algérie après la réunion de la Commission interministérielle des affaires musulmanes," L'Afrique française, XLIV (June, 1934), pp. 347-350.

- 17 L'echo d'Alger and La dépêche algérienne, February 3, 1935.
- 18 La dépêche algérienne, February 3, 1935.
- 19 L'echo d'Alger, February 3 and 5, 1935.
- 20 La voix indigène, February 19, 1935.
- 21 Ibid., pp. 501-514.
- 22 La dépêche algérienne, March 9, 1935.
- 23 France, Government General of Algeria, Assemblées financières algériennes, 1934, Session, Financial Delegations, Arab section, p. 303.
- 24 Ibid., 1934, Extraordinary Session, Arab section, p. 40.
- 25 Ibid., Kabyle section, meeting of November 14, 1934.
- 26 Ibid., Arab section, p. 40.
- 27 Ibid., Colons, pp. 270-271.
- 28 Carde interview with Le petit journal, reprinted in L'echo d'Alger, February 21, 1935.
- 29 Interview with Le temps, as reported by La dépêche algérienne, March 17, 1935.

³⁰La dépêche algérienne, March 21, 1935.

³¹France, Journal officiel, Senate, Debates, 1935, Ordinary Session, p. 378.

³²Ibid., p. 382.

³³La voix indigène, March 27, 1935.

³⁴Minister's report to the president of the Republic, preceding decree, Journal officiel, Laws and Decrees, 1935, p. 3867, reprinted in L. Mohendis, "A l'assaut de l'Afrique française du Nord," Renseignements coloniaux (April, 1935), p. 23.

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Michel Parès, a deputy from the département of Oran, denounced the trip as useless and dangerous. (La dépêche algérienne, March 4, 1935.) Senator Duroux and Deputies Fiori, Gustavino, and Serda offered excuses why they would not or could not make it. (La dépêche algérienne, March 4 and 11, 1935.)

³⁷Ibid., February 28, 1935.

³⁸La dépêche algérienne, February 15, 1935.

³⁹Ibid., February 16, 1935.

⁴⁰Ibid., February 17, 1935.

⁴¹L'echo d'Alger, February 18, 1935.

⁴²La dépêche algérienne, March 8, 1935. This was true to the extent that the government's capacity to meet Muslim political demands depended on its authority. "Authority is acquired by the equitable application of principles and never imposed by procedures of violence," wrote Zenati in La voix indigène, March 8, 1935.

⁴³La dépêche algérienne, March 18, 1935.

⁴⁴France, Journal officiel, 1935, Ordinary Session, Senate, Debates, p. 376.

⁴⁵Interview with Le petit journal, February 19, 1935, reprinted in L'echo d'Alger and La dépêche algérienne, February 21, 1935.

⁴⁶La dépêche algérienne, February 20, 1935.

⁴⁷See Worms, "Le préfet et ses notables."

⁴⁸A.F.A., 1934, Ordinary Session, Program, 190; Financial Delegations, Plenary, pp. 578-582; Colons, pp. 629-634; Non-colons, pp. 180-186; Arab section, p. 300.

⁴⁹See La dépêche de Constantine, August 14, 1934.

⁵⁰France, Département of Constantine, Conseil général, 1934, October Session, pp. 501-514.

⁵¹La dépêche de Constantine, November 9, 1934.

⁵²L'echo d'Alger, November 15, December 6, 1934;
La dépêche de Constantine, December 14, 1934.

⁵³See La voix indigène, October 13, 1934.

⁵⁴Le républicain, February 20, 1935, quoted in
La dépêche de Constantine, February 23.

⁵⁵L'ecno d'Alger, February 14, 1935.

⁵⁶La dépêche algérienne, February 13, 1935.

⁵⁷February 19, 1935.

⁵⁸February 21 and 23, 1935.

⁵⁹February 19, 1935.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER 5

¹See Jacques Chastenet, Histoire de la Troisième République, Vol. IV, "Déclin de la Troisième, 1931-1938," (Paris: Hachette, 1962), Chapters 4, 5; François Goguel, La politique des partis sous la Troisième République, Vol. II, Book IV, "Les crises de la nouvelle avant-Guerre, 1933-39" (Paris: Seuil, 1946), Chapters 1, 2, and 4.

²France, Government General of Algeria, 1934, Ordinary Session, Assemblées financières algériennes, "Exposé: étude sur les budgets algériens de 1900 à 1934," by Pierre Borderès, pp. 13, 14. See also inserted chart comparing French and Algerian tax structures.

³Ibid., "Rapport au nom de la commission des finances, chargée d'examiner le projet de budget pour l'exercice 1935," Tirage définitif, by Marcel Duclos, p. 138.

⁴Ibid., p. 92.

⁵Jules Carde, speech May 5, 1934, ibid., Financial Delegations, Plenary, p. 284.

⁶Lacking a treasury of its own, Algeria depended on French financial institutions.

⁷"What? The Financial Delegations don't play politics? Who are you trying to fool? Why, politics, that's all they do play." La voix indigène, March 3, 1935.

⁸See La défense, May 21, 1934. For the assimilationist version, see La voix indigène, June 7, 1934, article entitled "Honte!"

⁹France, Journal officiel de la République française, Chamber, Debates, 1934, p. 3426.

¹⁰A.F.A., 1935, Extraordinary Session of February, Financial Delegations, Arab Section, p. 176.

¹¹France, Journal officiel de la République française, 1929, 2nd Extraordinary Session, Chamber, Documents, pp. 570-593.

¹²Ibid., 1934, Chamber, Debates, p. 3423.

¹³Ibid., p. 3416.

¹⁴François Goguel, Histoire des partis sous la Troisième République (Paris: Seuil, 1946), II, 260; Edward Bonnefous, Histoire politique de la Troisième République (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1962), V, 302.

¹⁵France, Chambre des Députés, Notices et Portraits, 1932.

¹⁶L'Echo d'Alger, November 13, 1934.

¹⁷From brief accounts in Algerian press of Carde's daily activities.

¹⁸The avis of the Conseil d'Etat, unlike its decisions, are not published.

¹⁹See France, Journal Officiel, 1934, Senate, Documents, p. 1384; France, Association de l'Administration préfectorale, Annuaire des membres de l'administration préfectorale, 30 mars 1930 (Paris: Charles-Lavazelle, n.d.); Maurice Viollette, L'Algérie, vivra-t-elle? Notes d'un ancien gouverneur général (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1931), p. 273.

²⁰France, Journal officiel, 1938, Senate, Debates, p. 994.

²¹Galle, A.F.A., 1935, Extraordinary Session of February, Plenary, p. 54.

²²See Table 6-3.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER 6

¹Marcel-Edmond Naegelen, Une route plus large que longue (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1965), p. 14.

²Interview with Charles-André Julien, April, 1970.

³General Catroux, Dans la bataille de Méditerranée: Egypte-Levant, Afrique du Nord, 1940-1944 (Paris: Julliard, 1949), p. 432; Yves Maxime Danan, La vie politique à Alger de 1940 à 1944 (Paris: R. Pichon and R. Durand-Auzias, 1963), pp. 17-30.

⁴France, Government General of Algeria, Commission chargée d'établir un programme de réformes—politiques, sociales et économiques—en faveur des musulmans français de l'Algérie (3 vols.; no place or date given), Tome II, Vol. 1, pp. 95-102.

⁵Ibid., II, 2, pp. 787-790.

⁶According to Lucien Paye, who was Capitant's chef de cabinet for two months in 1944. Interview, May 21, 1970. Paye was director of Muslim reforms in Algeria from 1945 to 1948.

⁷France, Government General of Algeria, Documents algériens: synthèse de l'activité algérienne, October 30, 1945—December 31, 1946. Political Series, pp. 45-46.

⁸France, Commissariat Général au Plan, Commission du Plan d'Équipement scolaire (Le Gorgeu Commission), Rapport général concernant l'Algérie (Alger: Imprimerie officielle, 1955), p. 15.

⁹Abbas created the Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien (UDMA) on emerging from prison in the spring of 1946. Messali returned to Algeria in the fall to organize his Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques (MTLD).

¹⁰See Jacques Soustelle, Aimée et souffrante Algérie (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1956), Chapter III.

¹¹For this sort of argument in capsulized form, see Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), pp. 263-266.

¹²France, Government General of Algeria, Journal officiel de l'Algérie, Débats de l'Assemblée algérienne, tables prepared by administration, February 16, 1954, p. 31.

¹³Interview, April 15, 1970.

¹⁴See L. Gray Cowan, "The New Face of Algeria, I and II," Political Science Quarterly, LXVI (September, December, 1951), pp. 340-365, 507-531.

¹⁵Le Tourneau, op. cit., pp. 339-340.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 342.

¹⁷France, Government General of Algeria, Commission chargée, II, 1, p. 119.

¹⁸Ibid., II, 1, pp. 122-132.

¹⁹France, Government General of Algeria, Journal officiel de l'Algérie, Part I, 1944, p. 759.

²⁰From El-Chihab, February, 1930, quoted in Merad, op. cit., p. 342. The author cites reformist records (p. 338) but says precise statistics are lacking.

²¹Lucien Paye, unpublished manuscript, p. 370.

²²Robert Malan, "Espoir d'instruction," L'Algérie et sa jeunesse, Secrétariat social d'Alger (Alger: Secrétariat social d'Alger, 1957), p. 88.

²³Michael K. Clark, Algeria in Turmoil (New York: Praeger, 1959), p. 46.

²⁴France, Government General of Algeria, Journal officiel de l'Algérie, Débats de l'Assemblée algérienne, March 23, 1950, pp. 431 ff.

²⁵Ibid., March 20, 1951, p. 237.

²⁶Ibid., March 29, 1951, p. 423.

²⁷Ibid., March 23, 1953.

²⁸Ibid., March 24, 1954.

²⁹Ibid., March 26, 1954, p. 301.

³⁰Naegelen, op. cit., p. 116.

³¹Malan, op. cit., p. 91.

³²For a good discussion of these French-Muslim lycées, see Ali Murad, "Regards sur l'enseignement des musulmans en Algérie (1880-1960)," Confluent, Nos. 32 and 33 (June-July, 1963), p. 642.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER 7

¹See Redouane Ainad-Tabet, "Le mouvement du 8 mai 1945 dans le Nord constantinois," unpublished thesis for the Diplôme d'études supérieures d'histoire (Faculté des Lettres et des Sciences Humaines, Université d'Alger, 1968), Chapter II; see also Robert Aron et al., Les origines de la guerre d'Algérie (Paris: Fayard, 1962), Part II, Chapter 2; and Manfred Halpern, "The Algerian Uprising of 1945," Middle East Journal (April, 1948), pp. 191-202.

²Ainad-Tabet, op. cit., p. 41.

³Ibid., pp. 43-44; Clark, op. cit., p. 34.

⁴Ainad-Tabet, op. cit., pp. 61-62.

⁵Ibid., p. 47.

⁶Liberté, June 14, 1945.

⁷L'echo d'Alger, June 30, 1945.

⁸Liberté, May 17, 1945.

⁹See article by Roger Esplaas in Liberté, June 21, 1945.

¹⁰France, Government General of Algeria, Assemblées financières algériennes, May 15, 1945.

¹¹France, Département d'Alger, Rapport au préfet, procès verbaux des délibérations du Conseil général et de la Commission départementale, November 6, 1945; Alger républicain, November 7, 1945.

¹²Liberté, November 19, 1945.

¹³Alger républicain, December 2/3, 1945.

¹⁴Gordon Wright, The Reshaping of French Democracy (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1948), p. 212.

¹⁵Paris: Les grandes éditions françaises, 1948.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 234.

¹⁷See also his Yves Châtaigneau, Fossoyeur Général de l'Algérie (Alger: Editions nationales, n.d.).

¹⁸Liberté, April 4, 1946.

¹⁹France, Government General of Algeria, A.F.A., May 15, 1945, p. 95.

²⁰Alger républicain, May 20/21, 1945.

²¹Quoted in L'echo d'Alger, May 22, 1945.

²²Ibid., June 20, 1945.

²³Ibid., June 21, 1945.

²⁴La dépêche de Paris, quoted in L'echo d'Alger,
June 23, 1945.

²⁵June 24/25, 1945.

²⁶L'echo d'Alger, June 26, 1945.

²⁷Ibid., June 30, 1945.

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Philip M. Williams, Crisis and Compromise, Politics
in the Fourth Republic (Hamden, Conn.: Archon, 1964),
Appendix V.

³⁰L'echo d'Alger, September 28, and October 3, 1945.

³¹See Claude Collot, "Une fausse réforme: L'Assemblée
financière de l'Algérie (septembre 1945 - janvier
1948)"; Revue algérienne des sciences juridiques, économiques
et politiques, March, 1968, pp. 51-126.

³²L'echo d'Alger, December 4, 1945.

³³La Dépêche algérienne, February 16, 1946.

³⁴France, Journal officiel, March 1, 1946, p. 505.

³⁵Wright, op. cit., pp. 142-150.

³⁶Ibid., p. 179.

³⁷Ibid., 1945, pp. 718-725; La dépêche algérienne,
January 11, 1946.

³⁸France, Journal officiel, Debates, 1946, pp. 561-576, 655-659.

³⁹Ibid., p. 186.

⁴⁰L'echo d'Alger, October 21, 1945; Le monde, June 6, 1946.

CHAPTER 8

FOOTNOTES

¹See views of Laquière, France, Journal officiel de l'Algérie, Débats de l'Assemblée algérienne, 1954, p. 34.

²See views of De Sérigny, ibid., p. 136; Baretaud, ibid., p. 329; Justrabo, ibid., 397; De Calan, ibid., p. 400.

³For evidence supporting their contention, see France, Rapport du groupe d'étude des relations financières entre la métropole et l'Algérie (no place or publisher given; 1955).

⁴Journal officiel de l'Algérie, Débats, 1954, p. 9ff.

⁵Ibid., pp. 14-19.

⁶L'echo d'Alger, February 16-23, 1954.

⁷Journal officiel de l'Algérie, Débats, session of March 24, 1954, pp. 167-194.

⁸L'echo d'Alger, March 13, 1954.

⁹Report of Salah Mesbah, March 31, 1954, Journal officiel de l'Algérie, Débats, p. 570.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Ibid., December 22, 1954, p. 1349.

¹²According to the Bottin administratif et documentaire (Paris: Societé Didot-Bottin, 1954), the responsibilities of the Economic and Financial Bureau included: "Agriculture, organization of banking, financial regime, budget of Algeria, development plan, water system, food supplies, import program, export program, Chamber of Commerce, industry, energy, gas and electricity, bridges, railroads, mines, housing, customs system, compensation of functionaries, pensions and retirements, war damages, public calamities, statistics and documentation."

¹³Interviews with Claude Tixier, April 15, 1970, and Roger Goetze, May 15, 1970.

¹⁴Justrabo, Journal officiel de l'Algérie, Débats, 1954, p. 46.

¹⁵Bortollotti, ibid., p. 74; Baretaud, ibid., p. 78.

¹⁶Mandon, ibid., p. 72.

¹⁷Of the 30 second-college delegates elected January 31 and February 7, 1954, 19 described themselves as independents and 6 more called themselves representatives of Franco-Muslim Union. The MTLD did not have any candidates; the UDMA elected three delegates, the MRP one, and the Radical Socialists one. In the first college, approximately

half the successful candidates were independents. Seven delegates were elected as Independent Republicans, four as Radical Socialists, one as a Socialist, one as a Communist, and one as a Union candidate. Three years earlier, 22 of 30 successful first-college candidates had run under party labels.

Half of the assembly was elected every three years. The new members elected in January-February, 1954, would not take their seats until April, after the budget had been voted. Statistics were compiled from L'echo d'Oran, January 31-February 1; La dépêche de l'Est, February 1 and 2, 1954; L'echo d'Alger, January 23 and 31, February 7 and 8, 1954; Alger républicain, February 4 and 5, 11 and 12, 1951. It is possible that the newspapers attributed party labels to candidates who were in fact running as independents.

¹⁸France, Government General of Algeria, Journal officiel de l'Algérie, 1954, pp. 140, 141, 531, 642-644.

¹⁹On scaling see Duncan MacRae, Jr., "A Method for Identifying Issues and Factions from Legislative Votes," American Political Science Review, LIX (December, 1965), pp. 909-926; Duncan MacRae, Jr., Parliament, Parties and Society in France, 1946-1958 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967), Appendix B, pp. 348-353; David M. Wood, "Majority vs. Opposition in the French National Assembly: A Guttman Scale Analysis," American Political Science Review, LXII (March, 1968), pp. 88-109.

²⁰The formula selected for scaling was Yule's Q, but the method was largely inspection, i.e. looking for zero boxes. Scale One contains three voting "mistakes," or inconsistencies; Scale Two contains none; and Scale Three, one. To verify what seemed to be obvious—that the three scales were not significantly interrelated—three pairs of Q values were calculated, and indeed, the obvious was confirmed. For roll-calls 3 and 5, Q is .24; for 4 and 6 it is .36; for 3 and 6 it is .08. MacRae required that all pairs of roll-calls on the same scale have Q values of at least .80.

²¹Interview, May 15, 1970.

²²Interview, April 15, 1970.

²³Interview, April 15, 1970.

²⁴The index may be conceived as the spatial distance separating delegates from the corner of a cube, the three dimensions of which are the three scales. That is to say that roll-calls one and two were regarded as a single vote for the purposes of the index, and votes that could be extrapolated from the scale were used along with actual votes. For instance, a delegate who voted against the rise in taxes on alcoholic beverages could be presumed to have opposed the hike in the gasoline tax as well, for no one voted "yes" on gasoline and "no" on alcohol. Where a delegate

could not be reliably placed in a single group, he was placed on the border between two of them, if this was possible from the information, and given an average of the dissidence scores assigned the two groups. For this reason, not all dissidence scores are integers.

²⁵For the 1954 variations on these themes, see La république algérienne, February and March, 1954.

²⁶Jeanne Siwek-Pouydesseau, Le corps préfectoral sous la Troisième et la Quatrième République (Paris: Arman Colin, 1969), pp. 109-124.

²⁷Ivo Rens, L'Assemblée algérienne (Paris: A. Pedone, n.d.), p. 228.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter 9

¹Key, op. cit., p. 307.

²Gremion, La structuration du pouvoir, p. 31.

³Winnacker, op. cit., pp. 261-277.

⁴For a more detailed report on voting of the Algerian deputies in the French parliament, see Robert D. Lee, "The Unintended Consequences of Fundamental Law in Colonial Algeria," paper delivered at the annual meeting of the Middle East Studies Association, Boston, Nov. 6-9, 1974.

⁵Viollette, op. cit., p. 303.

⁶A. F. A., Ordinary Session, 1927, Financial Delegations, Plenary, pp. 503-504.

⁷See Chapter 1, note 18.

⁸"It . . . becomes necessary to insure that the coopted elements do not get out of hand, do not take advantage of their formal position to encroach upon the actual arena of decision. Consequently, formal cooptation

requires informal control over the coopted elements lest the unity of command and decision be imperiled." Phillip Selznick, FVA and the Grass Roots: A Study in the Sociology of Formal Organization (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 261.

⁹A.F.A., Ordinary Session, 1934, Financial Delegations, Plenary, p. 290.

¹⁰See Agéron, Les algériens musulmans, II, 750-775. Settler deputies sought in 1918 to require by law that councillor-reporters have 10 years prior administrative experience in Algeria. Presumably this period would assure socialization into the settler mentality. Paul Cuttoli, deputy from Constantine, introduced a bill with the requirement cut to five years. It was reported out of committee, but never adopted. Interestingly enough, of six councillor-reporters named between 1923 and 1930, all would have met the 10-year rule. From France, Ministère de l'Intérieur, Association de l'administration préfectorale, Annuaire des membres, 30 Mars 1930 (Paris: Charles Lavauzelle, n.d.).

¹¹Marcel Duclos, A.F.A., Ordinary Session, 1934, Financial Delegations, Non-colons, p. 870.

¹²Viollette, op. cit., p. 49.

¹³See Samir Amin, L'Economie du Maghreb (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1966), I, 153.

¹⁴René Borderès, "Exposé--Etude sur les budgets algériens de 1900 à 1934," A.F.A., Ordinary Session, 1934, p. 8.

¹⁵See McConnell, op. cit., Chap. 4, for a discussion of the virtues associated with small, autonomous units of government in the United States.

*There are no pages numbered 327 to 329 in the revised June, 1976 manuscript.

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